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Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Ph.D.

THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY

THE BROSS PRIZE . . 1925

THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY

BY

DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH

DWIGHT PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN YALE UNIVERSITY

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To

THE MEMORY OF
MY BROTHER
DONALD HOWARD MACINTOSH

1880–1921

THE BROSS LECTURES

The Bross Lectures are an outgrowth of a fund established in 1879 by the late William Bross, lieutenant-governor of Illinois from 1866 to 1870. Desiring some memorial of his son, Nathaniel Bross, who died in 1856, Mr. Bross entered into an agreement with the "Trustees of Lake Forest University," whereby there was finally transferred to them the sum of forty thousand dollars, the income of which was to accumulate in perpetuity for successive periods of ten years, the accumulations of one decade to be spent in the following decade, for the purpose of stimulating the best books or treatises "on the connection, relation, and mutual bearing of any practical science, the history of our race, or the facts in any department of knowledge, with and upon the Christian Religion." The object of the donor was to "call out the best efforts of the highest talent and the ripest scholarship of the world to illustrate from science, or from any department of knowledge, and to demonstrate the divine origin and the authority of the Christian Scriptures; and further, to show how both science and revelation coincide and prove the existence, the providence, or any or all of the attributes of the only living and true

God, 'infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.'"

The gift contemplated in the original agreement of 1879 was finally consummated in 1890. The first decade of the accumulation of interest having closed in 1900, the trustees of the Bross Fund began at this time to carry out the provisions of the deed of gift. It was determined to give the general title of "The Bross Library" to the series of the books purchased and published with the proceeds of the Bross Fund. In accordance with the express wish of the donor, that the "Evidences of Christianity" of his "very dear friend and teacher, Mark Hopkins, D.D.," be purchased and "ever numbered and known as No. 1 of the series," the trustees secured the copyright of this work, which has been republished in a presentation edition as Volume I of the Bross Library.

The trust agreement prescribed two methods by which the production of books and treatises of the nature contemplated by the donor was to be stimulated:

1. The trustees were empowered to offer one or more prizes during each decade, the competition for which was to be thrown open to "the scientific men, the Christian philosophers and historians of all nations." In accordance with this

provision, a prize of $6,000 was offered in 1902 for the best book fulfilling the conditions of the deed of the gift, the competing manuscripts to be presented on or before June 1, 1905. The prize was awarded to the Reverend James Orr, D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology in the United Free Church College, Glasgow, for his treatise on "The Problem of the Old Testament," which was published in 1906 as Volume III of the Bross Library. The second decennial prize of $6,000 was awarded in 1915 to the Reverend Thomas James Thorburn, D.D., LL.D., Hastings, England, for his book entitled, "The Mythical Interpretation of the Gospels," which has been published as Volume VII of the Bross Library. The third decennial prize of $6,000 was awarded in 1925 to Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Ph.D., Dwight Professor of Theology, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., for his book entitled "The Reasonableness of Christianity."

2. The trustees were also empowered to "select and designate any particular scientific man or Christian philosopher and the subject on which he shall write," and to "agree with him as to the sum he shall receive for the book or treatise to be written." Under this provision the trustees have, from time to time, invited eminent scholars to deliver courses of lectures before Lake Forest College, such courses to be subsequently pub-

lished as volumes in the Bross Library. The first course of lectures, on "Obligatory Morality," was delivered in May, 1903, by the Reverend Francis Landey Patton, D.D., LL.D., President of Princeton Theological Seminary. The second course of lectures, on "The Bible: Its Origin and Nature," was delivered in May, 1904, by the Reverend Marcus Dods, D.D., Professor of Exegetical Theology in New College, Edinburgh. These lectures were published in 1905 as Volume II of the Bross Library. The third course of lectures, on "The Bible of Nature," was delivered in September and October, 1907, by Mr. J. Arthur Thomson, M.A., Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen. These lectures were published in 1908 as Volume IV of the Bross Library. The fourth course of lectures, on "The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine," was delivered in November and December, 1908, by Frederick Jones Bliss, Ph.D., of Beirut, Syria. These lectures are published as Volume V of the Bross Library. The fifth course of lectures, on "The Sources of Religious Insight," was delivered November 13 to 19, 1911, by Professor Josiah Royce, Ph.D., of Harvard University. These lectures are embodied in the sixth volume. Volume VII, "The Mythical Interpretation of the Gospels," by the Reverend Thomas James Thorburn, D.D., was published in 1915. The seventh course of

lectures, on "The Will to Freedom," was delivered in May, 1915, by the Reverend John Neville Figgis, D.D., LL.D., of the House of the Resurrection, Mirfield, England, and published as Volume VIII of the series. In 1916 Professor Henry Wilkes Wright, of Lake Forest College, delivered the next course of lectures, on "Faith Justified by Progress." These lectures are embodied in Volume IX. In 1921, the Reverend John P. Peters, Ph.D., of Sewanee, Tennessee, delivered a course of lectures on "Bible and Spade." These lectures are embodied in Volume X. In November, 1921, the lectures on "Christianity and Problems of To-day," which constitute Volume XI of the Bross Lectures, were delivered upon the occasion of the inauguration of the President. In the spring of 1923 M. Bross Thomas, D.D., Professor Emeritus of Biblical Literature of Lake Forest College, delivered a course of lectures on "The Biblical Idea of God." These lectures were published as Volume XII. The present volume is Volume XIII, entitled "The Reasonableness of Christianity," by Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Ph.D., Dwight Professor of Theology, Yale Graduate School, Yale University.

HERBERT MCCOMB MOORE.
President of Lake Forest University.

LAKE FOREST, Illinois.

FOREWORD

The main argument of this book, contained in chapters III to VIII, took shape in the summer of 1920, in conversations with my brother, to whose memory the volume is dedicated. As originally planned the book contained the material now found in the first ten chapters. For the Nathaniel W. Taylor Lectures, delivered at Yale University in April, 1925, a selection from this material was made as follows: First lecture, "Apologetics Old and New," from Chapters I and III; second lecture, "Freedom, Immortality, and God," chapters IV to VI; third lecture, "Providence," Chapter VII; fourth lecture, "Revelation," from Chapters VIII, IX, and X.

When, after the composition of these chapters, it was decided to submit the book in competition for the Bross Prize, the last three chapters were added. Non-philosophical readers will find a complete argument in the first ten chapters, and may safely enough ignore the remainder of the book, particularly the eleventh chapter.

Many of the positions taken in the present vol-

ume will be found, stated more or less differently and in some instances elaborated more fully, in my previous works, *The Problem of Knowledge* and *Theology as an Empirical Science.*

D. C. M.

New Haven, Conn.
September, 1925.

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THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY

CHAPTER I

APOLOGETICS OLD AND NEW

Great changes have taken place in belief during the course of Christian history, but the changes which have taken place in the reasons given by Christians for their beliefs have been greater still. Religion has changed less than theology, and constructive theology less than apologetics. This is because the grounds of religion in human nature lie deeper than thought and much deeper than argument. But man is not only religious; he is also thoughtful at times, and on occasion he can be argumentative. There must always be, therefore, a place in religion both for belief—theory, doctrine, theology, call it what you will—and, if self-respect is to be retained, for the reasoned statement and defense of that belief. If the religious man is to remain religious and thoughtful in the face of opposition and criticism he must be able to give a reason for the faith and hope that are in him; there must always be a place in religion for apologetics as religion's reasoned

self-defense. However, as has been suggested, the recent history of Christian apologetics shows an almost complete reversal of method from what was the common procedure throughout the centuries.

It is not to be denied that the older apologetics contained much that was of lasting value. It was its special merit that it aimed to be objectively valid and not simply subjectively satisfying; it sought to advance reasons for the faith to which the unprejudiced and reasonable outsider would have to yield his assent, whereas in more recent apologetic attempts any such objectivity and universality of appeal have too often been lacking. Nevertheless it is becoming more and more evident to thoughtful Christian people that the arguments upon which the older apologists placed chief reliance have lost for the modern mind their convincing power. This is due in the main to two things. In the first place the older apologists understood their task to be to defend an entire body of traditional teaching as true. In the second place, they gave a fundamental place to stories of miracle, not only as something to be accepted and defended, but more particularly as the principal means by which the remainder of traditional Christianity was to be proved divine and true. It is because of these two circumstances that modern-minded people are not convinced by the tradi-

tional defense of Christianity and no longer take any interest in its arguments.

The tragedy of any attempt to defend a whole body of traditional teaching is that the battles are inevitably fought out at precisely those points where traditionalism is weakest and where successful defense is sure to prove impossible. He who stakes all upon the defense of the indefensible is courting disaster. Failure, as might have been anticipated, has been the fate of both the Catholic and the older Protestant apologetics. With Catholics the traditional content was the whole official teaching of the church, including the church's interpretation of the Bible. With Protestants what was to be defended was, in theory at least, the entire content of the Old and New Testaments, no more and no less. The scientific accuracy of the Genesis story of creation, the universality of the flood, the literal standing still of the sun at the command of Joshua, the bears destroying the lives of forty children as a punishment for mocking at a prophet's bald head, the imprecatory psalms, the command of God to slaughter all prisoners of war, including women and children, and to stone to death a son for disobedience and an old man for gathering sticks on the Sabbath—these are a few samples of the issues over which the older Protestantism felt obliged to fight out the defense of the Christian faith. "The Bible is God's Word.

If you reject a single verse of Scripture, you treat God as a liar, and you might as well throw the whole book away." This is what was actually said, many a time no doubt, to young people who were beginning to think for themselves on religious questions. Historic Christianity was not regarded as a fountain from which each might drink according to his needs, but rather as if it were a reservoir which must be preserved from the slightest puncture lest all its contents should leak away.

Moreover, in appealing to miracle-stories as evidence of the truth of Christianity, the older apologetic has never been able to get quite away from the fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Protestants readily detect this fallacy in the Catholic apologetic. The Roman Church is the true church, it is maintained, and its doctrines ought to be accepted as true, because Christ declared, according to the Bible, that the "gates of hell"—heresy, for example—should never prevail against the church founded upon the Apostle Peter, by which, it is assumed, was meant the Roman Church. And when it is asked why we ought to believe that this is what the Bible really teaches, and that what the Bible teaches is true, we are met with the statement that the infallible church has decided that this is what the Bible teaches and that what the church says the Bible teaches is infallibly true. This process of making the infallibility of the

Bible depend upon the infallibility of the church, and the infallibility of the church upon the infallibility of the Bible, instead of finding some sure independent support for one or the other, must lead eventually, in minds that think logically, to the collapse of this particular type of traditionalistic faith. As well might one expect a superstructure to be the basis of its own foundation. An identical criticism might be made against the argument that the Catholic Church is shown to be the true and authoritative church by the genuineness of certain ecclesiastical miracles, and that this genuineness is certified by the infallible church. The fallaciousness of such circular reasoning in Catholic apologetics the old-school Protestant theologian has clearly seen; but he has been curiously blind to the fact that there is implicit in his own apologetic a similar fallacious circle. He may—and generally does—avoid an explicit statement of the fallacy; but there is no getting away from the fact that the real reason why he accepts the Biblical miracles as historical and as due to divine intervention is that he finds the account of them in the Bible. So then, when in his apologetic he appeals to these same miracle-stories as accrediting the divine inspiration and infallibility of the Bible, he too is virtually reasoning in a circle. It is no more logical for the Protestant to believe the Bible because of the Biblical miracles and the Biblical

miracles because of the Bible than it is for the Catholic to believe the church because of the Bible and the Bible because of the church, or the church because of ecclesiastical miracles and ecclesiastical miracles because of the church.

Moreover, with the progress of science the intellectual climate has greatly changed, and it is by no means easy for miracle-faith to maintain itself in a world which is becoming accustomed to the scientific method. The difficulty is twofold. It is difficult, if one is to give due weight to every critical suggestion of the scientific historian, to prove that the events took place just as recorded in the miracle-stories; and it is still more difficult to prove that what did happen could have taken place only through a special supernatural intervention, and not through law-abiding though as yet not fully understood natural processes. It may not be easy for science to *disprove* absolutely the historicity of a given miracle-story, or that there has been a supernatural encroachment upon the natural order, but that is not quite the point. If Christian apologetics is to produce an adequate certainty with reference to the main doctrines of Christianity on the basis of an appeal to stories of miracle, it must first gain an adequate certainty as to the reality and supernatural causation of the miracles themselves. And it is just this burden of proof with respect to miracles which has become in

our day a burden too heavy to bear. The undertaking is one in which success is impossible, and the modern Christian is finding this out. The result is that a rapidly increasing number of thoughtful Christians are giving up all appeal to stories of miracle in support of their faith. Some of them still believe in miracles as divine interventions, but they claim to believe in the miracles because of the unique value of Christ and Christianity; no longer do they claim that Christ and Christianity are to be believed in because of the miracles. Others there are who have come to discredit altogether the historicity of any *bona fide* miracle, and who would say that they believe in Christ and Christianity not because of any tale of supernatural intervention, but in spite of all mythical and legendary accretions which may have grown up like moss and ivy over the walls of Christian history.

This abandonment of the attempt to prove Christianity true by citing stories of miracle has been accompanied, or preceded, by another equally important change in the mode of defending the faith. In criticizing the older apologetics, it will be remembered, we mentioned not only its fundamental dependence upon miracle-stories as an argument, but also its assumption that an entire traditional content, ecclesiastical or Biblical, must be preserved intact and defended as true. A

distinction is now commonly made between what is called the essence of Christianity and that entire traditional content in which this essence is to be found, along with much besides which is characterized as non-essential. The two distinctive characteristics of the modern argument for Christianity, then, are the choice of the essence of Christianity in place of an entire traditional content and the defense of this essence without recourse to stories of miracle, and between the two the connection is commonly close.

It goes without saying that those who reject the miraculous outright are thereby committed to the defense of no more than a part of the Christian tradition, and to the employment of some other argument than the traditional appeal to miracle. But even among those who do not reject miracle-faith there are many who have come to see the necessity of making a distinction between the essence of Christianity and non-essential elements in the Christian tradition. "The old that ages he must let go who would hold fast the old that ages not," and there are elements in our Christian tradition which have aged more perceptibly even than the miracle-stories.

One of the pioneers of modern Christian apologetics in pointing out the desirability of confining the defense of Christianity to its essence was the English philosopher John Locke. In his *Reason-*

ableness of Christianity he observes that it is sufficient for the vindication of the Christian faith to defend as reasonable that which serves to mark one off as a Christian. This he claims to find in the belief that Jesus was the Messiah, a belief which was sufficient in New Testament times to distinguish the Christian from the Jew and the pagan. Taking this belief, then, as the essence of Christianity, Locke proceeds to argue for its truth by appealing to what he regards as miraculous predictions in the Old Testament and the record in the New Testament of miraculous deeds of Jesus performed to substantiate his Messianic claims. Now it is easily seen that Locke is still on the soil of the older apologetics, at least in so far as his positive argument is concerned. And it may be pointed out further that what he selects as the essence of Christianity, namely, belief in Jesus as the Messiah, is not enough, particularly in modern times, to serve as the essential mark of Christianity. It meant something for a Jew of the first century, as it means something for Jews still, to accept Jesus as the Messiah; but there are multitudes who have always been taught that Jesus was the Christ, or Messiah, and who have never disputed the doctrine, for whom the belief has absolutely no practical significance at all. For them at least it cannot be the essence of Christianity, if Christianity is to mean anything to them.

Moreover, as every careful and honest student of the subject knows, there are strong reasons for doubting whether Jesus really was in all respects the kind of Messiah that the prophets had in mind in their predictions of a heaven-sent leader who should usher in a new golden age. But, in spite of all this, Locke is a forerunner of modern apologetics; he insists that it is first necessary to select from the great mass of traditional Christian belief and practice what is sufficient to make the one in whom it is found a Christian, and that then it is enough that one's arguments be directed toward the defense of that, and that only, as reasonable and true.

Granted, then, that the modern Christian apologist must select the essence of historic Christianity and defend it as true without depending upon the appeal to miracle, two questions of method naturally emerge: How is one to distinguish the essence of Christianity from the non-essential elements in Christian tradition? And how is one to defend this essence of Christianity as true?

There have been two main types of answer to these questions in recent religious thought. The philosopher Hegel and his followers may be taken as representatives of the one answer, and the theologian Ritschl and his followers of the other. Roughly speaking, the distinction between the two groups is this: the Hegelians have taken reason-

ableness, rationality, as the criterion of the essence of Christianity and have sought to defend this essence as true by exhibiting its reasonableness, whereas the Ritschlians have taken religious value as the criterion of the essence of Christianity and have sought to defend this essence as true by exhibiting its religious value.

Neither course has been wholly satisfactory. The Hegelian philosopher naturally assumes that his own speculative system is the true norm of reasonableness, and when he undertakes to select the reasonable element in traditional Christianity as its true essence, what he really does is to select that, and that alone, which he can interpret as agreeing with his own speculative doctrines. But there is no guarantee here that what is thus selected belongs to the true essence of Christianity, except on the very questionable assumption that Hegel's speculative idealism is itself perfectly true. Moreover, even if the Hegelian doctrines were all true and known to be true, there would be no assurance that by the Hegelian method the whole vital essence of Christianity would be selected. It is conceivable that there may be much in Christianity that is true and of vital importance which those who use this method overlook, for the simple reason that it cannot be proved by their philosophy. But the Hegelian does seem to be on strong ground when, turning from the selection of

the essence of Christianity to a defense of its truth, he takes reasonableness as the criterion of truth. What he thinks is reasonable may not turn out to be really so, but there can be no doubt that what is genuinely reasonable is presumably true.

On the other hand, is it not probable that the Ritschlian has made an important contribution to Christian apologetics in taking religious value as the criterion of the essence of Christianity? That in historic Christianity which human experience shows to have permanent positive value for the life of man must surely belong to the essence of Christianity. It is essential that it be retained, if that is honestly possible; and what it is essential to retain is just the essence. Or, more completely, what is unrefuted in the light of science and critical reflection and at the same time necessary for purposes which it is our duty to entertain is the essence of Christianity. Other traditional elements may be regarded as non-essential either for the reason that they have no great significance or positive value for such purposes as ought to be considered, or because science and critical reflection show that they have no good claim to be true.

This doctrine of essence which we find implicit in the Ritschlian procedure may well be expounded at greater length. The essence of any such historic reality as Christianity is that in it which is essential, and it is equally obvious that what is essential must be

essential for some purpose or purposes. What seems essential to any individual is what appears necessary for the realization of his purposes; and what is really essential, generally considered, is what can be shown to be necessary for realizing purposes which have general validity, the purposes which ought to be entertained. As the essence of certain material substances is that in them which it has been found essential to extract and preserve for certain common human purposes, so the essence of any historic religion is that within it which it is essential to retain for truly valid human purposes, provided always that it can be retained when everything has been given up which for good and sufficient reasons must be given up. With this proviso the essence of anything is the highest common factor, the greatest common measure of the ideal and the actual. The essence of Christianity is that in actual historical traditional Christianity which it is essential to retain if the universally valid ideal for humanity is to be realized as soon as possible—provided, of course, that it can be retained after all that must be gotten rid of (superstition, for instance) has been eliminated.

This method of defining essence by simply stating what the term means in practical life has certain marked advantages over other ways of approaching the problem. It does not concern itself with that hidden "real essence" of Locke's definition, viz., "the real internal constitution of things whereon their discoverable qualities depend" (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book III, Chap. III, Par. 15). Any such essence is, as Locke himself admits, generally unknown if not unknowable. Neither does

our method take the opposite extreme of trying to satisfy our minds with a merely "nominal essence," that is, any abstract idea which the name may conveniently stand for. The supposed inner "real essence" is too inaccessible for our purposes; the "nominal essence," on the other hand, is too accessible, that is, too arbitrary and subjective; it is without any adequate general criterion. While Locke's "real essence" is universally valid but not discoverable, his "nominal essence" is discoverable but not universally valid; but the essence as we have defined it is at once as discoverable as human value, and as universally valid as the spiritual ideal.

Once more, this broadly practical and humanistic conception of essence as applied to historic Christianity differs widely from two mutually opposed theoretical definitions, each of which may be admitted to be valid enough from its own narrowly specialized intellectual interest, namely, that of the comparative student of religion on the one hand, and that of the historian of Christianity on the other. Of these two, the one represents the scientific interest in classification; the other, the chronicler's interest in a detailed descriptive statement of all the interesting facts. From the former point of view, the essence of Christianity is sufficiently found in that which is peculiar to it alone among all the religions of the world; for classification this is all that is essential. From the latter point of view, whatever has a place anywhere in historic Christianity is theoretically a part of the essence, even if it contradicts some other part of the essence; no part of the historic reality can be lightly dismissed as not essential for the historian. But, obviously enough, neither of these

concepts of essence is adequate from the point of view of the present-day practical religious interest. No more is either concept satisfactory for a critical philosophy of religion, interested as it is in the evaluation of religion and Christianity at their best, or, in other words, in the evaluation of such a content of historic Christianity as will conserve, as fully as can be done in a unitary and self-consistent system, all that is valuable and vital in that religion. The comparative religionist's definition would be likely to prove inadequate, for there are, presumably, important and valuable elements in Christianity which are neither common to all religions nor peculiar to itself alone. And the chronicler's or church historian's concept of what is essential in historical Christianity would necessarily include much that could not consistently find place in the religion of any one modern individual who might wish to know, first, what the essence of Christianity is, and, second, that this essential Christianity is true.

Ritschlianism, then, seems to have made an important contribution to the understanding of just what ought to be meant by the essence of Christianity. But when the Ritschlian turns from the selection of the essence of Christianity to a defense of its truth, his position becomes singularly inadequate. Distrusting philosophy and the appeal to reason, his argument is in effect this: that the spiritually valuable element in Christianity is true, not because it is reasonable, but just because it is valuable. Thus he lays himself open to the charge

so frequently made against his system, that it is too subjective. It may be sufficient, or at least tolerable, for the insider, the person who is already in the enjoyment of the Christian faith and experience, to be assured that the experienced value of his religion is the index to its truth; but such considerations generally fail to convince the outsider, or any one, indeed, whose confidence in the essential truth of Christianity has been shaken. In this one respect, then, namely, its admitted subjectivity, the Ritschlian apologetic is inferior to other systems, traditional or modern, which seek in their own way to commend the Christian faith as reasonable, non-Christians themselves being the judges.

Thus it would appear that, broadly speaking, Ritschlianism is right in saying, "The essence of Christianity is to be looked for in the spiritually valuable content of historical Christianity," while Hegelianism is right in principle when it says, "The reasonable is presumably true." But from these two premises we can draw no conclusion. Before we can have a complete apologetic argument we must supply the missing link between these two propositions. That missing link is the proposition: The spiritually valuable content of historic Christianity is reasonable. If we could say the essence of Christianity is the spiritually valuable in historic Christianity, the spiritually

valuable is reasonable, and the reasonable is presumably true, we could conclude logically, the essence of Christianity is presumably true. This means, then, that the main question before the Christian apologist to-day is whether the spiritually valuable content of historic Christianity is reasonable. Will it stand the test of rational reflection in the light of the facts of experience?

We have been making use of the common term "reasonable" without defining it, but before going further we must indicate the sense in which it can have application to a religious faith. It is reasonable to prove by the strictest logic, as in mathematics, what can be proved in that way. But much of life is lived on the basis of principles and faiths which we cannot prove reasonable or true in the way in which we should go about proving that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles. Assuming that when a faith leads us to employ reasoning processes these processes ought to be strictly logical, we would go deeper into the nature of what is called "reasonable" in practical life, and see with William James that any appreciation or unrefuted belief is likely to appear reasonable to us if it accords with our active tendencies. That idea which is theoretically permissible in the light of all we know, and which seems at the same time practically neces-

sary for the realization of our purposes, is likely to appeal to us as "reasonable" and probably true. At any rate, we are more than likely to take it up as a guide to action—a "working hypothesis," to use the scientists' term—which we can test further by thus acting upon it. But just here it is of the utmost importance, if reasonableness is to be maintained, that we should have the intellectual integrity to pay due regard to the evidence of experience, even when it tends to discredit our original active faith. There is a vast difference between wilful believing, supported by false rationalization, and a reasonable will to believe. It is one thing to believe what we want to believe in defiance of the facts; it is quite another thing to act deliberately on a working hypothesis which may not have been proven as yet, but which is permitted by such facts as are accessible, and which for good and sufficient practical reasons makes a strong emotional appeal. But in the meantime, while we are waiting for refutation or verification in experience, there are other tests which we should do well to apply to such hypotheses as appeal to our active tendencies, if we want to make sure of the entire reasonableness of our faith. These tests may be put in the form of questions. The first is this: Is the active tendency with which the belief in question harmonizes based upon normal instincts and

healthful habits, and does acting upon the belief continue to foster normal and wholesome living? The second question is like unto the first, but goes beyond it: Is the active tendency which prompts the faith justified, judged by those universal spiritual standards which we have in ideal truth and beauty and goodness and in ideal holiness and love? A third question is closely related to the second, but it is well to put it explicitly: Is there a logical harmony between the belief in question and our other critically approved beliefs, and is there a working harmony between the active tendencies and purposes fundamental to this belief and the tendencies and purposes fundamental to other approved beliefs? This last is important, for the interest in rationality turns out, upon examination, to be in considerable measure an interest in inner harmony. In short, then, while a theoretically permissible belief seems reasonable when it accords with whatever our active tendencies may happen to be, a theoretically permissible belief rightly seems reasonable, and so *is* reasonable, if it is necessarily bound up with our active tendencies when they are what they ought to be. In our faith as in our philosophy we are to synthesize and systematize with the pertinent facts our appreciations of value; only let us be sure that we have real facts and that our values are true values.

This explanation of our use of the term "reasonable" should make it clear that what we aim to do cannot be dismissed as if it were what the newer psychologists term "rationalization." What they refer to would better be called a false rationalization; it is the substitution, for the real cause and motive of a belief or attitude, of some artificial but more acceptable reason. The idea prevails in certain quarters that any attempt to vindicate the reasonableness of Christianity is necessarily involved in this illegitimate rationalization. This is indicated by the following sentence from Tansley's *New Psychology* (p. 185): "The rationalization of religious beliefs that are to all appearance constituted by experience of life constitutes a regular system which we call Christian apologetics."

Now it must be admitted that there is a real danger indicated here, which it is exceedingly important to recognize and avoid. To accomplish this two things are necessary. In the first place, we must be careful to select as the real essence of Christianity to be defended only that content which can be honestly defended as reasonable and true when due regard is paid to logic and scientific fact. More definitely, our task of selecting the spiritually valuable content of Christianity as its essence is not completed until we have submitted any such supposed essence to the test of reasonableness and truth. And if this should seem to be a return to the already criticised Hegelian way of determining the essence of Christianity, the reply is that to this extent Hegel was on the right track, although he failed for two reasons: in the first place, he did not sufficiently recognize other than "rational," that is, intellectual or theoretical,

criteria of value, so that much of what is positively valuable and vital in historic Christianity was not included in his statement of its essence; and secondly, he read back into the supposedly rational essence of Christianity the main features of his own rationalistic idealism, thereby, in the opinion of many of us, corrupting the content of Christianity at the same time that he made it easy to argue for its reasonableness from his own peculiar point of view. These things being so, it is evident that the Hegelian apologetic for Christianity is itself a good example of objectionable "rationalization." It produces a highly artificial and questionable philosophical doctrine as the "reason" or implicit ground of Christian belief, whereas its primary psychological basis is to be found in the needs and satisfactions of religious experience itself.

The second thing which we must be careful to do in order to avoid any false rationalization in our argument for Christianity is to discover and state frankly these primary motives and causes of the Christian belief and attitude. Not only must the extent to which Christian faith is an effect and expression of practical need and religious feeling be fully recognized; the foundations of religion in the feeling-willing nature of man must be evaluated as well as recognized, and, if they are found valid, they must be made a part of the theoretical argument for Christianity. But this, it will be interjected, is just what the Ritschlians do in their argument, to which objection has already been made, when they assume that in the spiritually valuable character of essential Christianity there is evidence of its truth. Now we would be the first to admit, as indeed we have vir-

tually done already, that in so far as this is what Ritschlianism means, there is value in its argument for the truth of Christianity; but it would surely be an incomplete defense of the truth of Christianity to say that its spiritually valuable content is true just because it is spiritually valuable. The general principle of such a procedure would be that loose and slippery pragmatism—or pseudo-pragmatism—of much popular religious thinking which would say that whatever works well or is useful in the way of belief is true, or even that truth means nothing but the working of an idea, for the time being, "in the way in which it sets out to work." Our objection is not to pragmatism in so far as it coincides with the scientific method of acting upon working hypotheses and measuring their truth by the extent to which they work, provided that due notice is taken of the difference between the various kinds and degrees of working which fall short of verification and, on the other hand, the working which amounts to verification. For example, when acting upon the hypothesis leads one into experiences in which what is supposed in the original hypothesis becomes a fact of first-hand experience, this is working which amounts to verification. Neither is what we object to a critical philosophy of values combined with a tendency to regard as reasonable and true those beliefs about reality which logically follow from the validity of such values as have been subjected to thorough philosophical criticism and have stood the test. That there is a contribution to be made by a philosophy of values to a theory of reality has already been intimated, and just how we should make use of this in our procedure will be made plain in the

sequel. What we would insist upon in the present connection is that while Ritschlianism and religious pragmatism may be said to start out on the right track, even in their argument for the truth of Christianity, they are to be condemned for two reasons. In the first place, the Ritschlians are particularly to be criticised for their refusal either to test or to supplement their religious doctrine as they might by making it a part of such a sane and moderate metaphysical theory as would result from a systematic combination of the general results of the scientific study of facts and the critical examination of values. In the second place, one must condemn that particular brand of religious pragmatism which would come to the help of Ritschlianism and defend the inconclusive argument that essential Christianity is true because it is practically valuable, by corrupting the concept of truth and making it mean nothing but practical value itself. Whatever else may be true of truth, it is representation of reality, and to try to make an insufficient argument appear sufficient by taking such altogether unwarranted liberties with the concept of truth is only another illustration of that false "rationalization" to which we have referred.

The sense in which we would admit a reasonable "will to believe" should now be clear. It is easy to criticise James's phrase, especially when it is interpreted as meaning the right of the individual to believe anything he may choose to believe for any practical purpose he may have in mind. But this is not James's doctrine. What is contended is that when an individual is confronted by a situation in which he cannot know with certainty which of two

contradictory suggestions is true, although of course one must be, and only one can be, true; when, furthermore, the suggestion which accords best with his highest and best impulses and with the moral will appeals to him as believable enough for it to be possible for him to act upon it as a working hypothesis; and when, finally, under the circumstances he must act as if this suggestion were true or else as if it were false, he has the moral right to act as if the suggestion were true. So stated, the doctrine of the will to believe, or, as James later said he might better have called it, "the right to believe," is seen to be not only unobjectionable but positively reasonable and highly significant.

That there is always more or less danger of committing ourselves to what is not, but only seems to be, spiritualiy valuable or essential in Christianity, and then going on to support our favorite doctrines by means of false and artificial "reasons," we should be the last to deny. To guard against this false "rationalization" we shall employ the following procedure. First of all we shall ask what fundamental attitudes and beliefs, uncontradicted by known fact, are so bound up with critically examined values that they must be regarded as essential to religion at its best, whether that religion should turn out to be Christian or not. We shall then raise the question as to whether this universal essence of valid religion is or is not also Christian. Then, in the

event of an affirmative answer, in order to make sure of including the whole vital essence of Christianity, we shall ask what additional content of historic Christianity seems essential, either because of its value in facilitating the realization of the true ideal of humanity or for any other reason, and we shall finally inquire whether this further content is reasonable and therefore presumably true.

CHAPTER II

CHRISTIAN MORALITY

Essential Christianity, we have seen, must be reasonable and at the same time vital enough to persist after any irrational traditional growths have been pruned away. But the spiritual ideal includes morality as well as rationality. It is not enough to say that anything in religion which conflicts with sound morality is unessential. It is not only not essential that we retain it; it is essential that we get rid of it. Full recognition of the moral ideal is unconditionally imperative. Other things being equal, the more moral a religion is, the more essential it is. Whatever in historic Christianity is at once moral, vital, and reasonable must be regarded as a part of its essence. It is at least essential that it be retained in order that the universal ideal of humanity may be realized as soon and as fully as possible.

But the moral evaluation of a religion presupposes an answer to the question, What is true or valid morality? And inasmuch as Christianity is a morality as well as a moral religion, logically our next step will be to inquire into the nature of reasonable morality, that we may know whether a reasonable morality is Christian and

an essentially Christian morality reasonable and true.

In the first place, no morality can be regarded as fundamentally reasonable unless it is essentially free. It must be open-minded, liberal, unfettered by arbitrary authority, providing for the freedom of the moral consciousness in its judgments as to right and wrong. Man is distinguished from the lower animals by nothing, perhaps, so much as by his practical idealism. That is, he can set up a definite idea of something more satisfactory than anything he has yet experienced, and he can persistently direct his efforts toward the realizing of this ideal end. Now if this process of setting up and realizing ideals is to be done reasonably and as it ought to be done, the end set up as the goal of endeavor must be a good end, and the means employed to realize it must be the right means. In short, right conduct is using the best available means to reach a thoroughly good end. Clearly, then, it is fundamental to the development of the moral consciousness that the individual should come to be able to recognize for himself what ends are good and what means are best for the achieving of good ends. And it ought to be quite as evident that if this power of moral judgment is to be developed, the individual must be allowed freedom to use his own judgment in appreciating ends as good and observing what means are most

effective in working toward good ends. Any reasonable morality will provide for this freedom for the exercise and further development of the moral consciousness—freedom from the cramping and crippling restrictions of arbitrary external authority. Moreover, no system of morals, however reasonable its requirements in themselves, can be known to be reasonable save as there is freedom for its critical examination in comparison with other systems.

Since, then, reasonable morality is free from any authority of the ultimately external and arbitrary type, essential Christianity, being reasonable, can include no morality which is not similarly free. It must be admitted that not all morality that has borne the name "Christian" has been thus inwardly free. There has been much rigid legalism in historic Christianity. Oftentimes the enactments of the church, or the letter of Scripture, or the traditional words of Jesus have been set up as the final authority, by no means subject to review or revision before the bar of the individual conscience. But this legalistic form is by no means essential to the vital content of Christian morality. Indeed, we have excellent historical evidence to show that the distinctively Christian morality was characterized at the beginning by an attitude of revolt against the legalism of the Jewish Scribes and Pharisees.

Paul constantly exhorted his converts to stand fast in their new-found Christian liberty and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage. Jesus also, according to the Synoptic tradition, in dealing with such practical matters as the Sabbath, fasting, tithing, ceremonial washings, the question of divorce, and the treatment of enemies, protested against the traditional legalism in the name of free moral judgment and action. We are not contending that all Christian morality has been sufficiently free, nor that all free morality is necessarily Christian. What we are concerned to say just here is that, while any thoroughly reasonable morality must be inwardly free, this is very far from excluding Christian morality from reasonableness. Whether the appeal be to history or to contemporary experience, it has not been shown that an essentially Christian morality cannot be perfectly free nor that a free morality cannot be thoroughly Christian.

But it is not enough that the moral consciousness be left free to come to its own conclusions. Reasonable morality is necessarily liberal, but not all liberal morality is reasonable. If the moral consciousness is to be in accord with right reason, it must be teachable. It must be ready to learn from experience. In other words, if a system of morals is to be rational, it must be empirical. It must not mistake license for liberty; it must not

be satisfied with mere wilful self-assertion. It must learn to judge what is right and what is wrong in conduct in the light of experience—the experience of consequences. Since right conduct is using the best available means to reach a thoroughly good end, and since, consequently, it is important to know what ends are good and what are the best means of attaining to such ends, the appeal to experience is necessary to the knowing and doing of what is right.

Experience enables us to appreciate the value of different states as ends. Many states and conditions of life are easily and directly appreciated by normal human beings as good, desirable; thus bodily comfort viewed as an end is readily appreciated as better, more desirable, than bodily pain. But what would be desirable enough by itself is sometimes found to be linked up with what is highly undesirable, and what would be undesirable by itself is often a means to what is good and very desirable. Hence if we are to be wise in our aims, we must often criticise and revise our first instinctive feelings and judgments about the ends we set before us. When lesser goods conflict with the greater good, the former must be cancelled and the latter kept steadily in view as the goal of our conduct. We must learn to turn from pleasures that lead to evil, and we must often "take pains"—literally—to reach

what, when we are sufficiently farseeing and critical, we can regard as genuinely and permanently good.

But conduct, to be right, must not only set before itself the highest ends; it must also choose the best available means to realize ends that are good, and here again the most reasonable course is to learn from experience—the experience of others as well as our own. What the best available means are for attaining to any given end has to be learned by the empirical method of common sense and science, that is, through observation and experiment. Even when correct information is received from another as to right conduct, it must have been derived from experience originally, and if the person taught is to know with certainty that it is right, he must judge it for himself in the light of consequences experienced in himself or observed in others. Instruments and methods are to be judged by the consequences of employing them. This is in accord with common sense and science.

This appeal to consequences does not exclude a high moral idealism, as we shall see; but the highest and loftiest idealism, if it is to be intelligent and successful in realizing its ideals, must look to its method, that is, to relations of cause and effect, to consequences. Virtue is its own highest reward, no doubt; but—apart from the element

of conscientiousness, which is always necessary for moral action—how is one to tell what actions and qualities of life are to be encouraged as virtues, if no appeal is made to the value of ends or the efficacy of means? And as for conscientiousness, in itself it simply means the steady intention to keep on realizing ends ultimately appreciated as good, even when they may run counter to natural inclination. This being so, there is no guarantee that conscientiousness in any particular instance will lead to right action, for the reason that it may be and often is accompanied by depreciation of some of the highest ends and ignorance as to the most effective means. Conscientiousness is indispensable, but it is not sufficient. Conscience requires education, and there can be little education apart from experience.

At bottom Christian morality is essentially empirical; it judges conduct in the light of consequences. To be sure, in the classic documents of Christianity, the appeal to consequences is not commonly made in the scientific terms of cause and effect, but rather in the more popular and easily understood terms of reward or punishment, but the essential meaning is the same. The Christian is to prove all things and hold fast that which is good; science and common sense can do no more. It may be that the consequences to which appeal is made strike us as belonging too

much to a future state of existence, but in so far as this may be true, it is to be interpreted as a feature of the non-essential elements in historic Christianity. It is not of the essence of the Christian morality; it belongs to the Jewish husk, not to the essential Christian kernel. Still, the appeal to consequences in a future life as a motive —if there should appear good and sufficient reasons for believing in a future life—cannot be dismissed as wrong or unreasonable, especially if due regard be paid to the more significant kinds of consequence. However, the Christian appraisal of conduct, it should not be forgotten, takes account of the life that now is; by their fruits it would know principles and methods as well as persons. Essential Christian morality, then, is empirical; and since a morality which is empirical is to that extent reasonable, we may conclude that an essential Christian morality has this further title to be considered reasonable.

But while morality, to be reasonable, must be free to judge conduct in the light of its consequences and must do so, and while essential Christianity is able to meet this test of its moral system, it must be very obvious that freedom of judgment and the appeal to results are not sufficient to guarantee a true moral judgment. All reasonable morality must be, first and last, free and empirical; but not all free, empirical morality

succeeds in being fully reasonable, right, and Christian. It is not enough to point out that morality cannot afford to be liberal, breaking with tradition and legalism, unless it is at the same time empirical, scientific, judging conduct by consequences. It is perhaps even more important to add that in our moral judgments we cannot afford to be guided by consequences unless there is a proper estimate of the higher values among those consequences. In other words, the spiritual results of action must be duly considered and appreciated. To be fully reasonable, a moral system must be adequately spiritual in its choice of ends as well as scientific in its selection of means.

The word "spiritual" as used here may require some explanation. But, to begin with, it may be said that there is no more important element in spirituality than admirable moral character itself. Conduct tends to repeat itself and form character, and this character thereafter tends to express itself consistently in conduct. That character is good which tends, when supplied with information as to the relation of means to ends, to express itself in right conduct. Good character is good will, that is, the will so firmly committed to good ends that it will use the right means to realize those ends when, as we have said, information as to the right means is available. And it is very important to note that the

ideal of forming a good character comes to be itself a worthy end of action. As means to further good the value of good character is incalculably great; and as an end in itself it is second to none with which it can be compared.

But a further definition of what is to be understood by the term "spiritual" is necessary. Right conduct, it is soon seen, must take account of a graded series of values, for we cannot say that everything that is good under some circumstances can be made the end of action all the time. We have to choose between different relative goods; we cannot have them all. Some values are even to be regarded as mere means, never as ultimate ends. Such, for example, is material wealth, which the miser mistakenly treats as an end in itself. The same thing is largely true of certain values of political organization and of physical health. These are the material values. But there are other values that are not only instrumental to something else, but also ultimate values or ends in themselves, eternally valid as ideals for every personal spirit. Such are insight into the truth, ideal beauty, ideal love and friendship, and, as we have seen, moral goodness itself. In this list, if we may anticipate the results of our present inquiry into the reasonableness of religion at its best, the value of fellowship with God ought to be included. These ideal values, intellectual,

æsthetic, ethical, social, and religious, are what we would include under the term "spiritual." What we mean, then, when we say that if a morality is to be reasonable it must be spiritual is just this, that it must be characterized by an adequate appreciation of the relative value of the material and the spiritual. To be reasonable we must not only see that spiritual values are fitted to be made the end of life, and material values never more than mere means; if we are really reasonable we will act upon this insight.

It is easy to show the spiritual character of essential Christian morality. In the original documents of our faith materialistic ideals and covetousness are constantly condemned. Intellectual and æsthetic values, while not always strongly stressed, are by no means ignored: "whatsoever things are true" and "whatsoever things are lovely" are recognized objects of attention and action. But when we come to examine the social, religious, and ethical content of Christianity, we find that these characteristic ingredients of our best ideal of reasonable spirituality are in very considerable part the contribution of historic Christianity itself. Love to God and man and faithful devotion to the moral ideal are at the very core of Christian spirituality.

We have seen that morality must be free, that this free morality must be empirical, and that

this free empirical morality must be spiritual, if its claim to reasonableness is to be admitted. We have now to add that any moral system, if it is to be thoroughly defensible from the universal point of view of reason, must be thoroughly social, and not individual simply in its application. The spiritual values must be sought for others, not for one's self alone. Truly reasonable conduct must aim at the greatest total well-being, spiritual primarily and material as far as may be, of every person concerned. When we rise to the universal point of view of disinterested reason we easily see that, in its ideal possibilities, given unending time and favorable opportunities for development, each personality is of equal value with every other personality. As Professor Hobhouse has so clearly shown, the rational good, as what is really good, must be not only self-consistent but so harmoniously related to the experience of all sentient beings as to be universally valid and objective. Two or more individualistic moral systems, each aiming only at the self's own seeming good, however consistent they may be internally, are liable to clash with one another; in which case they could not all be rational. Natural self-preference, if it could justify any system of conduct, would equally justify mutually conflicting systems. This shows the principle of self-preference to be irrational. The rational motive for self-sacrifice,

often necessary for the greatest general good, is not to be found in the self-love of the individual, but in his appreciation of the ultimate value and significance of other persons. In all action the guiding ideal should be the greatest ultimate good to the greatest number, the relative importance of spiritual values being duly recognized. This may not be an easy principle to follow, but no one can say that it would not be reasonable. It would meet the tests of rational morality as set up by Kant: "Act so that the principle of your action might be made a universal law," and "Treat every person always as an end, and never as a mere means."

Now it is just this social quality which is the most conspicuous feature of the Christian moral ideal. It is the morality of unselfish love. Its fundamental presupposition is the infinite value, in the light of his potentialities, of every human individual. This estimate, which we owe to the Man of Nazareth, is a discovery which it took his boundless love to make. Jesus taught that a man should love himself, and others as himself. Every person should love his ideal self more than any amount of material things. "What is a man advantaged if he gain the whole world and lose himself?" And all other persons, ideally considered, are of equal importance with one's own self. One may be more responsible for one's own spiri-

tual development than for that of most others; one is more accessible to one's self than others are. But as an ultimate end, one is no more important than another. Moreover, Jesus was not satisfied simply to teach as a theoretical doctrine this rational democratic principle of individual self-sacrifice for the greatest good of the greatest number. He lived his life upon this principle and exemplified it in his death upon the cross.

Thus we conclude concerning the Christian morality that, making due provision for freedom and the appeal to experience, and being in its principles and ideal thoroughly spiritual and social, it is in its essence in full accord with right reason. Or, more exactly, on the one hand reasonable morality must be free and empirical, and this an essentially Christian morality is able to be; and on the other hand Christian morality is spiritual and social in the senses in which we have used these terms, and in this it is essentially reasonable. In fact, we are in a position to say that a morality that is truly free, empirical, spiritual, and social is reasonable; and since, as we have seen, essential Christianity in its morality is free, empirical, spiritual, and social, we are entitled to conclude that Christian morality is reasonable, universally valid, and permanently true.

CHAPTER III

MORAL OPTIMISM

Having found good ground for regarding Christianity as reasonable in its morality, we must now take up definitely as our main task the question whether Christianity is reasonable also as a religious faith. There is clearly a distinction between morality and religion, but it would be easy to overstate the difference. Morality has to do with ideals for conduct, whereas religion in the ordinary sense of the term has to do with man's relation to the Supreme Being. And yet in modern treatments of the subject we often find the life of aspiration or of devotion to ideals spoken of as religion. Thus we have the religion of science, or of truth; the religion of art, or of beauty; the religion of patriotism; the religion of humanity, of social service, and the brotherhood of man.

Now we are not disposed to raise serious objection to the use of the term "religion" in this sense, provided that the new usage be not allowed to displace or obscure the sense in which the word has been used historically. Agreeing that religion is "man's highest response to what he considers highest," let us not wholly reject the view that would define "the highest" in terms of an ideal

instead of in terms of an existent reality. Let it be granted that the term "religion" may be used broadly to include a whole-hearted response to any ideal felt to have supreme or "divine" value. Response to a divine ideal we may call fundamental religion, in distinction from experimental religion, or response to a supreme or divine Being.

Fundamental and experimental religion may be regarded as two phases of religion, discoverable and separable by analytical thought. In its concrete reality religion is a synthesis of the cosmic and social attitudes. Our attitude toward nature is cosmic; our attitude toward humanity, social; our religion, *i. e.*, our attitude toward the Divine, tends to be both cosmic and social. "Fundamental religion" stands for the isolation of the social element in religion, recognition of and aspiration toward ideal social values. "Experimental religion" stands for the cosmic element in religion, dependence and various other experimental relations toward the ruling Power in the cosmos.

Professor Eucken makes a somewhat similar distinction between what he calls "universal" and "characteristic religion." But while Eucken's "characteristic religion" corresponds fairly closely to our "experimental religion," our "fundamental religion" may be said to cover certain phases of what he calls "the spiritual life" as well as much of what he means by "universal religion."

Using the term "religion" in a broad way, then, we may say that there is a religion of Christian

ideals, including the Christian religion of humanity. Indeed, there is nothing more essential in Christianity than this devotion to ideal humanity, the "ideal" being interpreted from the point of view of the Christian appreciation of spiritual values. Taking the central figure of our sacred writings as essentially historical, we find in him, the Man of Nazareth, the supreme illustration in all history of fundamental religion, of unselfish devotion to humanity and to the spiritual ideal. The name of him who best loves his fellow men, who is most sincerely devoted to divine or ideal values in human life, will ultimately head the list of the true lovers of God. This is the practical significance of the idea of the immanence of the divine within the human. However much more there may be in the Christian religion than this, this much at least is both Christian and, from any spiritual and non-pessimistic point of view, reasonable. Whole-hearted appreciation of divine values in humanity, and particularly in humanity at its best, in Jesus of Nazareth for our best example, assuming his essential historicity—this we may call religion and the Christian religion at that, provided it is not assumed that this is all there is of religion or of Christianity. It is in the New Testament itself that we find "pure religion and undefiled" defined largely in terms of social service (James 1 : 27), and active brotherly love

made the criterion of the divine life in the soul of man.

But fundamental religion, even in its higher forms, is not sufficient to meet all the religious needs of men. What we have in mind is not alone the need of comfort in view of those bereavements to which the life of man as a social being is subject, or of escape from pessimism when the possibility of activity is suspended, when the disappointment of life's ambitions is experienced, and when one faces reflectively the inevitable approach of bodily death. Fundamental religion itself commonly needs the stimulus of religion in the more usual and specific sense of the word, if its highest development is to be reached. For steady aspiration there is need of inspiration ever new. Even as object of worship the Absolute Ideal is not all-sufficient; man seeks the Great Companion.

Turning, then, to a consideration of the reasonableness of the Christian religion in the more usual meaning of the term "religion," let us begin by comparing the various possible general attitudes toward reality, life, and destiny. For the purposes of our discussion, these possible general attitudes may be said to be four: pessimism, non-moral optimism, mere meliorism, and moral optimism.

Pessimism in its extreme form declares that life

is inherently and necessarily evil, that to be permanently unconscious or not to exist at all would be better than any possible conscious existence, that the best possible world would be worse than no world at all. But even in its less pronounced forms it despairs of a desirable outcome of the course of human events. It thus tends to deaden aspiration after the ideal and to paralyze all serious moral effort.

Non-moral optimism expresses itself either in the extreme doctrine that all is good, that evil is unreal, or in the more moderate but still uncritical dogma, which we find in modern deterministic evolutionary optimism, that everything is bound to turn out for the best, whatever man may do, whether it be his best or his worst. In its more extreme form non-moral optimism is an affront to our intelligence and our moral nature, and even in its milder form it serves to encourage recklessness and sloth.

In his recent stimulating and helpful little book on *Religious Perplexities*, Principal Jacks makes much of the distinction between a heroic and a cowardly attitude toward life. We would maintain that both pessimism and non-moral optimism are symptomatic of a cowardly attitude toward life. Pessimism expresses the attitude which would give up the battle to the enemy before the issue is decided. Non-moral optimism, denying

any ultimately real evil, even in moral delinquency, is simply a different expression of cowardice, an ostrichlike unwillingness to face the facts in their true character.

In contrast with these widely differing manifestations of a cowardly attitude toward life, meliorism and moral optimism are expressions of a heroic life-attitude. Meliorism, as William James defines it, is the doctrine that we must fight if we would win, that there is a good fighting chance for righteousness to prevail, but that the best efforts of human wills are required, if victory for the right is to be achieved. Mere meliorism, however, in spite of its great value as an incentive to moral effort, is incomplete in itself. Man must do his best if right is to triumph and human well-being is to be secured as soon and as fully as possible; but man is not the only factor at work. There is a cosmic factor also, transcending human power, and unless that superhuman cosmic power is favorable to man's ultimate well-being, the best that man can do will be insufficient to do for humanity what man's highest nature imperatively demands. If meliorism is not supplemented by an adequate religious faith as regards the superhuman factor, it is bound, sooner or later, to discover its own insufficiency, and then it will be in the greatest danger of giving way to the unheroic attitude of pessimism and despair. Mere meliorism may be

heroic while it lasts, but it is essentially only temporary.

For an essentially permanent heroic attitude, what might be called either religious meliorism or moral optimism is necessary. We shall use the term "moral optimism," by which we mean a fundamental attitude of confidence in the cosmos, together with a full sense of man's moral responsibility. It expresses and is expressed in the conviction that if only a person's will is right, he need have no fear of anything the universe can do to him; no absolute or final disaster can come to him whose will is steadfastly devoted to the true ideal. Similarly, it would say that if only all human wills were steadfastly right, there would be no occasion to worry about anything that might happen through natural processes to any person or to the race; no absolute evil could come under those conditions to any individual or to the race. It would hold that if man does his best, the Supreme Power on which he is dependent will do whatever else needs to be done. It points to the possibility of an inner or spiritual preparedness adequate for anything that the future can possibly bring, a more than stoical imperturbability in the face of all the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. If one seeks first and in a rational way righteousness and other eternal values—the essential content of the "Kingdom of God"—it prom-

ises that all that he needs will be his, and that being rightly adjusted at the centre of his life, he need not even be afraid of them that kill the body and after that have no more that they can do. To such a one the saying of the ancient sage applies: "There can no evil befall a good man, in life or in death." For the moral optimist the universe is such that the highest spiritual ideals, Christian ideals, for instance, are practicable, progressively realizable, and the values thus produced will be ultimately conserved.

If this is true, several other propositions are also true; but just what is logically implied in moral optimism we must reserve for later discussion. Suffice it for the present to say that in a development and judicial examination of the implications of moral optimism will be found the main elements of a modern apologetic for the Christian religion, the missing link between Ritschlianism and Hegelianism, a vindication of the reasonableness of the spiritually valuable content of the Christian religious faith.

Now this moral optimism, we would maintain, is reasonable. It is the simple resultant, the joint product of the natural, normal optimism of the healthy mind in a healthy body, and what one of the greatest of philosophers has evaluated as the only ultimately good thing in the universe, the good or moral will. We find that an optimis-

tic outlook tends to be instinctive and well-nigh inevitable during the health of the body, particularly of the nervous system. It may therefore be fairly described as a normal human attitude. Criticism in the light of life's experiences, however, tends to question and suggest qualifications of this naïve, buoyant optimism that belongs to physical and mental vitality. And as the moral consciousness develops and the will is brought into a condition of moral health, there is a tendency to transform the original, uncritical, natural optimism into a critical, moral optimism. This is the natural faith of the normal life, controlled by knowledge of the facts and critical reflection, but also by the steadfast moral will. That is why, initially considered, as an attitude of life it is reasonable. It is what the strong good will says must be true. It is the faith of the virile and pure.

Would you be reasonable? Be normal and be moral. Be healthy in body and mind, be buoyantly optimistic; but take full account of your moral responsibility. Be yourself and your best possible self. Be strong, be heroic, but not by fits and starts; be not weary in well-doing. Steadily do your part and for the final outcome trust the Higher Power upon which you and yours are ultimately dependent. This simple, normal, moral,

and reasonable attitude is what we mean by moral optimism.

Moral optimism is not only normal; it is necessary. It works so well, is so wholesome in its effects as well as in its causes, is so inspiring that we may say that for the realization of the highest ends it is a practically necessary belief. Of course, we must be on our guard against a false "rationalization" of favorite beliefs, and all that; we must not will to believe without the right to believe, nor assume that what seems desirable is therefore true. No one is asked to sacrifice his intellectual integrity or to do anything not theoretically permissible. But why should we not believe—if, while remaining adequately critical, we can do so—that which we tend almost inevitably to believe when we are at our best, physically, mentally, and morally, that which it is most desirable for the highest ends that we should make the guide and basis of our active life? Religion has been described as "an act of self-maintenance," and moral optimism, this vital core of spiritual religion, this confidence that ultimately the universe is on the side of the highest values—moral optimism is an act of self-maintenance on the part of the spiritual life of man. Is it not reasonable, then, to regard it as a morally justified hypothesis, and to act upon the supposition that it is true?

Only moral indifference or a spiritually devastating pessimism would refuse to exercise this faith.

But, granted that moral optimism is normal, spiritually necessary, and so, presumably, a reasonable initial attitude and faith, can we go further and regard it as essentially Christian? Only on the basis of an affirmative answer can we make it a part of our Christian apologetic.

In this connection it is well to remember that a man's Christianity consists not in the multitude of the doctrines to which he subscribes, and that there may be and probably is more genuine Christian faith in a heartfelt moral optimism than in the docile acceptance of any number of ancient creeds. It may very well be that it is just this moral optimism which is the quintessence of Christianity as religion, and that anything in traditional Christianity which conflicts with this is rightly to be discarded as non-essential and outgrown.

It is indisputable that historic Christianity is optimistic as to the future of those regarded as being in the right relation to God, but not optimistic as to the future of any who may persistently refuse to enter into that right relation. Moreover, according to the Christian point of view the one great essential in being right with God is being right in the attitude of one's will. Logically, then, this means that according to Christianity the one

great essential toward an absolutely optimistic outlook for the individual is a settled moral attitude of his will. Similarly the only absolute disaster to be feared is to be found in continued sin and its necessary personal and social consequences.

It may be observed that the particular form in which this religious insight is expressed in the New Testament is due in part to the influence of current Jewish theories and expectations. Moreover, it must be confessed, this fundamentally moral religious conviction suffered distortion in the later church doctrine of the future life. But in spite of all that, it is indisputable that this moral optimism was present in primitive Christianity, and that it is at the heart of what is still vital and essential in the historic Christian faith.

The selection of moral optimism as constituting what is most essential in Christianity as religion, may be indeed the contribution of the modern mind, much as the selection of unselfish love to God and one's fellow men as the essence of the traditional Jewish law was the contribution of the social and moral consciousness which found its best expression in the "Founder of Christianity." But our present point is that that element of moral optimism was there in original Christianity, to be selected. And if it be remarked that our moral optimism no longer requires the traditional harsh and narrow final division of all mankind into two

classes, for one of which alone is the outlook at all optimistic, the reply is that, while this modification too may be the contribution of the modern social consciousness with its appreciation of the potential good of every person, this conviction of the modern social consciousness itself is the contribution of original Christianity on the one hand and logical thinking on the other. The function of modern thought has simply been to develop the moral optimism of primitive Christian faith freely and in harmony with the equally Christian insight into the incalculable value, actual or potential, of every human individual.

It will be our next task to develop in detail and examine carefully the main conclusions logically involved in this moral optimism, which we have found to be essentially Christian, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, normal, spiritually necessary, and therefore, if uncontradicted by the facts, reasonable and presumably true.

CHAPTER IV

FREEDOM

We have shown that moral optimism is essentially Christian, and that there are grounds for regarding it as a reasonable fundamental faith. We found in it neither inconsistency nor refutation by any known fact. We found it to be the normal expression of the good will and healthy mind in a healthy body, and a necessary condition of persistent devotion to the highest spiritual ends. We were led consequently to the opinion that it is always a reasonable thing to take it up as a life-attitude, to act upon it as a life-hypothesis. We freely admit that to argue from the spiritual necessity of moral optimism to the reasonableness of adopting it as a faith is itself one expression of moral optimism. It involves believing that there is ultimately a harmony between what is good for man to believe and what is true, a belief which flatly contradicts that pessimistic "anti-pragmatism" which teaches that the truth in philosophy is too sad to be good for human consumption; that in matters of ultimate faith we must fall back upon certain "indispensable fictions." If we had to believe the really good to be false or the true to be ultimately bad, we should have to be pessimists.

On the other hand, if what is so good as to be spiritually necessary is true, moral optimism must be true; and if moral optimism is true, not only must what is ultimately good to believe be true, but there must be an ultimate harmony between all absolute values, logical, æsthetic, moral, social, and religious, or, in other words, between truth, ideal beauty, moral goodness, ideal social life, and ideal religion. This looks like a fruitful proposition, and we may have occasion to refer to it again. Meanwhile let no one object that we are reasoning in a circle when we point out this mutual consistency of moral optimism and belief in an ultimate harmony of absolute values. We are not offering any demonstrative deductive proof of moral optimism. We have argued that it is a reasonable attitude and faith, and now we are simply being morally optimistic enough to adopt moral optimism itself as an hypothesis, and reasonable enough to develop what it involves in a self-consistent manner.

Considered in itself, moral optimism seems to be a thoroughly permissible hypothesis. The only way to test it further would be to draw out what is implied in it and test these inferences by comparing them with established facts and assured values. On the one hand, the initial reasonableness of moral optimism will be an argument for the reasonableness and truth of whatever may be

implied in it. On the other hand, if what is implied in moral optimism should turn out to be still permissible after a fair consideration of relevant facts and values, not only will the implications themselves be accredited to that extent, but the moral optimism from which they are derived will be confirmed to the same extent.

Now we shall not be reasoning in a circle if we argue that certain implications are reasonable because moral optimism is reasonable, and that moral optimism is confirmed as reasonable because these implications are found to be reasonable. This is not arguing in a circle, simply because the reasons referred to in the two instances are not the same, but are independent of each other. The initial reasonableness of moral optimism applies to its implications, and all further reasonableness discovered in these implications will be a further verification of the reasonableness of the original attitude and point of view. This procedure is simply the inductive method, employing deduction from time to time, as induction commonly does.

Again, if the result of our further study should be to confirm the reasonableness and presumable truth of moral optimism, and at the same time its agreement with the content of vital historic Christianity, this will be also a further confirmation of the view that moral optimism is essentially Chris-

tian as well as reasonable. Obviously, this will mean something for the defense of the reasonableness of essential Christianity.

What, then, are the implications of moral optimism? It will be our immediate task to show that, whatever else may be involved among these implications, the three great tenets of natural religion, which also belong to the content of essential Christianity, are included, namely, belief in freedom, in immortality, and in God.

The normal man has an inescapable conviction of his moral responsibility. This conviction is of the utmost importance for his conduct and character, and ultimately for his own general well-being and that of society. Now, if moral optimism is true, this morally indispensable conviction of responsibility must also be true. Otherwise there would be an ultimate conflict between absolute values, between the true and the good, and we should have to be pessimists for truth's sake, and moral optimists only for our good and in opposition to the truth. On the basis of a self-consistent moral optimism, then, we may say that man is a morally responsible agent. He may not always be as responsible as he thinks he is, and sometimes he may be more responsible than he realizes. Judgments as to the degree of responsibility, even for one's own actions, are not infallible; they may

have to be revised in the light of further information. But some degree of responsibility for deliberate conduct every normal person *must* acknowledge. It is intuitively certain, and moral optimism confirms it as true.

But if man is morally responsible, he must be, ultimately considered, a factor in the causation of his own conduct. To some extent he must be creatively free, a first cause. "Thou oughtest, therefore thou canst; thou art responsible, therefore thou art free," is the voice of moral reason. If we had to regard man's conduct and character as having been completely predetermined by a series of factors or conditions which were themselves completely predetermined by others, and so on back to a point in time before the individual's conscious life began, then we could not consistently ascribe to him any genuine moral freedom at all. And denying his freedom, we should have to deny his responsibility, abandon belief in an ultimate harmony between the good and the true, and give up moral optimism. On the other hand, if moral optimism is reasonable, a genuine creative freedom on man's part is a reasonable belief. And if belief in man's freedom should continue to prove tenable in the light of further experience and thought, moral optimism will be further confirmed to that extent.

Is this belief, then, that man is a morally free agent, scientifically tenable? Is it theoretically permissible? Let there be no ambiguity as to what is meant. To assert a genuine moral freedom is very far from meaning that in the explanation of any human action there is only *one* factor to be considered, namely, the present momentary personal self as an uncaused cause. It is not absolute indeterminism, a "liberty of indifference"; but, on the other hand, it means something more than the trite observation that there is continuity between the character of the person and his conduct, that there is something in the conduct which is the effect or consequent of something in the character. Freedom involves self-determinism; but the kind of self-determinism which is simply a veiled form of complete determinism leaves no place for genuine freedom. The crucial question is just this: Is it true that to some extent, however small, man's conscious conduct is being determined at the time by himself in such a way that his action was not completely determined before the time? The question is one the importance of which the scientist, as a man, should recognize; but it is not a question for science to answer, either in the affirmative or in the negative. As was clearly pointed out in a recent lecture delivered by Professor Hans Driesch in this country, when we analyze as fully as possible any typical instance of

deliberate human conduct, it always remains an open question—that is, if we disregard the moral consciousness and all practical considerations—whether the final conscious "I *will* it" is itself completely predetermined and, with its likewise predetermined accompaniments, predetermining, or whether it is the mark of an essentially creative act of the self, not completely predetermined by its antecedents. It is not uncommon in our day for psychologists as well as physicists to assume that scientific explanation involves complete predeterminism as its fundamental presupposition; but this is metaphysical dogmatism, not genuine science. A college professor made the statement recently in a public lecture that no student of human behavior could be scientific, no matter how objectively he might describe the facts, unless he began his investigation with the presupposition that everything that happens is completely predetermined by its antecedents—an excellent illustration of the unscientific metaphysical dogmatism of many who pride themselves in their science. It cannot be stated too emphatically that the business of science is precisely this—to state what has been found by experience and to describe the facts objectively, with a minimum of presupposition. It is not the business of science to present unnecessary theories and unverified metaphysical preconceptions as if they were verified fact.

Other ways of showing that the idea of a genuine creative freedom is theoretically permissible have been suggested. At the heart of it our conscious action is the direction of our attention, and when we give our attention to a stimulus with the feeling that we could attend to it longer and more intently, or more briefly and less intently, there is no science which is in a position to deny that this feeling is essentially correct. Again, as no one in our day has pointed out more convincingly than Bergson, change is an ultimate characteristic of reality. When, for instance, a body moves from one place to another, this motion is not correctly explained as a mere succession of different positions in which the body is at rest at succeeding instants. Between any two instants of time and any two positions in space, however close together, there is a process of change, a changing, a moving from the one to the other. And so it is with other processes of change. They all involve through some duration of time a *changing* as an ultimate irreducible process. Applying Bergson's generalization to our specific problem, we may point out that it is quite conceivable that human character does not undergo change in a merely mechanical or deterministic sense, an antecedent static condition of character necessarily predetermining, under the circumstances, the conduct, and the conduct necessarily predetermining the next suc-

ceeding static condition of character. Instead of there being in changing character a mere transition from one static predetermined condition to another, there may very well be *a changing of character in the volition or action and not simply as a result of it.* It is theoretically permissible to believe that in at least some of his voluntary acts man may to some extent transcend his already acquired character; that in the exercise of will he can rise above or fall below his immediately previous character; that while there is always a correspondence between conduct and character, the exact correspondence is not necessarily between the conduct of a given moment and the character of the immediately previous moment, but between the conduct and the character of the same moment. In some measure, however small, the character may be changing in the new volition, so that character and conduct change together. In any case, it is evident that character and conduct are not necessarily thought of as completely predetermined; it is permissible to believe that to some extent they are being creatively determined at the time, so that the way is open to regard the conscious personal self as being to a limited extent an uncaused cause, a creative free agent.

We found that man's consciousness of moral freedom must be true if moral optimism was true;

and, initially considered, moral optimism did seem reasonable and true. We have now found that, considered in itself, belief in human freedom is theoretically permissible. It was already found to be morally certain, as following logically from man's responsibility, which is morally certain. The result is that freedom as an implication of moral optimism receives further confirmation; and the same thing is plainly true of the moral optimism itself.

The meaning of this as evidence of the reasonableness of Christianity should be clear. It belongs essentially to Christianity to affirm whatever freedom is involved in moral responsibility. There have been theological predeterminists in Christianity, but this is explained by the fact that they were primarily interested in religious security and assurance. Their interest in assurance of salvation led them to cling to the doctrine of the sovereignty of God, and this in turn they mistakenly imagined must of necessity exclude any genuine self-determination on the part of man. But nothing is a true part of essential Christianity that logically undermines the sense of man's moral responsibility. Having seen, then, that moral freedom is not only Christian, but also involved in the reasonable initial attitude we called moral optimism, and at the same time theoretically permissible in the light of the facts, we are led to the con-

clusion that at least in this, its affirmation of a limited but creative moral freedom on the part of man, Christianity is reasonable and presumably true.

CHAPTER V

IMMORTALITY

Our discovery of the reasonableness of the Christian conviction that man enjoys a measure of moral freedom is but the beginning of what we may expect to find involved in moral optimism for religious belief and for the reasonableness of Christianity. Let us look further into the implications of our fundamental principle.

Moral optimism assumes man's right to an optimistic outlook on moral conditions. As a life-attitude it is moral and critical enough to recognize the unconditional imperative of the moral law, and at the same time normal and healthy-minded enough to rest assured that he whose life is consecrated to the moral ideal, to the discovery and performance of his duty, has a right to be nobly unconcerned as to what may happen to himself. What it logically involves is the faith that no absolute and final disaster can happen to man through purely external or physical events; that, even when outside forces have done their worst, no ultimate and irremediable evil, no final loss of spiritual values, can have befallen the will that was steadfastly devoted to the realization of the true ideal.

If we turn to human experience for confirmation of this conviction, we are confronted at once with the universal fact of physical death. Sooner or later each individual dies and disappears; only the race remains. Is this consistent with moral optimism? The ultimate conservation of all absolute, that is, spiritual, values, in spite of physical death, is obviously involved in the morally optimistic faith upon which we have taken our stand; for only under such conditions could the moral will be justified in facing any possible physical event with equanimity.

But the adequate conservation of spiritual values necessarily involves the conservation of persons. If all genuine spiritual values are to be conserved without final loss, the death of the body cannot mean the end of personal existence. There are spiritual values, moral and social values particularly, but other values also, which are inseparably bound up with the existence of the individuals in and for whom they exist. Since the human individual is a free agent, as we have seen, he is able creatively to produce spiritual values. This means that, given ever new opportunity for activity, he would be of infinite value as a possible means of creating such values. In other words, by virtue of his moral personality, man is of potentially infinite value as a means. Thus we find reflective support for love's intuitive certainty of the

infinite value of the individual as an end. There is a cynical proverb to the effect that love is blind, and this may be true of some kinds of love. But all noble and true loves are glimpses into the infinite worth of the personal individual as such, and he who does not know from experience what true love is, is blind. Feeling has cognitive value, and, generally speaking, the true worth of personality is not discovered apart from love.

There is nothing more fundamental or essential in Christianity than this appreciation of the infinite value of the human individual, and it is in this essentially Christian insight that we find the true answer to latter-day speculations about a merely conditional immortality. Wherever a divine all-seeing love would find absolute values, actual or potential, there is something the conservation of which divine love imperatively demands. If personalities in whom such absolute values exist are allowed to sink into nothingness, then faith in the conservation of absolute values is mistaken, and moral optimism is an illusory dream.

We are aware that some high-minded persons would turn attention away from the individual to the race, urging that while the individual unit may cease to exist, the race will persist; that values produced by the individual will be conserved in the race. Now this is true enough of some of the spiritual values produced by the individual, but it

is not true of all. In character and friendship are moral and social values which are inseparably bound up with the existence of the individual. Spiritual personality is of value as an end, and not merely as a means. We can view with composure the final disappearance of merely relative and instrumental values; but spiritual personality is of absolute value as an end. And spiritual personality is always individual, even when it is also social. Wherefore the moral optimism which affirms the conservation of all spiritual values cannot be satisfied with the persistence of the race alone. Besides, in spite of the speculations of some thinkers, it remains doubtful whether without the immortality of the individual there can be any immortality for the race. If, then, at last upon the physically embodied race inhabiting this gradually cooling planet the "slow, sure doom" shall fall, without personal immortality all values of and for human personality, social as well as individual, will be as if they never had been, and moral optimism will have been all along a delusion and a lie.

Just what will be involved in the undiminished conservation of spiritual personality, with its absolute values, we may not be able to surmise, except in a general way. But there must of necessity be included not only continued existence of intelligence, with experience, selective memory, and

thought, but moral activity with the development of character, and social relations, with the conservation of all true friendship and love. All this, with the vision beatific, moral optimism must postulate and the conservation of absolute values include. And with this, essential Christianity is in full accord. Apart from figurative and merely negative descriptions of the ideal future life, our Christian scriptures contain statements in terms of relationship to Christ which may be regarded as expressions of a more general truth. "To be with Christ"—this stands for ideal social relations. "We shall be like Him"—this means progressive realization of ideal character. "His servants shall serve Him"—this, taken with the words of the parable of judgment, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto Me," can only mean ideal human activity along lines of social service. All of this is essentially Christian and all is logically involved in moral optimism, so that if the attitude we have so designated is reasonable and true, the same may be said of this vital and essentially Christian hope.

It will be seen that from the point of view of moral optimism the question as to whether the individual desires a future life is comparatively unimportant. Whether we desire immortality or not, the conservation of every person whose will is

actually or even potentially moral is as imperative as the value of every such person is absolute. We may not want to live again; but as it is our duty to act morally whether we want to or not, so it is our duty to want to live again and to do in a future existence whatever good it may then be possible for us to accomplish. The desire to live forever is not a selfish or unworthy desire, if the extension of existence is not desired for unworthily selfish purposes. If to live is in itself better than not to live, to continue to live is similarly better than not to continue to live. It could never be right to refuse or not to desire further opportunity to develop and express the good will, and any adequate appreciation of the moral ideal with its categorical imperative must be accompanied by desire amounting to an absolute demand for opportunity progressively to realize that ideal.

We have seen that belief in human immortality is logically involved in moral optimism. We have also seen that moral optimism is normal and necessary for spiritual ends, so that, finding it theoretically permissible as far as we went into the matter, we have continued to regard it as a reasonable fundamental faith. With equal cogency we conclude that belief in immortality is reasonable also. But it is always true that the more general hypothesis is tested in the tests applied to the propositions logically deduced from it, and we

may raise the further question whether belief in a future life, together with the moral optimism of which it is one expression, is still theoretically permissible when we come to look further into the facts of nature and human life. It is admitted that with the morally discerning and those who have known friendship dearer than life itself, the demand for immortality is too imperious for the hope to be given up for anything short of its refutation by indubitable facts of experience. But the question remains whether, in the light of modern science, such refutation may not be forthcoming.

It must be admitted that it is the opinion of some scientists that human consciousness depends upon the brain in such a way that without that organ the conscious existence of the individual would be impossible; but this is not the teaching of science itself. As William James, William McDougall, and other eminent psychologists have said, and as every psychologist who has not needlessly sold out to materialism knows, there are no known facts concerning the relation of consciousness to the brain which require us to believe that the physical organ is indispensably necessary for conscious survival. Consciousness is instrumental to the body, without doubt; but increasingly the inverse relationship tends to establish itself. More and more as development proceeds in the individual and in the race, brain and body come to be

instrumental to mind, whose interests reach out far beyond the bodily organism and its physical environment. It is not necessarily an unreasonable interpretation of the facts, therefore, when mind is regarded as destined for a position of ultimate independence with reference to the present physical body. That normal faith of the healthy mind and moral will which we have called moral optimism, leading necessarily, as it does, to belief in human immortality, cannot be dismissed as forbidden by the facts. We who are still in the body have not yet verified the future life directly. The time for that will come when this earthly physical life is over. Whether we shall ever in this life verify the other life indirectly, through completely demonstrated communication from the departed, may well be doubted. When fraud, hallucination, and mere chance coincidence have been eliminated from the phenomena to which spiritists appeal, it seems always possible to regard the facts as due to subconscious activities of the medium and others present, and to telepathy between living persons. However, it may be remarked in passing that if mind in its relation to body is independent enough to make telepathy under certain conditions a fact, it seems not unreasonable to think that mind may be independent enough to continue to exist and act when set free from the body at death.

A more assured argument for the possibility of immortality is found in the fact of human freedom, already sufficiently established as morally certain. Human freedom being granted in the sense in which we have defined the term, it follows that mind or the self acts in an originative manner in and through the brain; and if the mind is independent enough to act thus creatively in and through the brain, it may conceivably be independent enough to act independently of this particular organism altogether. If mind is an agent and not a mere phenomenon, it may conceivably find or be furnished with another instrument when the one it is now using becomes no longer serviceable. In spite, then, of anything the pessimistic or doubting critic can show by appeal to reason or experience, belief in the undiminished survival of human personality is theoretically permissible and, in view of its foundation in moral optimism, presumably true. Considering, then, the central place the belief occupies in the Christian religious faith, we are in a position to claim, at this point also, further confirmation of essential Christianity as reasonable and so presumably true.

Before leaving the subject, however, one very important thing remains to be said. If we ask the secret of the persistence of belief in immortality in the absence of any absolute empirical demonstration of the truth of the doctrine, the answer is

that, after an appreciation of the worth of human personality, the chief factor in the belief has been the idea of God, that is, of a Power great enough and good enough to conserve the human individual in spite of bodily death. If we can be adequately assured, through experience or argument, of the existence of such a Being, we can at the same time be reassured of the truth of immortality. If we can be assured that the Supreme Being in the universe loves man with an everlasting love, we can be assured that man is intended for everlasting life. To the consideration of this most important of all religious questions, the existence and nature of God, we must next direct our attention.

CHAPTER VI

GOD

In considering questions of the existence and nature of God, our procedure will be to ask what moral optimism involves for belief in God, what significance the facts of experience may have for the confirmation or refutation of the theistic hypothesis, and the meaning of our conclusions for the question of the reasonableness of Christianity.

As a matter of fact, belief in God depends not primarily upon argument, but upon experience. It is not the contribution of philosophy but of religion. It is based upon the experience of religious need and its satisfaction. Schleiermacher began right when he suggested substituting for the so-called theistic proofs an appeal to the universal human consciousness of absolute dependence. We are all aware, in that immediate cognitive experience which we sometimes vaguely call "feeling," that we are absolutely dependent, and in this consciousness is included an immediate apprehension of God. In recognizing our absolute dependence there is included a recognition of a Reality upon which we are absolutely dependent, and that Reality, whether we can learn anything more about

it or not, is God, the God of universal experimental religion. This is where theistic thought should always begin.

But we are now in a position to take the second step, for the central and most far-reaching implication of moral optimism is the existence of God, and the God of moral optimism is this same God of universal religious consciousness, the Reality upon which we are ultimately dependent. Let us see how this is so.

If moral optimism is valid and there is an attitude and adjustment on our part which, when fulfilled, justifies freedom from anxiety about what is beyond our power and brings an inward or spiritual preparedness for anything that can happen to us, it logically follows that there must be among or above the powers at work in the world a Dependable Factor, conserving all absolute spiritual values beyond what man as a physically embodied and limited creature is able to do. This Power must be the ultimate power with which man has to do, the object of absolute dependence, and must be great enough and good enough—favorable enough to human values—to effect for man what man imperatively needs to have done, if he is to be justified in remaining a moral optimist. Preparedness of spirit for any disaster to physical existence which can come through the orderly operation of the forces of the natural world is logically possible

only on the postulate of the ultimate conservation of all absolute or spiritual values; and if we are to have logical ground for this faith in the conservation of values, we must postulate a Conserver of values, an ultimately dependable Factor, completely favorable to the true interests of man, adequate in power, and able rightly to guide the exercise of that power. Such a Factor religion postulates and calls by the name of God.

If moral optimism is reasonable, then it is reasonable to believe in God. And when we use this historic religious term, *God*, as a name for what is at once the Object of absolute dependence and the absolutely dependable Factor whose existence is implied in moral optimism, we are not using the term in any strange or unjustifiable sense. The meaning of the word as here used is identical for all essential purposes with the content which historic religion at its best has put into the term. Let us see how this is so. The gospel according to moral optimism is this: The God that man needs exists. What does this theistic implication of moral optimism itself imply?

The God of moral optimism is one. The absolutely dependable Factor must be at least one, and the burden of proof is on any one who ventures the opinion that there are more gods than one. If the God that must exist, according to moral optimism, is absolutely dependable, that is sufficient; there

seems no sufficient reason for postulating more than one.

The God of moral optimism must be absolutely sufficient in power for man's imperative religious needs, including his need of triumph over physical death. This is the practical meaning of omnipotence.

The God whose existence and absolute sufficiency for man's imperative religious needs are logically bound up with moral optimism must be so related to the world and to man that that adequate power of God is available for man when he needs it, no matter where man may be. This is the practical significance, or a large part of the practical significance, of omnipresence and immanence on the one hand, and of transcendence and world-dominion on the other.

Furthermore, the idea of power persistently directed toward an ideal end in which all spiritual values are fully included reasonably suggests that this power is consciously guided and controlled, that the ultimate Factor is essentially personal. If we imagine that we ought to go beyond the concept of personality in thinking of God, we are at a loss to make any further reasonable suggestion; personality is the highest kind of reality of which we can have any positive conception. This does not mean, of course, that the Divine Being is to be thought of as suffering certain special limita-

tions which we find to be characteristic of human personality; God may be superhuman without ceasing to be essentially personal. What is meant is that the God of moral optimism, however superpersonal he may possibly be in some unknown and unimaginable sense, is most reasonably thought of as at least personal in the sense of being conscious, intelligent, purposive, working consciously and rationally toward an end in which the conservation of human personality and values is included. Furthermore, such an essentially personal God, working dependably for such an ideal end, always adequate for man's absolute dependence and trust, must be regarded as completely moral, perfect in holiness and in self-giving love.

There are other ways of arriving at the conclusion that God is personal. This is not the point in our argument at which to stress Lotze's valuable suggestion that as the human self is immanent in the world of its experience and yet transcends that world which is its object, so the concepts of divine immanence and transcendence are harmonized in the idea of the personality of God. But it may be remarked that the fundamental faith involved in moral optimism to which we have already referred, the faith that there is an ultimate harmony between absolute values, leads us by yet another path than the one we have pursued to the conclusion that God is essentially personal. Conserva-

tion of the essential values of the religious consciousness requires that the Object of man's absolute worship and dependence be regarded as the realization of ideal perfection, whereas conservation of the essential values of the moral consciousness requires that the goal of ideal perfection be regarded as still awaiting realization. How can religious optimism, with its fundamental postulate of the reality of the Ideal, be harmonized with morality, with its certain perception that the absolute Ideal is not yet a reality, but an end demanding man's best effort for its realization? There are some who regard the opposition as ultimate, and who would either sacrifice religion for the sake of morality or discredit morality in the supposed interest of religion. But there is a more excellent way; there is a higher synthesis. The reality of the Ideal which religion demands can be found in the ideal character and will of God, and the unfinished task, the unrealized ideal without which there would be no validity in any moral law, is found in the fact that the good will of God is not yet fully realized, but is, with the voluntary co-operation of men of good will, being progressively realized. The synthesis is found in the concept of the perfect will with its perfect and eternally valid Ideal, unfulfilled as yet, but in process of being progressively transformed from mere ideal into reality. And will, let it be noted, is of

the essence of personality. If God is perfect will, working for the realization of its Ideal, God is essentially personal.

Once again, the consistent and persistent direction of power toward the realization of an ideal end, a guidance of adequate power that is itself adequate in spite of any obstacles that may arise in the universal process of things, necessarily involves the attributes of wisdom and what is, for every practical purpose at least, omniscience.

Thus from the point of view of moral optimism we are able to establish, as a reasonable belief, the existence not of some bare abstract First Cause, but of a personal God, sufficient in moral character, in wisdom, and in power to be to persons of good will the Object of absolute dependence and trust. In short, moral optimism logically implies the existence of the God of Christian faith and thus further confirms the reasonableness and presumable truth of essential Christianity.

We should be very far from dismissing as of no value the traditional arguments for the existence of God. In fact, from the point of approach we have chosen, new weight is added to those classic arguments. If, as moral optimism implies, there is a God who can be relied upon for the conservation of the spiritual values produced by good human wills, that God must be so fully in control of the universe that it is not unreasonable to surmise

that it is his universe, his work; that he is not only purposively at work in the evolutionary and other law-abiding processes of nature, but also the creative First Cause of the very stuff or energy of which the worlds are composed. Objection to the notion of creative First Cause as applied to God does not seem reasonable in view of what has been found to hold true of man. Responsible human freedom, as we have seen, involves, within however narrow limits, a genuine creative causality; as regards the direction of his attention, even man is, within limits, a first cause. The cosmological argument, therefore, moving from the universe as effect to God as cause, while it may not, abstractly considered, prove as much as was once supposed, may nevertheless in the light of moral optimism be regarded as representing a natural and legitimate movement of religious thought.

The teleological argument, barely hinted at in what has just been said, we shall have occasion to deal with at length in a later connection. Consideration of the famous ontological argument is likewise deferred. As for the moral argument, its relation to moral optimism might reasonably be expected to prove very close; but it is interesting to note that it is only on the assumption of moral optimism that this useful modern argument can be said to have its full logical force. In the absoluteness of the moral ideal as a law for conscience there

is a basis for postulating as imperative that every will that is essentially good or becoming good be given unending opportunity for moral activity and development. This means not only immortality for every good or potentially good will; it calls for a God great enough and good enough to guarantee that immortality. What the moral consciousness leads us to postulate thus as imperative, however, it takes the religious faith we have called moral optimism to assure us is reasonable and true. Similarly, it is moral optimism that would convince us that there must be a benevolent Power sufficiently in control of the universe to guarantee an ultimate adequate harmony of virtue and happiness. In fact, moral optimism is an essential part of the moral argument for the existence of God in its complete and convincing form.

Our discussion of the reasonableness of belief in God is not yet complete. We have found it to be logically implied in moral optimism, which in itself seems to be a reasonable life attitude. Initially, therefore, there is reasonableness and presumable truth in an essentially Christian theism. But we must examine further the question whether such belief in God is theoretically permissible in view of the facts of experience. Now this is an important matter, and the outcome of our investigation may be expected to have significance not only for the truth of theistic belief itself, but for the

validity of the moral optimism from which it may be inferred. In particular, we would raise two questions, namely, whether it is reasonable to believe in God in view of the various evils which abound in the world; and whether, if there exists such a God as has been described, it is not reasonable to expect to discover evidences in human experience of communication between God and man. In brief, before we can be assured that the theistic deduction from moral optimism is fully reasonable, we must find on the one hand a view of Divine providence which will contain a satisfactory interpretation of the existence of evil, and on the other hand we must have satisfactory evidence of divine revelation as a fact of human experience. To these problems of providence and revelation we must next address ourselves.

CHAPTER VII

PROVIDENCE

The God of moral optimism is that Factor which can be depended upon for conservation of the highest values for persons of good will, in spite of anything the forces of nature can do. More fully, this dependable superhuman Factor is, as we may reasonably believe, one, essentially personal, supremely moral, adequate in goodness, wisdom, and power for every imperative religious need of man. Practically considered, this means an adequate providential control of events, such that no absolute or final disaster can befall any one who is steadfastly devoted to those ideal values which constitute the divine character and will.

Facing the facts of history and of individual life, however, one is led to raise the question, Is this implication of moral optimism true? Are teleology and the doctrine of divine providence tenable? Are not the facts of evil in its manifold forms fatal to this serene and hopeful outlook? Is moral optimism, supposing it to be the core of essential Christianity, theoretically permissible in view of the problem of evil?

The attitudes taken toward this problem of evil have been many and various. It has been main-

tained by some that since God exists, and God is good, there can be no evil. All that is, is good, it is claimed, what seems to us evil being only an essential part of the perfect whole. But this is to deny our most fundamental moral intuition and to contradict the most elementary and universal deliverances of common sense. Among those who acknowledge evil to be undeniably real, an irreducible fact of human experience and the objective order, there are not a few who find in this fact of evil a fatal obstacle to any such religious faith as moral optimism. Since evil is, God cannot be, they conclude. Like the others who deny evil, they cut the Gordian knot; where the others deny the moral consciousness in order to maintain an extravagant optimism, these give up religion and fall a prey to pessimism.

Others avoid both of these mistakes. Evil is real, they maintain, and God exists. But in view of the fact of evil, they think of God as either not good enough or not great enough for man's absolute dependence and trust. God is the ultimate, absolute Power, say some; he is the mysterious Veiled Being back of phenomena, the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed, but a Power which we cannot regard as good, particularly as good enough to justify such a faith as moral optimism; God is great enough, but not good enough to be an absolutely trustworthy Ob-

ject of human dependence. God is morally perfect, say others; he is our ideal Companion, Inspirer, and Guide in the struggle against evil; but he is limited in power, a finite God, who came to be in the course of time; good enough, to be sure, but not great enough for man's absolute trust and dependence. On neither view can moral optimism be maintained. If God is thought of either as not good enough or not great enough to deserve man's absolute self-surrender and trust, the result for religion is not very different from what occurs when the existence of God is roundly denied. All three positions have the merit of not denying the reality of evil, but all alike would make religious satisfaction impossible. The one is atheism, the other two are partial atheism.

Others, again, hold that evil is real and that God exists and is both great enough and good enough for man's absolute faith and dependence; but they leave the problem of evil unsolved, or even declare it to be an insoluble mystery. There may be excuse for such a position, but this does not alter the fact that such failure to deal with a real problem of religious thought tends to foster doubt and uncertainty as to the truth of the doctrine of the reality and all-sufficiency of God. In reply to the question, What shall we think of evil? it is not enough to say with Principal Jacks, "Let us continue to think badly of it." Let us do so

by all means, and let us fight against it and get rid of it as far as we can; this is the attitude of all sound morality. But meanwhile the crucial problem for religion is this: While thinking badly of evil and fighting against it, how shall we avoid thinking badly of God, either of his goodness or wisdom or power, in view of the undeniable existence of evil in what is supposed to be his universe?

In truth, so long as this religious problem of evil remains unsolved, our apologetic will be a failure. Let it not be imagined that we are presumptuous enough to propose to banish all mystery from such facts as pain and sin and death. There is mystery—inescapable mystery—about every ultimate fact. We explain as we can by referring facts to other facts; but every new beginning, every personal consciousness, every individual life, all becoming and all being, the universe as a whole and every individual electron, time and space, the here and the now, action and reaction, First Cause and Final End, good and evil—all are full of mystery and will be so to the end of the story of human science and philosophy. We explain what can be explained by referring at last to what cannot be explained, but must simply be accepted as fact. It is not the business of science or philosophy to eliminate mystery, but to discover what and where the real mysteries are. But it is also the business of science and philosophy to

get rid of false and artificial mysteries, such as arise out of confused thinking or erroneous presuppositions. It is the mystery of evil in this sense that we must seek to dissolve, the confused thinking that tends to undermine religious faith when the dark and tragic facts of existence are contemplated. Unless this religious problem of evil is solved, that is, the problem of how to avoid thinking badly of God in view of the facts of evil, doubts will persist as to the reasonableness of Christianity and especially of the Christian idea of God. Moral optimism will be dismissed as only initially reasonable. It will be regarded as ultimately doubtful, because apparently out of harmony with the facts of experience. To this problem, then, our most serious attention must be given.

First of all, let the advantages of our position be noted, as compared with that of some others who, in acknowledging the reality of evil and confessing their faith in a perfectly good and omnipotent God, have had to give up the problem of evil as insoluble. Some of these have made the mistake of attempting to solve the problem without any reference to a future life. Such a course is not necessary for us, for we have found belief in immortality a tenable faith, and one that is logically involved in a reasonable moral optimism.

Others have faced the problem from the point of view of a thoroughgoing theological determinism, in which no place is left for a genuine human freedom. For all such there is naturally no solution of the problem of moral evil. But this is not our position. We have seen a genuinely creative human freedom to be theoretically permissible, involved in moral optimism, and morally certain in the consciousness of moral responsibility. Others there are—and they are more numerous than either of the classes already mentioned—who admit the appeal to a future life and do not deny, but assert, a genuine free agency on man's part, but they still give an important place to the idea of God's arbitrary miraculous intervention in the natural world as an occasional means of counteracting evil. It should not be supposed that we are presuming to be able infallibly to draw a definite line between fact and legendary addition to fact in traditional accounts of "miracles." There is possibility enough in this universe, so far as we know, of events the laws of whose happening we do not yet fully understand. But such events are not necessarily arbitrary divine interventions in the natural order. If arbitrary miraculous intervention be God's way of dealing with evil, it must always be an insoluble mystery why such interventions do not take place oftener, and why they

are not made thoroughgoing enough to destroy evil miraculously at once and forever. As has already been made clear, however, we are not proceeding on the assumption of the reality of such arbitrary divine interventions, so that for us this particular form of the mystery does not exist. Affirming freedom and immortality, then, and not insisting upon miraculous intervention as essential or a fact, we shall perhaps not find the undeniable facts of evil an insuperable obstacle to belief in the existence and all-sufficiency of God, or to the moral optimism from which this belief may be inferred.

Let it be said at the outset that we have no intention of arguing, after the manner of Leibnitz, that the world as it is in all its present details is the best possible world. Leibnitz was a theological determinist, and, believing as he did in the perfection of God, he naturally concluded that God must have made the best of all possible worlds, the evils incidental to such a world being necessarily bound up with its excellent features. But having seen reason to affirm in opposition to any such total predeterminism an essentially creative freedom on man's part, we must regard God as not the only agent at work in the making of the world what it is; and this being granted we should surmise, and experience tends abundantly to confirm the truth of the surmise, that man may not have

always used his freedom in the best possible way. He has not always found out the truth so fully as he could and should have done, nor has he always acted in such full accord with known truth as was possible. The result is that the world to-day is very far from being the best possible world, in the sense of the best that at an earlier date was possible for this later date. Unless you and I, for instance, throughout our lives up to the present moment have always done as well in every way as was possible—and it is safe to say that we have not—the world is not to-day so good a world as was a possibility for this present date at the time when we were born. Nor, for similar reasons, is the world yet the best world that is now a possibility for some definite future date. We have only to think of the long list of vices, crimes, and other instances of man's ignorant or wilful inhumanity to man, of the wars, floods, famines, pestilences, conflagrations, and other disasters which might have been prevented had man always been as diligent in learning the truth and in doing his duty as he might have been, to realize that if this world and the human race are still far from the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, it is very largely because of man's wilful delinquency and blameworthy negligence. If all human agents had always done the best they could, especially with the help of the best available religion, the present con-

dition of humanity would probably have been in most respects far beyond what is now our ideal for the future of the race on this earth.

But evils which have resulted from the misuse of human freedom cannot reasonably be made a basis for rejecting the idea of an adequate providential control of events by a God who is at once good enough and great enough for man's absolute trust and dependence. If man as an immature developing personality is to acquire moral character, with the absolute values it involves and makes possible, man must be free, within whatever limits, creatively to determine his conscious behavior. And there is necessarily involved, in the freedom of any such being, the possibility of moral evil and all its unfortunate consequences. Deliberate moral evil is absolute evil, but its *possibility* was *necessary*, if man was to appear as a developing free agent. The only alternatives to the appearance, whether by creation or evolution, of man as a free agent were either that he should appear as a completely predetermined and therefore unfree agent, necessarily incapable of any real individuality or moral character, or else that he should not appear at all. But it certainly has not been shown that a race of mechanical puppets or no human race at all would have been preferable to a race of morally free personalities, capable of creatively determining their conduct and character in the choice be-

tween right and wrong. Without freedom not only would unfortunate consequences of human action very probably be multiplied in many ways; all the absolute values of human morality would necessarily be forever impossible.

While then we insist, as against Leibnitz, that the world as it is, the world largely as man has made it, including as it does his ever-new misuse of freedom and its indefinitely continued evil consequences, is very far from being the best world that was originally possible, and very far also from being as yet the best world that is still possible, we may raise the question whether with this correction the Leibnitzian thesis is not essentially sound. May it not be that the world in its general constitution, as God, not man, may be thought of as having made it, even including the provision for human freedom with its ambiguous possibilities, is better for God's perfect purposes than any alternative which could be proposed? That through man's fault *it is not the best possible world* is no argument against the view that in its general constitution, as the effect of God's causality, *it is the best possible kind of world* for the present stage of man's existence. And if it is this, obviously it is the kind of world which a God great enough and good enough for man's love and trust might have founded, in whose evolution he may be purposively at work, and over which he

may be constantly exercising an adequate providential control. Let us look more particularly into the facts, to see whether this may not be reasonably believed.

The religious problem of evil becomes acute when we reflect upon the many things in the world which seem evil and undesirable, apart from those for which man's free initiative is responsible. The naïve traditional explanation, by referring to a primeval divine curse imposed upon nature because of the fall of man, has passed through the stages of being believed, questioned, denied, and ridiculed, and it is now almost forgotten. But the evils and the problem remain. Disasters to life and possessions through the unvarying processes of external nature are made more frequent and are often aggravated through human ill-will and negligence; but even when man does his best, natural catastrophes occur too often to be taken lightly or ignored. Extremes of heat and cold, storms of wind and lightning, floods, earthquakes, tidal waves, volcanic eruptions, avalanches—these are some of the disaster-bringing events which are involved in the reign of invariable mechanical and chemical law, without man's participation being an essential factor.

In considering such facts, however, it should not be forgotten that in the main the mechanical and chemical processes of nature work for rather

than against the continued existence and well-being of the human race and such other forms of life as exist on the planet to-day. Indeed a very large part of the benefit involved in the law-abiding processes of the environment is to be found in just this fact that they are absolutely reliable; given certain conditions, certain consequences are to be expected without fail. What the proverb says of fire is true of natural processes generally; they are bad enemies, but good friends. The orderly processes of nature may seem ruthless to one who gets out of the right adjustment to them, but by virtue of just that seeming ruthlessness, that absolute invariableness, they make a dependable platform on which to stand. Men and animals can adjust themselves to the future as well as the present. Habits consciously formed can be continued automatically, leaving consciousness free for new achievements, and the habits formed continue to serve the needs of life, because we have an orderly environment. Without the reign of law in nature this would be impossible; there could be no learning from experience. In fact, the more we look into the mechanical and chemical processes of the world in which we live, the more we are impressed with what Professor Lawrence Henderson, of Harvard, has called "the fitness of the environment," the apparent definite and specific pre-adaptation of the physical world

to be the dwelling-place of life as we know it. Whether we think the evidence of purposive preadaptation amounts to practical proof or not, the facts are such as to make it at least not unreasonable to believe that a world of dependable mechanical and chemical law is a better kind of world than any alternative that we can definitely suggest.

Here, then, in religion rather than in empirical science or in speculative philosophy, we have the answer to the question of miracle. Considered simply as a matter of tradition, and apart altogether from the problem of evil, we should probably have to leave the question unsettled as to whether or not any arbitrary miraculous intervention of God in external nature ever has taken place; one opinion would be about as good as another. But now we can see, as already intimated, that if miracles to prevent natural disasters ever happen or have happened, they ought to occur much oftener than they do. How else could God be regarded as justly impartial in dealing with his creatures? But if a miracle were to be performed, suspending the laws of nature, every time any physical life or its possessions were threatened with injury or destruction, what would become of the natural order, and how could other lives ever learn what to expect or how to adjust themselves to their surroundings? The whole orderly system of nature would be upset and the

development of intelligence and moral character made impossible. If a miracle were performed to keep the fingers of the innocent infant from being burned when he reaches out and touches the beautiful flame, a second miracle would be needed the second time the flame appeared, and so on without end. All would be miracle with no place left for law, and consequently no learning through experience, no development of character. It is difficult without contradiction to imagine a lawless world, but if we may suppose anything about it, we may conclude that in such a world life could not progress in consciousness and behavior beyond the stage of infancy; man would remain an imbecile until by some happy chance his worthless existence was brought to a timely end. In short, the religious problem of evil becomes insoluble, once we have admitted the hypothesis of a miraculous suspension, either occasional or frequent, of natural law. We must take our choice: we may believe in miracles in the sense of arbitrary divine interventions, or we may find a reasonable solution of the religious problem of evil; we cannot do both.

The question of prayer and its answer must be faced from this point of view. How many there are who in agony of spirit have prayed that the bitter cup might pass from them, and the heavens have seemed as brass; to its very dregs they drank the cup. There is a place, and a large one, for an-

swer to prayer. The verbal expression of prayer is not prayer. Prayer is the soul's sincere desire, but it is more than that. Prayer is the right religious adjustment, and there are objective effects following the right religious adjustment which would not be experienced without it. This is the dependable human experience of the answer to prayer. But it is also a dependable human experience that the heavens are as brass toward any petition that asks for what is against the laws of nature. There is a law of prayer and its answer. But there is no place in the best possible kind of world for the arbitrary interruption of the established natural order.

When we speak of the reign of natural law it must not be supposed that we mean that all events in the physical world are necessarily to be explained fully in terms of mechanical and chemical laws alone. On the contrary, there are many evils to which life is subject in which the crucial factor, in the opinion of many able thinkers, is something between conscious and responsible human action on the one side, and mere mechanical and chemical law on the other. This theory of a subconscious but super-mechanical factor is generally known as vitalism. Among the evils not to be explained as due to conscious human causation, nor yet—according to the vitalists—as purely the

product of mechanical and chemical law, are the distinctively biological and physiological evils, such as the evolution of injurious forms of life, including poisonous reptiles and plants, disease-bringing bacteria, beasts of prey, and in man especially the development of mental and moral abnormalities and derangements which the individual has not consciously caused and for which he cannot rightly be held responsible.

We are dealing here, of course, with phenomena which some would regard as completely predetermined by mechanical and chemical factors. On that theory, their meaning for religion is sufficiently covered by what has been said of the mechanical and chemical order of the world: all things considered, dependable order seems better than arbitrary miracle. Even the violent and premature death of some individuals, as part of the price that has to be paid for a world of dependable law, seems not too much, on the hypothesis of life after death for all those whose worth is sufficient to warrant it.

But vitalism, as a theory of life below the human, while still far from being established, in spite of Driesch's three so-called proofs, and while it is neither particularly fruitful as a scientific hypothesis nor in any way essential from the religious point of view, is nevertheless a thoroughly respec-

table philosophical theory, especially if we assume two things: first, that man has had an evolutionary origin, and, second, that he is endowed with some measure of creative freedom. Man's creative freedom is itself a vitalistic fact, and it is not altogether unreasonable to suppose that this freedom in man is a higher evolution from a super-mechanical and rudimentary freedom in the lower orders of life from which humanity has been evolved. And if organic evolution, individual development, and the activities of living forms are to be thought of as not necessarily completely predetermined from the beginning, but at least sometimes to some extent determined at the time the new development or activity takes place, our problem as to God's providence, particularly with regard to the biological evils to which we have referred, becomes a somewhat different one. From this vitalistic point of view disease-bringing bacteria and other humanly undesirable biological phenomena may have been spontaneous products and activities of life, rather than predestined to appear by any supreme Power in which religion is interested. But on this view how can it be maintained that that so-called supreme Power is really in control of the creatively evolving organic world sufficiently for the imperative needs of men? The reply is twofold. In the first place, God may be able to use not only machines but super-mechani-

cal units, more or less free agents, for the realizing of his ends; mere man can do this on a small scale. In the second place—and this supposition throws light upon the first—it is reasonable to suppose that possibly the only way in which morally free human beings endowed with physical bodies could have come into existence in an orderly evolutionary way was as descendants of previously existing physical beings in which there was this germinal freedom which the theory of vitalism supposes. On this supposition, in view of the infinite significance and value of moral freedom in man, the sufficiency of God's providential control would be vindicated as something which could be reasonably believed. Better freedom, with all the risks and temporary evils bound up with it, than the absence of moral personality in man. Free moral personality in man is worth the price that may have had to be paid for it. It does not appear, therefore, that there is anything in the free evolution of humanly undesirable forms or activities of life which is necessarily fatal to belief in God's sufficient providential control of nature for the religious needs of men.

In all this we have assumed, sometimes tacitly, the immortality of moral personality. This we have the right to do, having already dealt with the question and found the affirmative position reasonable. But there are certain aspects of physi-

cal death as an evil which are not fully dealt with by mere reference to the assurance of immortality. Even if it be granted that all the essential values of individual personality and of the social relationships of friendship and love will be conserved in spite of the changes involved in physical death, can we reasonably believe that the kind of world in which death is so often untimely and ultimately the lot of all, is better than any other possible kind of world, or at least as good as any other, for the present stage of man's existence?

So far as the universality of death is concerned, a little reflection will show that it is certainly better for the future of the race on earth that the older individuals should experience physical death and disappear. Room is thus made for new generations to develop without the unduly hampering authority of those who have lived before. Moreover, assuming immortality, it is better for the individual himself that he should be freed from the burden of the aged body with its rigidity of habit, and be given an opportunity for freer self-expression than is any longer possible under the old conditions. This earthly life is the kindergarten stage in the individual's spiritual development, and it is highly desirable not only that its lessons should be learned, but that the learner should be promoted to a school of higher learning.

With reference to untimely death, however,

something different must be said. From the point of view of human love, untimely death must be regarded as so great an evil that only two things would be too great a price to pay to prevent it. These are, on man's part, the doing of what would be morally wrong, and wrong for definite and assignable reasons of human well-being; and, on God's part, the interrupting of the natural order of the world in an arbitrary miraculous intervention. Granted the immortality of personality and love, we may reasonably believe that even the untimely passing of many whom we have loved long since and lost awhile is not too heavy a price to pay for an orderly and dependable universe, free from miraculous disturbances such as would defeat the universal human need to know what sort of a world we are in and how to adjust ourselves to it.

However, serious evils to human life and values are incidentally involved in the prevalence, without suspension, of mechanical and chemical law. Serious, likewise, are the evils made possible by moral freedom in man and whatever rudimentary freedom there may be below man. So serious, indeed, are they that, even if the world in which they can occur may be better for this stage of human development than any alternative that might be suggested, it is surely incumbent upon every moral agent, God or man, to do everything

consistently possible for the mitigation of these evils. As our problem has to do with the relation of God to evil, let us ask whether the world has anything that may be interpreted reasonably as evidence of a divine power at work to mitigate these incidental evils, not by miracle, indeed, but through new developments within natural order.

Such a new development within the natural order there was in the first emergence of sensation in animal life. So new a thing is sensation as compared with physical and physiological processes that it does not seem possible that it could have been predicted on the basis of those processes. It is a product of creative evolution. And yet its emergence left the orderliness of the physical world intact, while a new law-abiding order of its own, that of the psychical, was introduced. Sight, hearing, sensations of taste, smell, and touch, of heat and cold, of equilibrium and motion, pleasure and pain—these function for the guidance and protection of the living organism in the midst of the dangers incidental to a world of mechanical-chemical law and self-determining freedom. For example, sight, hearing, and the sense of smell enable men and animals to avoid many enemies and threatening dangers; they also make it possible for them to secure food, shelter, and other necessities. Sensations of sight, smell, and taste serve to identify wholesome food substances. Sen-

sations of heat and cold lead the organism to seek climates and temperatures favorable to its life; the sense of equilibrium guides the body to such a readjustment of its centre of gravity as will prevent injury by falling. Feelings of pleasure are associated with activities involved in satisfying appetites, and operate in the main to preserve the life of the individual or of the race.

There is one sensation, however, which demands special attention in a discussion of the problem of evil, namely, pain. In itself pain appeals to the one experiencing it as evil. Fundamentally, however, it is not an evil, but a blessing in disguise. There are many processes destructive of the tissues of the body, such as bruising, cutting, burning, under-feeding, over-feeding, over-exertion, and the like, which, unless accompanied by some stimulus to a quick reversal of adjustments and activities, would soon cause serious injury or death to the body, thus leading, in all probability, in the case of most of the higher species of animals, with their delicately complicated organisms, to their early extinction. We know of nothing but pain which could serve as the sharp negative stimulus required. If the burning of the body, exposure to dangerous extremes of heat and cold, bodily exhaustion, hunger, thirst, bruises, wounds, and conditions of acute disease were not normally accompanied by pain, all the higher and more compli-

cated forms of animal life would soon be killed off by the ruthless operation of the natural forces. Indeed, in the light of the well-established evolutionary view of the origin of species, the human species included, it seems not too much to say that a world without any pain in it would have been a world in which the human race could never have been evolved. The animal ancestors of man would have been killed off long before the biological conditions for the appearance of the human species had been reached. The whole animal creation groaned and travailed in pain together, waiting for the evolution of life that could be the bearer of moral personality—in other words, waiting for the revealing of the sons of God. Surely, then, from any point of view other than that of extreme pessimism, we cannot regard as fundamentally evil the kind of sensation without which the human race could never have come into existence.

However, pain is not in every instance biologically necessary. Sometimes, apparently, it is quite needless and useless. But this is because, like all other sensation, pain occurs according to law. Under physiological conditions similar to those in which pain has proved its survival value in the history of animal life, pain will occur again, even if in some particular instance it may not exercise any useful biological function. But, everything

considered, just as it seems better that there should have been pain than that there should have been no pain, so it seems better that pain should happen according to law than that it should not do so. Instances of useless pain are part of the price the animal creation pays for preservation of higher forms and the evolution of the highest.

Pain that is not directly valuable, biologically, often has a useful function in human life, it may be remarked, as furnishing a means of moral discipline and the development of fortitude, sympathy, and other desirable traits of character. So valuable has this seemed that very often in the home, the school, and the state, pain in one form or another is artificially induced in order the more effectively to train the developing individual in the way in which he should go. But in spite of all this it remains true that there is in the world much needless pain, which it is man's duty to diminish as far as a way to do so may be found.

The question of immediate concern here is whether the cosmos shows that any provision has been made to diminish needless pain, such as may reasonably be interpreted as divinely intended, providential. It must not be by miracle, of course; that has already been seen to be undesirable. Whatever the process may be, it must be part of an orderly, intelligible universe. Precisely this which we are looking for is to be found in the or-

derly processes of thought, taking that term in its widest sense, so as to include memory and imagination as well as conception, judgment, and reasoning. As compared with the life of sense, this was something new in the world, and yet it made its appearance, as was desirable, without destroying the order of the physical and psychical processes which lay beneath it.

Thought observes sensations and their conditions, stores them up in memory, and anticipates future possibilities, probabilities, and certainties. Such thought leads to knowledge of the conditions of well-being and happiness on the one hand, and of injury and suffering on the other. It leads, also, to a distinction between such pain as is valuable for guidance or discipline and such as serves no necessary purpose. All such knowledge normally tends to prevent injury and needless suffering and to promote well-being and happiness. For example, man can learn to avoid the pains that follow excess in the pursuit of pleasure, and he can learn to "take pains" enough to provide against much greater future pains for himself and others. The discovery of anæsthetics is simply one conspicuous example of the beneficent function of thought in regulating for man's advantage the processes of sensation. All this is better than any magical elimination of useless pain by arbi-

trary divine intervention, for it leaves the order of nature intact for man's guidance and at the same time provides for man's mental development by giving him problems to solve.

It must be admitted, however, that the emergence of thought makes possible a new species of evil, namely, error. Moreover, error is not only an evil in itself; it is a frequent cause of other kinds of evil. Error as to the ends to be pursued or as to the means to be employed may cause an immense amount of unnecessary suffering and disaster to life and objects of value. Not only is there a failing, through ignorance and error, to remedy remediable evils; there is often the imposition of additional suffering and destruction of life as the direct result of erroneous ideas. Religious persecution is only one instance among many.

But, undesirable as error undoubtedly is and deplorable as its consequences frequently are, it does not seem desirable that it should be magically eliminated by arbitrary miraculous interference with those laws of mind according to which under certain conditions erroneous thinking naturally occurs. But it does seem desirable that there should be some normal way of directing thought in such a way as to make information more accurate and complete and the whole proc-

ess of thinking more effective for good. Now, as a matter of fact, such a normal mode of correcting the natural errors of thought exists in what we call the will, which is essentially just the capacity for controlling, within definite limits, the direction and degree of attention. By means of voluntary attention haphazard thinking is transformed into systematic study, with science as a characteristic result. Moreover, this capacity for voluntary attention, with the real though limited freedom it involves, makes possible something even more significant than science, namely, moral personality itself, and limitless development in the direction of the moral ideal. How infinitely better this way of dealing with error and other evils is than it would be to obliterate them by miraculous intervention, thus destroying the orderliness of mental processes and leaving man with no problems to solve and consequently no possibility of the development of mental power or moral character.

The real though limited freedom of the human will carries with it incalculable possibilities of making the world a better place to live in. As has been intimated above, if all human wills were as good and efficient as by virtue of their freedom they might be, thought would become so potent for good that the life of sense would be so harmonized and physical evils so greatly reduced as ultimately to make the conditions of life on the

earth in most respects almost ideal. Undoubtedly there will always be, under human and earthly conditions, unsolved problems to be grappled with, unavoidable danger to be faced, and unpreventable pain to be endured. But in this way intellectual power will continue to be promoted, and courage, fortitude, and other noble qualities further developed in the life of the spirit.

But the free direction of attention has made possible not only scientific knowledge and the greatest of all goods, moral personality, or the good will; it has made possible, as we have seen, the greatest of all evils as well, namely, sin or moral evil. Moreover, what was made possible when man became a free agent has become actual; moral evil is a fact, and something of what this means, both as an end in itself and as instrumental to other evils, has already been indicated. Even science, fundamentally good as it is, may be perverted to serve the purposes of evil and unsocial wills, making crime more skilful and war so destructive as to threaten the future existence of the race.

Still, no wise man would wish to be without that which has made moral evil possible, namely, free agency, with the laws of character-formation. Without freedom no act could be morally evil; but morally good action would be likewise impossible. Without the laws of character-formation evil

character could not grow from evil conduct, but neither could good character grow from good conduct; man would remain a moral imbecile. Thus moral freedom and the laws of character-formation, with all the risks they entail, are necessary elements in the best possible kind of world, a world in which moral personalities are being produced and developed. However, some of the moral evil which the evolution of free agents made possible, the action of those free agents has made actual; and it remains to ask whether the ways provided for the overcoming of moral evil may be reasonably regarded as the best possible ways, and therefore worthy of a God who is great enough and good enough to be the object of man's absolute worship and trust.

The ways of correcting moral evil are, briefly, two. There is the way of learning, through experience and observation, the consequences of different modes of life; and there is the way of moral salvation through the right religious adjustment. Life is a school with the law of consequences as its curriculum, and those who truly learn its lessons will not be satisfied with mere knowing what is right, but will turn from moral evil and seek the morally good. This provision of a universal system of education through experience, leading to science on the one hand and morality on the other, we may call, using the theologian's term,

"general providence." It applies to everybody, and not to those alone who fulfil certain special religious conditions. Similarly, we may use the term "special providence" for the provision made in the religious experience of moral salvation for the regeneration of the will and ultimately for renovation and development of character in accordance with true ideals. The provision is special in the sense that it is for those who fulfil certain special religious conditions; but we know no one so depraved that we can say there is no such experience for him. Thus there is no distinction from this point of view between special providence and grace.

To a certain extent man can choose what sort of divine providence he will have in his life. He can choose the long, roundabout, second-best sort of providence, the trial and error method, frequently doing wrong and reaping its bitter consequences. This is the kind of providence intended to teach those who refuse at first the preferred method of special providence, which is to have the good will vitalized in the experience which follows persistence in the right relation to God. The only thing which can keep any one ultimately from such a religious experience will be, we may believe, his own free will. This religious experience of moral salvation, it should be noted, is not a merely negative experience of being passively de-

livered from evil; it is a positive experience of spiritual achievement, through right adjustment to God. Moreover, as is especially significant in connection with our present problem, the experience involves no infringement of the freedom of man's will, nor any interference with the laws of the human mind. It seems reasonable, therefore, to believe that in his way of dealing with moral evil, through the "general providence" of the school of experience in general and the "special providence" of the experience of saving grace, God's method is better than any substitute that could be devised.

Throughout our discussion it has been suggested from time to time that certain relative evils may be and often have been made instrumental to good. But it is important that this be not misconstrued. We would maintain that deliberate moral evil is absolute evil; it will be forever regrettable; we may learn from moral evil, indeed, but it can never be rightly regarded as good, from any possible point of view. As has been well said, there never was an evil deed such that a good deed in its place would not have been better. But there is also a great deal of evil which is really evil in the sense that, generally speaking, it ought to be destroyed, which nevertheless may not only be made instrumental to good, but may even become a means of greater good than would likely

have been realized, at least so soon, without it. This is true, many times, of such evils as privation, superfluous pain, immaturity, crudity, lack of knowledge, danger of individual or social disaster. Man has had to exert himself and to join with other like-minded persons in order to overcome these evils, either for his own sake or for those with whom he has sympathy; and out of this exertion and co-operation have come intellectual growth and science, moral character, æsthetic culture, and an increasing sense of human brotherhood. Of all such relative evils Royce's dictum holds true: "Evil is a good thing—to overcome."

Let us, then, for clearness, bring together in conclusion some of the main steps in our somewhat complicated argument for the reasonableness of an essentially Christian faith in God, in spite of the fact of evil. A physical world of absolutely dependable mechanical and chemical law is a better basis for the development of physical life than any alternative that can be suggested. But the working out of the natural processes in such a world tends to prove disastrous at times to physical life and to objects having value for life. On the other hand, the development of moral personality in man requires a creative free agency on his part, which freedom, we may suppose, may have required for its appearance in the course of evolution an essentially similar though less developed

free or "vitalistic" factor in the lower orders of life from which man has ascended. A means of guarding against the disasters involved both in the realm of mechanical and chemical law and in the partially free or creative evolution of life is found in the facts of sensation, including pain. Sensation itself, while an absolute novelty, occurs according to law; consequently under certain circumstances there tend to be instances of needless pain. A means of guarding against needless pain and also against disasters to life and values is to be found in thought. The processes of thought also occur according to law, with the consequence that under certain circumstances there tends to be erroneous thought. A means of guarding against error is to be found in the capacity of directing attention, within necessary limits and yet in a free and creative way. This free agency, however, while indispensable for the development of moral personality, also necessarily involves the possibility of moral evil, which, when it becomes actual, carries with it a train of error, needless suffering, and disaster to life and objects of value. A means of guarding effectively against moral evil is to be found not so much in the trial and error method by itself as in the method of adding to the lessons of experience in general the religious experience of moral salvation, an experience which occurs without violation of the laws

of nature or of mind and without interfering in the slightest with the free agency of man. But in spite of all that sensation, thought, free will, and the religious experience of moral salvation can do, there remains the inevitable fact of physical death. To meet this phase of the problem of evil it is necessary to postulate personal survival of bodily death—a belief necessarily bound up with moral optimism and in the light of our best knowledge theoretically permissible, so that in view of our discussion up to this point it is to be regarded as eminently reasonable and presumably true.

We have not claimed to furnish *demonstrative proof, from an examination of the facts,* that the world we live in is for us the best possible kind of world. We do not know enough for that. But we do claim that, while it is obvious that the world, in so far as it is what man has made it, is very far from being as yet the best possible world, nevertheless the world, in its general constitution and in so far as it may be thought of as being what God has made it, *may be reasonably believed to be the best possible kind of world for the present stage of man's development.* Indeed, the world in which we live is a marvellous combination of creation and evolution, spontaneity and orderliness, the needed novelty when it is needed and the necessary continuity of natural law. The Cosmic Power seems able to bring out of its treasury things

new and old, as they may be necessary, in order that the world may be the best possible kind of world to be the scene of the first stage of man's existence. It seems not unreasonable, then, to believe that that same Cosmic Power is great enough and good enough for man's absolute dependence and trust. A normal and spiritually necessary moral optimism leads naturally and logically to this essentially Christian faith in God, and we know no fact which should be regarded as fatal to the reasonableness of this belief. While, then, we do not claim that the traditional doctrine of divine providence is beyond criticism, we nevertheless find that it is eminently reasonable to believe that God is purposively at work in the world, exercising a providential control over the events of time that is adequate to every religious need of man. And while we do not claim that the old teleological argument for the existence of God on the basis of the mutual adaptations of organisms and their environment amounts to a logical demonstration—evidences of "natural selection" have made that less feasible than ever —still we would venture the opinion that in showing that the fact of evil in the world is not incompatible with belief in a God who is great enough and good enough for every religious need of man, and that in its general constitution the world may be reasonably believed to be the best

possible kind of world for the present stage of man's existence, we have vindicated all that is essential in the argument from "evidences of design."

CHAPTER VIII

REVELATION

The problem of divine providence in face of the facts of evil is one of the two chief problems suggested by the essentially Christian idea of God which moral optimism involves. The second problem, not entirely separable from the former, is that of revelation. Moral optimism implies the existence of God, a dependable higher Power, great enough and favorable enough to man to do for man what he imperatively needs to have done for him, if he is to be logically justified in his moral optimism. This adequate and friendly higher power is, as we have seen, reasonably believed to be essentially personal, social, moral, acting consciously, intelligently, and in holy love with reference to the true welfare of human beings.

All this being reasonable belief on the basis of moral optimism, the question is sure to arise, Is it not reasonable to expect that this personal, moral, social God will reveal Himself to man? Must not the divine love express itself in communication of some sort with human persons? Is it not reasonable to expect God to take the initiative in such communication and revelation? And, more especially, if man were whole-heartedly

to seek after God, would it not be incredible that a God adequate to man's needs in wisdom, love, and power, should persistently refuse to reveal himself in response to man's appeal?

The movement of our thought here is similar to that of the older apologetics. There it was maintained that it was reasonable to expect a moral personal God to reveal himself to man. But it was assumed that that revelation would necessarily involve a miraculous intrusion of the supernatural, and that its content would be found in the sacred book of some religious faith. The next step was to compare the sacred books of the great world religions, with the result that to the Christian apologist it was very evident that the Christian Scriptures were vastly superior to the sacred writings of any other religion. Accepting the Bible, then, as divine revelation, it was concluded that it must be perfect in every respect, inerrant, and infallible, since God, who gave it, was himself perfect in wisdom, in goodness, and in power. Naturally the miracle-stories were taken as at once evidence of the supernaturalness and divine authority of the record and themselves proved authentic by their being recorded in that infallible divine Book.

This procedure of the older apologetics was notoriously an illustration of the false and vicious "rationalization" to which reference has already

been made. What really actuated the older apologists was the wish to dispense with reason as a guide as soon as possible—for it was a guide of which they were secretly afraid—to take refuge in some absolute external authority. One can understand the motive of the older apologists, but their argument is unsound in at least three particulars. It is indeed reasonable to expect revelation from a friendly Being of adequate wisdom and power, but it does not follow, and it is dogmatic to assume, that the revelation will turn out to be an infallible Book—or, for that matter, the *ex cathedra* utterances of an infallible church. A particular book, authorized by a particular church, might conceivably contain a human record of divine revelation, but it would not follow that it was itself that revelation. In fact, it cannot even be assumed that revelation will be primarily in the realm of doctrine, propositions addressed to the intellect. It is quite conceivable that it should be in experience, in the deeper realms of the spiritual life.

Again, the supposed book-revelation and church-revelation are easily seen by the critically-minded to be very far from inerrant and infallible. To refer to a specific instance, can we accept as inerrant the statement, made in the supposedly infallible Book and endorsed by the supposedly infallible Church, that in the time of David it was

a sin to take a census of the population, but that God commanded David to number the people and then punished the people for what David did at God's command? And if we can accept this, can we also accept as inerrant the statement made in another part of the Bible with regard to the same incident that it was Satan who led David to number the people?

In the third place and finally, the older apologists were dogmatic in assuming that revelation necessarily involves miracle in the ordinary sense of that word. On the contrary, we have seen good reason why the world should be an orderly and dependable world, and there is the same reason why revelation should not make it cease to be thus orderly and dependable. In fact, if there is to be revelation, there are the best of reasons why it, too, should be orderly and dependable, not arbitrary or exclusive, but equally accessible to all who fulfil the same conditions.

Turning, then, from criticism to construction, we assume not only that revelation is to be expected, but that the to-be-expected revelation will itself be orderly and dependable. Next, let us return to the thought that in the general constitution of the world as a world of natural law, of the orderly evolution of sensation, thought, and human freedom, of educative discipline through consequences and opportunity for the religious expe-

rience of moral salvation, we have confirmation of that adequate providential control of the universe which moral optimism logically involves. Then let us bring these two lines of thought together and find, in the processes to which we have just referred, the true and universally accessible revelation of the God of our morally optimistic and essentially Christian faith. On the one hand, there is natural law and the orderly evolution of life, leading through sensation to thought and creative human freedom, with capacity for aspiration toward the spiritual ideal. All this, confirming belief in the general providence of God, as we have seen, may be interpreted as constituting at the same time God's *general revelation*, accessible to all who are capable of normal human experience. The philosophical conception suggested is that of a constant and progressive immanence of God in the world of nature and of man. On the other hand, in the special religious experience of moral salvation, of spiritual achievement through a definite religious adjustment, an experience accessible to all who will fulfil the necessary conditions, there is what may be regarded not only as special providence but at the same time as *special revelation*. This normal religious experience of spiritual uplift through the right religious adjustment is the true answer to prayer. It is the dependable response of Reality to the

faith and self-devotion of man, and that Reality which responds in dependable fashion to religious faith and self-devotion is what religion must regard as God.

By this experience of special revelation is not meant, at least primarily, the mystical experience, though there is a place in true religion for mysticism, so long as it remains under rational and moral control. In the more mystical phase of normal experimental religion the individual gains a highly dynamic and wholly desirable subjective assurance of the most essential truths of religion. Moreover, in mystical religion hypotheses are suggested which may be tested in reflection and in the experiences of practical life in general and in those of the practical religious life in particular. But the special revelation of God in religious experience to which we have been referring has nothing necessarily esoteric about it. It is not primarily an emotional experience, but an experience in the realm of the will. It is simply the difference which persistence in a certain practical religious attitude, which we may call the right religious adjustment, makes in the spiritual and particularly in the moral achievement of normal human beings.

In this idea of special divine revelation in special religious experience we have the vital essence of the old miracle-faith. It is what we may call

the new Christian supernaturalism. The revelation is found in the dependable response of Reality to man's right religious adjustment. But there is room, also, for recognition of the divine initiative in leading man into the right religious adjustment. This divine initiative may be partly a matter of what we have called general providence and general revelation, and partly a matter of what we have called special providence and special revelation. There are events within the field of human experience, in the present as well as in the past, which have special significance, objectively as well as subjectively, as furnishing evidence of the reality, presence, and activity of God as a living, responding Factor in the lives of human beings. This is all that is essential in supernaturalism.

And yet, while this view, that special revelation is to be found in the dependable experience of spiritual and particularly moral salvation through the right religious adjustment, is the permanently valid essence of Christian supernaturalism, it would be equally true to say that it overcomes the old antithesis between natural and revealed religion. Revelation of the reality of God in the religious experience of moral salvation is as normal and natural as any other process of cognition. It is the discovery of reality through experience.

A dependable religious experience is what we ought to expect of a dependable religious Reality,

when we discover and practise the right religious adjustment. And whatever else that responding Reality may be, it is at once an existent Factor and the God of experimental religion. It seems to be what Christianity has meant, essentially, by the "Holy Spirit." The existence and revelation of this God may not be universally verified; but the claim is made with a challenge to investigation, that it is universally verifiable. And the verifiable fact, it should be noted, is not simply a fact of subjective religious experience, a fact of the psychology of religion; it is a fact statable in terms of what a real Factor can be depended upon for, and as such it is a verifiable fact of religious knowledge, of theology. Even if everything else in our thought of God were to remain mere postulate and theory, this at least would be scientific fact and enough to make empirical theology, in germ at least, truly scientific.

In this use of the religious experience of moral salvation to establish as fact the existence of the God of experimental religion, we have the complement to the moral argument in one of its possible forms. On the basis of sinful man's need of moral salvation, the existence of God, the moral Saviour, may be postulated as humanly imperative. What this argument postulates as necessary (and it is what moral optimism would find it reasonable to believe), this the religious experience

of moral salvation reveals as truth and Reality, namely, a Power, not identifiable with ourselves, that makes for righteousness in and through us, when we persist in the right religious adjustment.

As a matter of fact, the only adequate proof of the existence of the God of religion is to be found in experience, and in religious experience particularly. It is always through experience that existence is demonstrated, whether the particular existent in question be a physical thing, one's own personal self, another human person, or God. Mere deduction can establish no more than logical possibility. As is being seen more clearly in our day than formerly, the ontological argument —proceeding from an analysis of the idea to an affirmation of existence—is valid only when experience can be appealed to as establishing the idea. One phase of this empirical ontological argument is virtually present, as we have already seen, in Schleiermacher's substitution of the universality of the feeling of absolute dependence for the supposedly universal classic arguments. In our inescapable experience of absolute dependence we are aware of a Reality upon which we are dependent, and this reality, ill-defined as it may be at first, is God. But in moral experimental religion, as we now see, we can carry this empirical argument further. In the dependable experience of moral salvation through a certain religious ad-

justment we are aware of the existence of a Factor in Reality which delivers from evil and makes higher spiritual achievement possible; and that Factor is the God of moral experimental religion, or, to use the historic Christian term, the "Holy Spirit."

We see, then, that in its true form, as Professor Hocking has well said, the ontological argument is a report of experience. But it is an argument which, even in its empirical form, is not without its difficulties. While it is readily seen that the existence of God, defined in some very general way, can be proved from dependably successful religious adjustment, it seems more difficult to establish in this way the existence of the highly defined moral personal God of Christian faith. We may surmise, indeed, that the ontological argument in its finally satisfactory form is an ideal which has never yet been completely realized. To prove the existence of God by experience, the idea of God must be correct and experience adequate, and most modern religion is defective in both respects.

In this connection it is interesting to place in juxtaposition a typical philosophical statement and a declaration which has been common among mystics. A well-known philosopher (the late Professor Simmel, of Berlin) has made the assertion that there is nothing more certain than what God

is—as Object of spiritual worship He can be no less than ideal personality—but, it is added, there is nothing more uncertain than *that* God is. The mystic, on the other hand, says he is immediately certain that God is, but confesses inability to say just what God is. The ideal for religion would be to bring together these two complementary assurances. This would mean being assured through religious experience of the existence of a Being in whom the true ideal of personality is embodied. (Is it not significant that, according to tradition, the historic Jesus was assured of the existence of ideal Personality—one who is at once "Your Father" and "perfect"?)

Acknowledging, then, that the ontological argument in its full and final form may very well be, as far as we are concerned, an unrealized ideal, we may ask how far in the direction of that ideal we are in a position to go. The answer is to be found in large part, we should say, in bringing together the universal religious consciousness of a Reality upon which we are absolutely dependent and the results of our analysis of the belief in God involved in moral optimism—this on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the proof, in the dependable experience of moral salvation through a certain religious adjustment, of the existence of a dependable morally saving and uplifting Factor in Reality. The Object of our ultimate depen-

dence undoubtedly exists, and if moral optimism is valid, there must exist, as the Factor upon which we are ultimately dependent, a Being great enough and good enough for our absolute trust, and thus essentially identical with "God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." On the other hand, the God of ultimately successful religious dependence, the dependable Factor making for moral salvation and spiritual achievement, especially on condition of the right religious adjustment, whose existence is proved in experimental religion at its best, is essentially identical with "the Holy Spirit" of Christian faith. Nor does it seem unreasonable to surmise that these two, God the Father and God the Holy Spirit, are in reality one and the same God, differently conceived and experienced because differently approached. At any rate, according to the principle of parsimony, the burden of proof would seem to be on those who would assert that there are two Gods, rather than one.

In showing, as we have done, the reasonableness, on the basis of moral optimism and religious experience, of believing in the existence of an Object of absolute human dependence, an essentially personal, rational, and moral Being, sufficient in power to conserve all absolute values, and a Factor dependable, on condition of a certain religious adjustment, for the experience of moral salvation;

and finding nothing fatal to the natural religious surmise that these are one and the same religious Object, we may consider ourselves to have vindicated sufficiently for practical religious purposes the reasonableness of an essentially Christian idea of God. In view, too, of our earlier discussions, we may now claim to have shown the reasonableness of essential Christianity, both as morality and as religion. What we have done has made for the supplying of the missing link in modern apologetic argument between the valid elements in the Ritschlian and in the Hegelian apologetics, between the proposition that essential Christianity is what is most valuable in historic Christianity and the proposition that what is reasonable is true. In other words, we have gathered evidence which goes to show that what is most valuable in historic Christianity is reasonable, thereby indicating the logical conclusion that essential Christianity is true.

Our argument has thus avoided the characteristic weakness of most recent apologetics, the resting, first and last, in subjective feeling. It has been addressed to the outsider quite as much as to those already committed to the Christian faith. It has thus led to reasons—not purely speculative but deeply grounded in life, and yet universally valid and objective—for accepting essentially Christian views of freedom, immortality, God,

providence, and revelation. It only remains to inquire into the reasonableness of the Christian faith in the divine person and saving work of Jesus, who is called Christ.

CHAPTER IX

THE HISTORIC JESUS

In discussing the reasonableness of Christian faith our procedure thus far, it will have been noted, departs widely from that of the older apologetics. Not only have we said nothing in our constructive statement about what Locke set up as the distinctive essence of Christianity, namely, belief in Jesus as the Messiah. Our argument has not even concerned itself with the historic Jesus, much less with the theological Christ. Whereas the older apologists sought to establish the supernatural authority of Jesus Christ as the basis for everything else in Christianity, we began by showing that moral optimism is normal, spiritually necessary, and at least initially reasonable. Then, assuming this moral optimism, we have shown that it is reasonable to have an essentially Christian faith in human freedom, in personal immortality, and in a God great enough and good enough for man's absolute dependence and trust; a moral, personal God, adequate in wisdom, power, and holy love to meet all man's imperative religious needs; adequate in providential control of the world in spite of the facts of evil; discoverable and revealed in human experience; the Object

of absolute dependence; the dependable Source of the religious experience of moral salvation; responding thus to man's need and entering into communion with mankind. In the course of our analysis of these implications and their examination in the light of accessible facts and values, we have found them confirmed. They are permissible; they are reasonable; they are in course of being verified; and so they are presumably true. Incidentally, in this way the moral optimism from which these consequences have been deduced has also been confirmed.

The advantage of this procedure over that of the older apologetics should be evident. It has been through no oversight that nothing has been said of Christology or of the historic Jesus. There is an important tactical advantage in showing how extensive and vital is that content or essence of Christianity which can be defended successfully without any assumption as to particular facts of history. We escape the danger of infecting the entire content of essential Christian belief with the necessary incertitude of historical opinion. All that has been said of the reasonableness and truth of Christianity is demonstrably valid, whether we have any Christology or not, and whatever we may or may not believe about the historic Jesus. It would still be valid if it should turn out that Jesus was essentially different from

what has been commonly believed, or even that he was not truly historical at all.

This is a matter of great importance not only for Christian apologetics but for Christian faith. That was a pitiable confusion of thought when the clergyman who had spent fifty years in the ministry concluded, as he has recently made public under the title *Confessions of an Old Priest*, that he would have to give up Christianity, for the reason that Christianity is identified with the ancient Christological creeds, and these creeds are centrally concerned with alleged historical miracles, while as a matter of fact—so he had come to believe—miracles do not happen, never have happened, and ought not to happen. As one of the most penetrating of American religious thinkers, the late George B. Foster, was never tired of insisting, there is nothing in the past which is in the past alone and not also in the present, which can be of the essence of Christianity as a living religion (see *Christianity in Its Modern Expression*, 1921, pp. 8, 156–158). Bousset was right as against Troeltsch when he pointed out that historical certainty cannot be manufactured at the bidding of the theologian, and that it is the systematic thinker's task to lead faith to a sure foundation, independent of the uncertainties of historical investigation. And we may now say that in the normality and reasonableness of moral

optimism, in the essentially Christian character and theoretical permissibility of its implications, and in the dependable fact of a repeatable and essentially Christian religious experience of moral salvation, we have a foundation for faith laid bare, which is demonstrably clear of the uncertainties which beset the path of the historical critic.

Let us be clear as to just what we are and what we are not saying about Christology and belief in the historicity of Jesus. We are not maintaining that Christianity would have arisen where and when it did without the historic Jesus or without Christology; on the contrary, it may be that there is no reasonable historical explanation of the rise of Christianity, except on the assumption of the historicity of Jesus. Neither are we denying that Christology and belief in the historicity of Jesus are *psychologically* necessary for the Christian faith of certain persons at certain times. What we do seem to have found sufficient reason to conclude is that an essentially Christian faith in God and an essentially Christian experience of moral salvation through the right religious adjustment are *logically* possible without either Christology or an assured belief in the historicity of Jesus. This being granted, it becomes clear that we are not under the necessity of substituting for the discarded external authority of the priest in matters of fundamental religious faith the external

authority of the historical critic. We have a logical right to be essentially Christian without the one or the other. Christian religious faith and the Christian moral life are essentially autonomous. Fundamentally they are a moral and religious attitude of will, not an opinion on any matter of historical investigation. It is only to be expected that on such intricate questions of historical criticism as the extent to which the Jesus of the Gospels is truly historical, equally honest scientific historians will come to more or less widely differing conclusions. But it should be clear that the Christian moral ideal, as it has been set forth above, is valid, apart altogether from the question as to how far it was historically realized or even taught by the historic Jesus; and similarly it should be clear that Christian optimism and faith in God are reasonably believable and progressively verifiable in human experience to-day, whether they were believed and verified by the historic Jesus or not. If one can believe in an essentially Christian morality and Christian optimism, with what the latter involves for belief in God and a future life, he can logically believe enough to enable him to become a Christian and experience the revelation of God in moral salvation.

But granting that Christology and belief in the historicity of Jesus are not absolutely indispensa-

ble, logically, to the exercise of an essentially Christian faith or to the living of an essentially Christian life, it does not follow that such beliefs have no moral or religious value. It may very well be that a certain belief in the historicity of Jesus and a certain Christology are, if not logically essential to the *being*, still psychologically essential to the highest *well-being* of Christianity, both intensively in the individual and extensively throughout the world. The loss to the world would be neither trivial nor merely apparent, if it became necessary to hold that never within the human race had there arisen a real Jesus of Nazareth; in its self-consciousness humanity would be immeasurably poorer without that presence which, above any other, dignifies the race and raises our estimate of the value of every human life. Indeed, to those who have come not simply to believe in the Jesus of history, but truly to love him, it may well seem psychologically impossible to discredit his historic reality; viewed as an end in himself he seems indispensable, and they refuse to give him up. This is very subjective, of course, and proves nothing in the realm of historical opinion; but subjectivity is not falsity. The subjectively valuable may be found to be objectively valid, on other grounds. Pedagogically, too, belief in the fundamental historicity of Jesus and his religious interpretation in an essentially Christological sense

have very great value. They make it possible to present the Christian ideal in morals and religion as a following of the magnetic and inspiring leadership of Christ; and, thus presented, Christianity makes a wide and very powerful appeal. Whatever the logical possibilities may be, in most instances even now, after two millenniums, it is only with and by means of thoughts of the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith that Christian faith and life become a psychological reality.

But the belief is not of pedagogical and psychological value only; its logical value, while not indispensable, is very great. It goes without saying that belief in the historicity of Jesus is logically indispensable to Christian faith in Jesus Christ; but what we are dealing with is Christian faith in God. Assuming the fact of Jesus, we can point to a more impressive instance of individual verification of the Christian type of faith in his experience than is to be found anywhere else. This is not to overlook the important distinction, already actually made, between historic fact and scientific fact. Historic fact is once for all; scientific fact is essentially repeatable, verifiable in present-day experience when the appropriate conditions are fulfilled.* Now it is the binding of Christian faith

* Essentially identical, for most purposes, with the distinction, of which Professor J. B. Pratt has recently made use, between historic fact and scientific fact, is the common distinction between particular data and empirical laws.

to historic fact, in such a way that the validity of the faith stands or falls with the historicity of the fact, that is dangerous. This is that "entangling alliance of religion and history" which is so fatal to religious assurance in the modern mind, with its critical and even sceptical investigation of reputed historic fact. Religious faith must find objectivity and verification in fact; but this must be fact in the scientific sense. The religious hypothesis must be progressively verifiable in our own experience, when we fulfil the appropriate conditions. But, granted the importance of this distinction between historic and scientific fact, it is also true that in some individual lives the necessary conditions of the best type of religious experience have been more fully met than in others, and there may very well be a great historic fact which for this very reason is supreme in verifying value. Indeed, this is what we undoubtedly have in the religious experience and moral life of the historic Jesus. It helps to confirm us in our Christian convictions, and rightly so, to reflect that those hypotheses of which we are receiving verification in our own experience were still more fully verified in the religious experience of the historic Jesus. In his experience the reality of an uplifting power, able to deliver from evil on condition of the right religious adjustment, was amply demonstrated. Thus the historic fact of Jesus has

value for establishing more securely the scientific fact of revelation of the saving power of God.

But Jesus' verification of the Christian belief in revelation cannot be said to be logically indispensable to the maintenance of Christian faith to-day. Jesus himself was logically justified in his faith, although it was without dependence upon any equivalent of the historic Jesus before his day. And for us it would be harder, no doubt, but not necessarily impossible to be or remain Christian in faith and life, if we had to give up belief in the historicity of Jesus. If that particular verification of the Christian faith which we find in Jesus were lacking, it would still be possible and all the more necessary to supply the lack by renewed attention to verifying experiences in the past and present, and especially by fulfilling the conditions of further verification in the future.

In these last statements it has been assumed that Jesus' own religion was essentially Christian. There are some scholars who dispute this, maintaining that Christianity is the religion or gospel about Jesus, not the religion of Jesus himself. Formally and verbally, we may admit they are correct. The Christianity of the apostolic church expressed itself in terms of belief about Jesus, in Christology. And, no doubt, the leaders of the early church may be reasonably regarded as the founders of Christological Christianity. But if we

are discussing the Christian religious life and experience rather than the Christological forms in which it expressed itself, if God-consciousness is the central thing in religion, and if Jesus imparted his God-consciousness to his disciples, then, it would seem, the Christian God-consciousness was in Jesus, and his religion was essentially Christian.

We have assumed for the sake of argument in these preliminary observations that the Jesus of Christian tradition is essentially historical, although we have maintained that essential Christianity would be reasonable even if this were not true. We have been ready to admit the incalculable value of belief in Jesus of Nazareth as historical and of the Christological interpretation of his person; but we have served notice to the historical critic that we do not regard the work he is doing as settling the question of the life or death of the Christian religion. However, the Christianity we are defending is not, as a matter of fact, a Christianity without the historic Jesus, nor is it a Christianity without Christology. There is an important Christological appendix to the main body of modern Christian apologetics. In undertaking, then, to show the essential reasonableness as well as religious value of the Christological element in Christianity, the first step will be to show how reasonable it is to believe in the essential historicity of Jesus.

The essential historicity of Jesus does not mean that all details of the Messianic picture brought before us in the New Testament, or even in the earliest gospel story, are historically accurate. Much of the discredit into which Christian apologetics has fallen was due to the attempt to defend the absolute accuracy of New Testament tradition instead of simply seeking the truth as to how far it is accurate. We must know no other procedure in defending the historicity of any individual or event than the procedure of scientific historical criticism. In fact, methodical doubt must be used as a means, if we are to have any assured standing ground in the end. We must let that be shaken which can be shaken, if that which cannot be shaken is to be seen to remain. In dealing with the central figure of the gospels, the husk or shell of interpretation must be removed, in order that we may get at the kernel of assured historical fact.

Now it is neither practicable nor desirable to exhibit here, step by step, the processes or even in any detail the results of scientific historical study of the New Testament. Even the general results of that study will be assumed by us for the most part, rather than stated. It should not be necessary any longer among the well-informed to argue at length to show that there is an intermediate position which is more reasonable than

the doctrines of those conservative and radical extremists, both of whom would insist that we must accept the New Testament picture of Jesus the Messiah in every detail, or else give up belief in the historicity of Jesus altogether.

What has seemed to me one of the most important recent contributions to Christian apologetics on its historical side is to be found in Professor B. W. Bacon's *Christianity Old and New.* There it is pointed out that in our three earliest documentary sources of information as to the historic Jesus—the genuine letters of Paul, the main content of the Gospel of Mark, and the "second source" used by 'Matthew' and 'Luke'—we already have pictures of Jesus drawn under the influence of the belief that he was the one whom God had chosen to be Messiah to his people. The critical student must therefore be prepared to find details of the pictures which can be more reasonably interpreted as supplied by the writer's presuppositions as to what the Messiah must be, than as an objective portrayal of actual facts. Thus the Marcan portrait is that of a strong Son of God, clothed with God-derived Messianic authority and power over nature and the spirit-world; in the letters of Paul we meet the suffering Servant of the Lord, the Man from Heaven, voluntarily undergoing humiliation and death for the redemption of his chosen; and, finally, in the sec-

ond source material of the synoptic gospels we find depicted the Servant of the Lord in whom dwelt the spirit of wisdom and understanding, as well as of power and the fear of the Lord, and whose words were consequently the words of divine wisdom and truth. Now, as Professor Bacon admits, these pictures were all drawn under the influence of certain traditional notions as to what the Messiah must be, and are therefore not to be taken uncritically as necessarily historically accurate just because they happen to be part of our earliest available records on the subject.

But while this is true, it is also a fact that the pictures are distinct enough to make it unreasonable to regard any one of the three as having been derived from the others. Moreover, while different from each other, they are not in conflict with each other. It is possible, so far as internal evidence is concerned, that all three sources may give essentially correct information as to the sort of person Jesus was. And that this is indeed the case, it is reasonable to believe in view of the fact that all three portraits of the personality of Jesus were accepted by the primitive Christian community as a true likeness at a time so early that it could be known "by authentic report, if not from personal experience, to what degree the titles and ascriptions were in keeping with the life." People who had known Jesus before his crucifixion, or

who had known those who had been his companions, would not be in a position to deny all legendary stories which might have been added to the true account of what Jesus said and did; but they *would* be able to correct fundamentally false representations as to the kind of person Jesus was. We may be reasonably sure, therefore, that Jesus was such a person as could be appropriately pictured as the strong Son of God, speaking and acting with an authority and power as of God, and yet the suffering Servant of the Lord, and withal one whose words were words of divine wisdom.

This is the argument, and we may go further and say that if this much of the New Testament picture of the historic Jesus is accurate, it is entirely reasonable on the same principle to suppose that more than this is also substantially correct. The question as to just how much more of the record is to be taken as historically reliable it may not be possible to decide with any assurance of infallibility; but there is a reasonable course between credulity and utter scepticism which the critically-minded may pursue. There are elements to be eliminated as more reasonably explained by presuppositions in the minds of the writers than as due to the facts, but in many other instances the opposite is true. And, no doubt, we shall be confirmed in the judgment that the Jesus of the gospels is essentially historical, the essence of the

gospel portrait being that in the total picture which it is possible for us to retain on critical grounds, and which must be retained if the New Testament picture of Jesus as the Christ is to continue to have for the modern mind its unique moral and religious value.

It is reasonable, then, to maintain the essential historicity of Jesus. Precisely that which is most valuable for the Christian consciousness is that of which we can be most reasonably certain. We can be practically assured of his spirit, of the main content of his moral and religious message, of his attitudes, values, and aims. There can be no reasonable doubt—and here I follow Professor F. C. Porter—that in thought, word, and deed Jesus exalted purity of heart, inwardness, humility, childlike sincerity, courage, freedom from covetousness, generous forgiveness, love of enemies, self-denial, unworried trust in God as the perfect Father, unselfish love and service to the poor and needy and to the outcast and little children. In spite of much uncertainty as to details, our knowledge of the historic Jesus is extensive enough and sure enough to be made the basis of a religious valuation of his person and work.

CHAPTER X

THE PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST

The permanent contributions of the historic Jesus to humanity, we shall maintain, are mainly three. He set before man the true moral example, the true religious example, and the true revelation of God. Because he discovered, through love, the true worth of man, regarding every human life as of incalculable value, he made morality fundamentally social, rather than a merely individual matter. Thus he set before humanity the true moral example. But he also discovered the true way to God. Carrying his moral and social interest into religion, he thought of God as a friendly moral and social Being; through a moral attitude toward a moral God, he sought religious experience not only for its own sake but also for moral and social ends; thus at the same time making his religion thoroughly moral and bringing into his morality the dynamic of this thoroughly moral religion. In this he set before man the example of a truly religious as well as truly moral and social man.

But in Christianity Jesus is regarded as more than an example to man. He is taken to be a

revelation of God. Is this a reasonable belief? That it is may be gathered from what has already been said. If through his dependence upon and responsiveness to God a truly moral life in exceptional measure was achieved in him, this is reasonably interpreted as a divine work in his life. This is involved in what has been said about revelation in religious experience. The quality of his life would thus represent the ideal toward which the divine activity was and always is directed. This amounts to saying that the quality of Jesus' life was just the quality of the divine will itself. And if the quality of Jesus' life and character revealed the quality of God's life and character, Jesus may be said to have been *divine in the quality or value of his personality.*

Thus the divineness of Jesus Christ in the sense of his divine value came essentially through his religion, however much it may have been augmented through the influence of heredity and environment. Despite his inherent social and moral qualities, his generous love for his fellows, and his earnestness of spirit, he would not have been what he was without his self-surrender to God. The essence of faith in the divinity of Christ is sincere appreciation of his spiritual value, and wholehearted response to his spiritual appeal. Indeed, the more we follow him and enter into a similar religious adjustment, the more we find his spirit

to be divine. And there is more Christianity, more true faith in the divinity of Christ, we may be sure, in honest admiration and following of Jesus the man, than in glib repetition of all the Christological creeds by those who are strangers to his spirit.

Furthermore, when Jesus' character is taken as revelation of the character of God, and Jesus' love to men as revelation of God's love to men; and when as a consequence the individual comes to God in trust and love and self-surrender; or, in other words, when one faithfully follows the religious example of Jesus, moral salvation is the result. This means that, as the historic source of an experience which is really the work of God, Jesus exercises the *divine function* of saving man from his sin.

This is but the continuation in our own day of the function exercised by the historic Jesus in the genesis of our religion. The place which Jesus occupied in the founding of Christianity was undoubtedly central. Christianity grew up about him as its historic source. There is no reasonable historical explanation of the rise of Christianity apart from the influence of the historic Jesus. Whether we call him the Founder of Christianity or not is of no great significance; he is the Foundation, the central and most essential figure in the founding of the Christian religion. And what

he accomplished was done once for all. To the historic Jesus more than to any one else we of to-day owe the Christian ideal, the Christian faith and the Christian experience. Historically for all of us, and psychologically for most of us, he is the author of our salvation. His function, therefore, in human life is the divine function.

But let us see what else is involved in this view that Jesus was divine in quality and in function. If Christ was divine in quality, or Godlike, God must be Christlike; and if God is Christlike, he must have done and be doing a Christlike work for the salvation of men. It would not be Christlike to be able to work for the supreme good of man, and not to do so. But nowhere do we see a fully Christlike work being done for man, except in Christ himself, and in the Christlike in other human lives. Hence it follows that if we can verify in the world of experience the faith that God is like Christ, *God must have been in Christ* and must be in the Christlike, delivering from sin and reconciling to himself. The same conclusion follows more directly from the other proposition, that the function of Christ in humanity is the divine function of effecting moral salvation. The unique thing about the historic Jesus is that the divine was so fully present in him, as evidenced by the value of his personality and his function in the lives of men, that the conspicuous thing

about him comes to be his divineness. *He is the Divine Man;* this is his distinguishing characteristic.

This is the Christian doctrine of divine immanence. It does not deny the divine immanence elsewhere, but it affirms a special immanence in Christ and in the Christlike spirit. It is sometimes supposed that divine immanence is a doctrine of speculative philosophy and not of a truly Christian theology. But it has its roots deep and widely spread in the Christian religion. A moral and essentially Christian optimism involves the omnipresent accessibility of God as a source of help to man. It also involves an adequate divine providential control of all that is. Both of these concepts point to divine immanence. Again, it is reasonable on a morally optimistic basis, as we saw, to expect a divine self-revelation, and to interpret the religious experience of moral salvation as being such a revelation. Now this self-revelation of God in connection with man's moral life means a divine immanence and inworking which, taken in connection with the evolutionary concept, strongly suggests a wider presence of the divine in nature and humanity as the necessary precondition of the higher immanence in special revelation. Furthermore, not only does the doctrine of a divine incarnation in Christ suggest the reasonableness of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit,

that is, of the presence of the divine in the Christlike; these doctrines of incarnation and the Holy Spirit, taken with the evolutionary concept, suggest once more a wider divine immanence as the necessary precondition of the specialized immanence in Christ and the Christlike. But the acme of immanence is incarnation. God was in Christ, and it is there that we most surely and satisfactorily find him.

We may now take one further step. Believing in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, it becomes clear that it is also reasonable to believe the vital religious essence of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. We have already seen reason to believe that "God the Father," the God of moral optimism, is not a different God from "God the Holy Spirit," the God of the religious experience of moral salvation. The two, we may reasonably believe, are one and the same divine Being, the one and presumably personal God, viewed under different aspects corresponding to his different revelations to men. Now we are in a position to add that it is this one God, the Father or Holy Spirit, who indwelt in such fulness the life of the historic Jesus and gave him so divine a value and function in human history and experience that he is rightly regarded as *the* divine Man, *the* historic revelation of God in man. Consequently, the full vitality of the Christian view of

God is realized only as we think of the one God of our faith as the perfect and all-powerful Father, revealed in the Spirit of Jesus of Nazareth, the divine Son, and immanent in the spiritual life of man and active in the religious experience of moral salvation as the Holy Spirit.

What goes beyond this in the traditional doctrine of the Trinity (by which we mean the doctrine of three eternal Persons who are nevertheless but one divine Being), is the product of the Greek speculative philosophy of the early centuries of the Christian era—a philosophy which can hardly be said to be the philosophy of the modern mind. Modern theologians and philosophers have sought in various ways to galvanize it into a semblance of life, but with very doubtful success. What we have set forth here as the vital religious essence of the Trinitarian thought is all we need to be concerned to defend as reasonable and true.

This religious kernel or essence of Trinitarian Christianity, stated in terms compatible with modern historical scholarship and present-day philosophical concepts, we may call *the new Christian orthodoxy*. We have maintained that all that is logically essential to a truly Christian faith and life can be stated without reference to the historic Jesus; but it should now be clear that the essence of Christianity can be stated also in terms of the historic Jesus evaluated and interpreted as divine.

He is the Christ, or Messiah, in the sense that he is the representative and revealer of God through whom historically the Christian salvation has been mediated to men. Christianity is the Christocentric religion, a Christlike attitude toward a Christlike God for the sake of realizing Christlike purposes in the individual life and in the world.

We have said that the main contributions of Jesus to humanity were three: the furnishing of the true moral example, the true religious example, and the true revelation of God. All three are involved in the definition, just given, of the essence of Christianity in terms of the historic Jesus. Living in a Christlike attitude toward God is following the religious example of Jesus. The Christlike God is the God revealed in Jesus. Entertaining Christlike purposes with reference to the individual and the world involves following the moral example of Jesus.

Assuming, then, the historicity of Jesus, his fundamental place in the Christian consciousness is permanently assured. He represents in concrete embodiment the essence of Christianity. On the one hand, he represents God in humanity; he is the divine Man, the living Word, the Son and Revealer of God, the Incarnation of the Spirit of God. On the other hand, he is the Redeemer and Saviour of men, the bringer of life and immortality to light, the Great High Priest of humanity, the

Mediator and Reconciler between God and sinful men.

This latter phase of Christian thought is so central and significant that it should receive further elaboration and defense. As it is often stated, the doctrine of the saving work of Christ must seem to the critically-minded both immoral and unreasonable. But this is not true of the essence of the evangelical message. Reasonable Christianity includes not only a new Christian supernaturalism and a new Christian orthodoxy, as already set forth, but a *new Christian evangelicalism* as well. To state precisely what this is will be at the same time to make clear its inherent reasonableness and truth.

To begin with the simplest aspect of the saving work of Christ, it may be pointed out that the love and self-sacrifice, the sufferings and martyr's death of Jesus, viewed simply as a man, are full of moral inspiration. In so far as man is led by this inspiring moral *example* to adopt Jesus' principle and imitate from the heart his way of life, he is *at one* with God.

But the moral example of Jesus brings to sinful man a feeling of self-condemnation, and not inspiration alone. When Jesus is viewed not as human simply but as divine, when the cross of Christ is taken as revealing "the cross eternally in the heart of God" on account of the sin of man

whom God loves, when the pure self-giving love of Christ is taken as *revelation* of the love and grace of God, then sinful man is impelled to come to God in repentance and trust, in self-surrender and love. Thus, through responding to the love and grace of God, man becomes reconciled to God at heart and fulfils, in sincere repentance, the necessary moral condition of forgiveness, or what is called in less personal terms justification.

It must not be supposed, however, that with this initial reconciliation of God and man on the basis of man's sincere repentance, the divine righteousness is fully satisfied. Much less is it reasonable or moral to suppose that the divine justice was satisfied, centuries before that repentance, by Jesus' vicarious suffering on the cross, viewed as a substitutionary punishment of the sinner's sin. Any such notion is not only not a part of the essence of Christianity; it is essential to the well-being of Christianity that it be eliminated from the Christian's belief. There can be *satisfaction* of the moral, Christlike God only in the destruction of sin and its evil consequences. Full satisfaction of God's righteousness belongs therefore to the future rather than to the past. As is being seen ever more clearly in our day, God must do everything he can do to destroy sin and all ultimate evil, and man as a free agent must also do whatever he can do toward the same end, before

either God or man can have any right to be morally satisfied, and it is only as the triumph of good over evil either is being experienced or is anticipated in faith that there can be any true satisfaction of righteousness, human or divine.

Moreover, true reconciliation of man to God necessarily involves the reconciliation of man to man, and this for two very good reasons. In the first place, God loves our fellow men and cannot justify us if we cherish enmity against them. If we forgive not men their trespasses, neither will God forgive us our trespasses. In the second place, the divine life is immanent in man, so that the Reality we are reconciled to in being reconciled to God is in our fellow men. If we are not ready to be reconciled to man whom we have seen, how shall we be reconciled to God whom we have not seen? Inasmuch as we have or have not done as we ought to the least of Christ's brethren, we have or have not done as we ought to Christ himself, and to the God whom Christ revealed. Full atonement is impossible without the at-one-ment, or unification, of man with man in a universal brotherhood. Full atonement is thus not a fact of past history, but an ideal for the future, and in the end as truly a matter of social relations as it is of personal religious experience.

Having thus followed reason as well as the moral and religious consciousness in interpreting

the person and saving work of Jesus Christ, there is no unreasonable element in our doctrine demanding explanation or "rationalizing" defense. Assuming, as seems reasonable, the essential historicity of Jesus, we have found the doctrines of the divinity of his person and the redemptive value of his loving self-sacrifice to be fundamentally and profoundly true. Thus, while essential Christianity was seen to be reasonable and presumably true, whatever opinion one might be forced to take on matters of historical investigation, it is also seen to be reasonable to adopt, not a Christianity without Christology or belief in the historic Jesus, but Christianity with the historic Jesus and an essentially Christological interpretation of his person. And this Christocentric Christianity is not only indefinitely richer in concreteness of content; it is at the same time equally reasonable and as manifestly true.

CHAPTER XI

KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL

On the assumption that religion is for everybody and not simply for the expert historian or the professional philosopher, we undertook to show the reasonableness of Christianity apart from any dependence upon historical criticism or technical philosophy. And yet, while our argument for the truth of essential Christianity was complete without the appeal to any particular fact of history, we found, through consideration of the historic figure of Jesus, reassurance and added richness of content with respect to the essentials of the Christian life and faith.

Let us see how the case stands with philosophy. We are aware that it is the opinion of some that only by means of philosophy, and very technical philosophy at that, can the reasonableness of Christianity be vindicated. Others again are equally sure that philosophical study will necessarily prove fatal to even such a selected content of historic religion as we have designated the essence of Christianity. Now, while not necessarily depending on philosophy for the defense of the Christian religion, we see no reason to avoid

the philosophical encounter. We do not anticipate that there is anything philosophy has a right to say which would disallow the exercise of the reasonable Christian faith set forth in the preceding chapters. The religious implications of discredited systems of philosophy will have no importance for our present purpose; it will be enough for us if the consequences of the best accredited system of philosophical thought are not antagonistic to essential Christianity. As in the case of history, however, it may turn out that the most reasonable philosophy will also have positive value for Christian apologetics. This remains to be seen.

The philosophical problems which have most direct bearing upon the validity of experimental religion are the problems of knowledge (epistemology) and of reality (metaphysics). We shall first have to make a survey of the field of general epistemology, covering as our principal points of interest the validity of immediate or perceptual knowledge (epistemology proper), the nature and test of the truth of judgments (logical theory), and the scientific method of proof (methodology). In the light of our results in this investigation of the general problem, we shall have to follow a similar course with reference to the problems of religious knowledge, dealing chiefly with the possibility of religious knowledge and the methods

of testing the truth of religious judgments. Then finally we shall have to consider some outstanding problems of metaphysics which have obvious relation to a religious view of the world.

It will be our ambition in considering these somewhat technical problems to keep in as close touch with the point of view and procedure of common sense as the successful scientist habitually does in his own sphere. Both science and philosophy, we take it, should be continuous with common sense, the former in the realm of information, the latter in the realm of wisdom. At their best, both are simply critical common sense. Possibly the point of view suggested may be indicated a little more clearly by means of a parable.

What is called the history of philosophy is the record of a checkered career, the story of the wanderings and excesses of a prodigal. For a certain father, named Common Sense, had two sons, Science and Philosophy. And Philosophy, being dissatisfied at home, said to his father: "Father, give me the portion of thy substance that falleth to me." And he divided unto them his living, giving to Science the field of all possible information, and to Philosophy all the treasures of available wisdom. Science soon proved himself a dutiful son. He dwelt soberly at home with Common Sense, scorning the delights of uncontrolled imagination and living laborious days to such an ex-

tent that he was able gradually to amass a very considerable treasure of well-ordered knowledge. But with Philosophy it was not so. Having gathered everything together, he took his journey into a far country, and there he squandered his substance, the wisdom he had received from Common Sense, in riotous imagination. And when he had spent all in his various speculative ventures, there arose a mighty famine in that country, and he began to be in want of any positive truth or practical wisdom for the sustenance of his life. Having been reduced, in the extremity of his want, to the necessity of trying to satisfy his philosophical hunger with the coarse husks of scepticism and its consequent pessimism, at last he came to himself and said: "I will arise and go to my father, Common Sense, and will say to him: 'Father, I have sinned against the higher truth and in thy sight, and am no more worthy to be called thy son; make me as one of thy hired servants.'" And so now Philosophy, prodigal son of Common Sense, is on his way toward his parental home, having gained little or nothing from his long wandering and his varied experiences, except sophistication. But there is occasion for rejoicing in this return of the prodigal to the home and ways of Common Sense; it is a case where wisdom has been dead and is alive again, and was lost, but is found. Still, the returned prodigal must settle

down as sophisticated or Critical Common Sense in the sphere of would-be wisdom, and learn to live soberly and industriously in such close fraternal and co-operative relations with Science (Critical Common Sense in the realm of information) as will eventually win the respect and goodwill of that rather self-righteous and still very suspicious and censorious elder brother. And indeed Philosophy cannot well begin the reformed life without partaking in considerable measure of the results of the past labors of that same plodding and stay-at-home brother. For it is to Science, not Philosophy, that Common Sense has been able to say: "Son, thou art ever with me, and all that I have is thine."

Philosophy must, for the future, be characterized by common sense; but it must be something more than common sense. It must be common sense raised to a higher power—the outcome of the application of common sense to common sense. It is not the part of wisdom either summarily to reject ordinary common sense as radically mistaken, or unquestioningly to accept it as infallibly true. If common-sense points of view have not been in the main essentially sound and true, how are we to explain their persistence and practical value? But, on the other hand, if ordinary common sense ought always to be regarded as the last word of wisdom, how are we to explain

the persistent reaching out after more satisfying insights, to which the whole history of philosophy bears witness? When a common-sense course is followed with reference to common sense, a critical and sophisticated common sense is seen to be preferable to the dogmatic *naïveté* which often passes by the same name. G. K. Chesterton, in a much-quoted passage, makes much of the parallel between his belated appreciation of the value of orthodoxy and the story of a bewildered mariner's discovery of a supposedly new country, which turned out in the end to be the same old England from which he had previously set sail. A similar situation exists in the case of what we have called Critical Common Sense. What we mean is no narrow and insular self-restriction to naïve points of view, but common sense rediscovered and appreciated afresh after a fair consideration of alternative suggestions of the philosophical imagination, and subjected to the conservative revision which extended experience and reflection make necessary.

In other words, what we are concerned to make clear and emphatic is that the results of normal pre-philosophical intellection are indispensable, though not final, for philosophy. Common perception and common reflection, with their "common-sense" results, having survived thus far in the struggle for existence by virtue of their con-

firmation in practical life, are to be regarded for this reason as very probably, in their main features, essentially true. They are not perfect; revision and progress are to be looked for; but *the burden of proof lies upon those who would substitute for the fundamentals of the common-sense point of view any doctrine which is foreign to those ways of thinking which have borne and still bear the test of universal human practice.* What we mean to advocate, so far as philosophical method is concerned, is neither an uncritical "common-sense" dogmatism nor a universal Cartesian doubt, but a conservative, critical procedure, such as might be expected to commend itself to persons of recognized good judgment as being sensible and wise.

I. The Problem of Acquaintance

The best field for illustrating the philosophical value of the point of view and procedure we have indicated as those of Critical Common Sense is probably to be found in connection with the very fundamental philosophical problem as to whether genuine knowledge is humanly possible, and if so, how. The topic is one with reference to which controversy has long raged between the various idealisms, realisms, and dualisms. Let us therefore try to indicate, even if it must be in bare outline only, the conclusions with reference to this problem which seem qualified to stand the test of

a critical common-sense revision of ordinary common-sense beliefs. We may not be able to make any strikingly novel suggestions; but from the point of view we have chosen, novelty is a less important consideration than probable truth.

(*A*) *Realism Versus Idealism*

In the first place, let it be said that Critical Common Sense is for realism as against idealism. By realism we mean simply the doctrine that there is reality, even physical reality, which is not *idea* in any common meaning of the term. The term "idealism" is commonly used in a double sense, so that, if misinterpretation is to be avoided, special attention must be given to its definition. What we may call practical idealism, namely, living on the assumption that *ideals* are valid and authoritative for the human will, is not only not excluded, but may be regarded as required, by critical common sense. And if we mean by theoretical idealism no more closely defined doctrine than that reality and the relation of man thereto are such that all inwardly valid and authoritative ideals are progressively realizable outwardly—in other words, that there is a place for ideas and ideals in the fundamental constitution of things —then there seems no reason why we should not cheerfully claim for critical common sense the spiritual vision of theoretical idealism. Critical

common sense, broadly defined, may very well include a critical common-sense morality and religion.

But if by theoretical idealism we are to understand the doctrine (for which a less ambiguous designation would have been idea-ism) that all things are ultimately *ideas* and nothing more, then we must insist that critical common sense is against it. This is true whether the idealism is of the subjective or of the objective type.

By subjective idealism is meant the doctrine that things are never anything more than dependent contents of the stream of consciousness of one or more conscious subjects. In other words, things—and more particularly, physical things—are simply ideas in the psychological sense of the term; they have their existence only in, for, and as parts of particular conscious states. This variety of idealism might well be called psychological idealism—a term which is all the more appropriate in view of the fact that sometimes the subjectivism of this type of idealism is disguised without any radical change in the essential character of the system. This disguise of the subjectivism is generally effected more or less unconsciously, so that the thinker imagines he has gotten rid of the subjectivism altogether. When the transition from undisguised to disguised psychological idealism is clearly understood, however, it is seen to be

accomplished by the device of treating the psychological subject, the conscious ego, as itself a psychological object, and applying to it the idealistic doctrine that it exists only in and for consciousness—or, as it is more appropriately termed once the transition has been made, "pure experience."

Now it is easily apparent that subjective or psychological idealism, whether it be in its original undisguised form, or under the disguise of "the philosophy of pure experience," is not the common-sense view. It cannot even justly claim to be in accord with *critical* common sense. In common sense, or common pre-philosophical cognition, physical things are regarded as having an existence before, after, other than, and independently of their presence as appearances in the field (or fields) of consciousness of a subject (or subjects). Moreover, this point of view and doctrine is and always has been in its main features the *practical* creed of all human beings, idealistic philosophers themselves included. Manifestly, then, it is nothing but fair that the burden of proof should be regarded as resting upon subjective idealism whenever it is offered as a substitute for this primitive achievement and still universally prevalent practical belief of the human mind.

And the same thing may be said of idealism in its "objective" form. Objective idealism identi-

fies reality with the rational or logical idea, the predicate of the judgment, either in conjunction with conscious experience or apart from all consciousness. In the former case the objective idealism is of the concrete variety; in the latter case it is abstract. In the one case reality is identified with the concrete universal, that is, the rational system of things viewed as thought-constructs in one or many minds, or systems of experience. In the other case, reality is identified with rationality or eternal validity, whether ever thought of or experienced by any mind or not. Reality as a whole is regarded as the totality of such eternal validities. To any common-sense point of view this is to identify reality with the abstract universal, and the doctrine may be called abstract objective idealism. Now it is surely obvious that when any form of objective idealism, concrete or abstract, is offered for our acceptance in place of the realism of common sense, the idealist is under obligation to take upon himself the burden of proof.

Indeed, it is a fact that both subjective and objective idealists have very generally recognized and assumed this burden of proof. In several ways they have undertaken to bolster up their favorite doctrine. They have claimed to disprove realism, leaving idealism as the only doctrine which can be rationally held. They have professed

to derive subjective idealism directly from psychological analysis, and objective idealism from logic, or from psychology and logic together. They have claimed ability to prove one or another form of idealism on the basis of the universal and necessary presuppositions of the possibility of knowledge. And finally they have argued for their system on the ground that, as they say, it is the only one on which a spiritual morality and religion can be vindicated. Let us briefly consider each of these defenses of idealism in turn.

The attempt to discredit all forms of realism, leaving idealism alone in possession of the field, we may pass over for the moment in view of the fact that it is our intention to indicate in outline, toward the end of this chapter, a form of realism which has not been—and we believe will not be—shown to be untenable. With many of the criticisms directed by idealists against current forms of realism, we shall be found to agree. But if even one form of realism remains tenable, this argument for idealism remains inconclusive.

The claim to derive idealism directly from psychological or logical analysis requires special attention. It is a fact that in the early stages of the study of psychology, subjective or psychological idealism is very likely to be *suggested*. Since many elements in the field of experience which the naïve consciousness has regarded as independently

real are shown by psychology to be dependent upon subjective conditions, there is a temptation to generalize and say that all objects in the field of consciousness are wholly dependent for their existence upon subjective, or at least conscious, conditions. But any such generalization is clearly fallacious. And especially in view of what the natural sciences have to say about the physical preconditions of consciousness in animals and man, the doctrine based upon this fallacious generalization cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged.

It is, of course, true that we have never perceived any object that was not perceived at the time, nor have we ever thought of anything which was not then being thought of. There is nothing strange about this "egocentric predicament," as it has been called. Indeed, it would be passing strange if it were not so. The subject cannot be aware of an object in any particular way, except an object that has a subject aware of it in just that way at that time. It is simply a specific statement of the axiomatic truth that a relation is what it is, and not some other relation. And yet, strangely enough, some supposedly very wise philosophers have found in this simple predicament an argument for idealism. Since we have never been conscious of anything that is not, at the time we are conscious of it, an object of con-

sciousness, they infer that nothing can exist except as it is an object of consciousness; that things have reality only as contents of consciousness. Now, whatever we may think of this psychological idealism on other grounds, it should be easily seen that this particular argument for the doctrine is no more a proof than it would be to reason that since I can never be sitting beside any person except one who has some one sitting beside him, therefore there never can be any person except one who has some one sitting beside him. The egocentric predicament, as has been pointed out often enough, proves nothing for or against idealism as a doctrine. It is simply an irrelevant fact.

Not much more can be said for the argument for idealism from mysticism, although it is favored by some philosophers. Since the mystical experience is a revelation of Reality, and since in a certain phase of the mystic's contemplation of God there is a tendency for physical and all finite objects to lapse from consciousness, it is inferred that physical and all finite objects are thus shown to be unreal, mere deceptive appearances, like the contents of a dream. Now the psychology of the mystical state is well understood; the disappearance of the finite and physical from the mystic's consciousness is simply an extreme instance of the general fact that highly concentrated attention to

one object tends to be accompanied by inattention to everything else, with the result that the latter disappears, leaving the former in sole possession of the field of consciousness. It is no more logical to hold that mysticism proves the idealistic doctrine than to claim to annihilate physical things by simply closing our eyes, or turning away from them. We do not deny the reality of the Object of mystical contemplation, but this reality must be tested in the experiences of practical life in the objective world. In all essentials, we may believe, it will stand that test. But when the unreality of the finite and the physical is submitted to the test of practical experience in the workaday world, as an hypothesis it is immediately and constantly refuted.

The philosophy of pure experience, however, which we have described as a veiled form of psychological idealism, claims to set forth simply and truthfully the results of an analysis of experience. In reality, however, it dogmatizes beyond the results of analysis. To be sure, things are what they are experienced as—for that experience as long as it lasts. But this does not mean that things are nothing but what they are experienced as, any more than it means that they are, when not experienced, all that they are when experienced. As a matter of fact, we have very good empirical reasons for holding that some of the objects ex-

perienced are, at a particular time, much more than they are experienced as, at that time. The botanist who bestows a casual glance upon a garden of flowers knows that those flowers have a complex structure and are at the moment passing through a variety of processes, the like of which he has observed at other times, but of which he has no present experience. The appeal to immediate experience is, of course, valid as a methodological principle for finding out what things are; it is simply the scientific method of observation and experiment. But as a basis for psychological idealism, however disguised, it is wholly inadequate.

The psychology of perception, which is generally made the chief corner-stone of psychological idealism, is really very far from affording a secure basis for any such philosophy. Mature perception involves, besides sensation, the ideational processes commonly referred to as apperception; but this does not mean, as the idealist maintains, that the physical object is a construct composed simply of the materials of sensation and thought. It is a violation of common sense to suppose that the physical energy which stimulates the organs of sense is the psychological idea or construct of ideas in and through which the sense-experience is interpreted. Apperception has to do with the construction of the perceptual image (if we may

call it such) but not with the construction of the physical thing which is the perceived object. We eat food, but not our sensations of taste or our perceptual images or ideas of food.

But while subjective or psychological idealism is thus insecurely based upon erroneous suggestions which are liable to occur to the student of psychology, objective idealism is similarly made to rest in whole or in part upon a suggestion arising from the study of logic. Since in the judgment an idea is predicated of the reality taken as the subject matter of thought, and since more particularly in the adequate definition we have a statement of what the reality "is," it is assumed that the adequate idea and the thing are not only essentially but existentially identical. The generalization is hazarded that ultimately things are nothing but true and adequate ideas. Reality is declared to be the Absolute Idea, that is, the absolutely rational and complete idea, the complete definition. This Absolute Idea may be thought of as having its being apart from any particular consciousness, in which case the objective idealism may be called simply logical or abstract idealism. Or the Absolute Idea may be thought of as having its being in conjunction with one all-inclusive conscious experience or multiplicity of conscious experiences together all-inclusive, and then the objective idealism may be called concrete, or logi-

cal-psychological idealism, singularistic (or "monistic") in the one case, and pluralistic in the other. The singularistic form of logical-psychological idealism is generally called absolute idealism. But this concrete objective idealism, while it approximates realism (and therefore common sense) more closely than does subjective idealism, is nevertheless fundamentally fallacious. The logical within the psychological, the rational within the experiential, is a *criterion* of objective reality as opposed to subjective fancy; but it is not existentially identical with it. The whole truth about a person, for instance, is no more the person himself than a true idea or proposition about him is a part of him. The synthetic judgment does not construct and the analytic judgment does not dissect the thing itself, but our idea of the thing.

It must be admitted that concrete objective idealism, or logical-psychological idealism, is a better practical substitute for the common-sense view than either psychological idealism or logical idealism by itself. While psychological idealism is concrete but subjective, and while logical idealism is objective but abstract, logical-psychological idealism is both concrete and objective. Its "Idea" is not the concrete particular nor the abstract universal, but the "Concrete Universal," which, it is claimed, is the true individual. This

sounds very fine, and with its substitution of the rational (idea) within the empirical (idea)—which is the *criterion* of reality—for reality itself, it not only serves as a tolerable makeshift for common-sense realism in practical life, but even awakens a good deal of curiosity, just because it is such a curiously pieced-together substitute for the real thing.

It is as if a man without the use of his feet and a blind man, both helpless enough by themselves, should get together, the blind man carrying the lame man on his back and the lame man guiding the blind man; they would manage to get along after a fashion, and would doubtless attract more admiring attention than any number of ordinary normal pedestrians. The analogy is not an unfair one. Much of the interest aroused in the mind of the philosophical neophyte by the system under consideration is due to its novelty and its peculiar parallelism to the realism of everyday life. But logically considered, it retains as an aggregate all the original defects of its parts. At best it would be an unnecessary substitute for what has not been shown to be unsatisfactory. But until it can be shown that there is no fallacy in saying that since real things cannot be known without appearances in consciousness, real things are therefore nothing but appearances in consciousness, and that there is no fallacy in saying that since reali-

ties cannot be adequately known without rational definition, realities are therefore nothing but rational definitions, both psychological idealism and logical idealism, whether taken separately or in combination, will have to be judged fallacious. Very superficially viewed, the fantastic combination may be allowed to pass as sound and normal, but critically examined, its original defects appear. Psychological idealism without logical idealism is blind, and logical idealism without psychological idealism is footless.

Another of the trusted arguments of idealism is that which would make it out to be the only possible solution of the problem of knowledge. The argument assumes as self-evident that knowledge is a possible achievement of human experience and thought. It is pointed out that one cannot even deny that any knowledge is possible without assuming that at least some knowledge is possible, namely, enough knowledge to deny that what is said to be knowledge is knowledge. So, then, the original thesis of the dialectical argument, set up as self-evident because its contradiction is self-refuting, is the proposition, Knowledge is possible, or, as it is interpreted, We know Reality. The antithesis emerges with the proposition, We can know only ideas (contents of consciousness as such; or definitions, predicates of judgments; or combinations of both).

It becomes evident at this point that in the idealistic argument we are to witness a begging of the question. Idealism in one form or another has been smuggled in. It is by no means clear from the fact that we know by means of ideas (contents of consciousness, or predicates of judgments) that what we know must also be ideas. What we know is not necessarily identical as an existence with what we know it with; in fact it cannot be. There must be a certain *practical* identity or functional equivalence between the subject matter and the predicate, between the reality and its appearance; but this is the only identity there must be for knowledge, and the only kind there can be.

But the epistemological argument for idealism proceeds to state as the "higher synthesis" between the thesis, We know Reality, and its antithesis, We know only ideas, the proposition, Reality is only idea. This is capable of various interpretations, of course, according as "idea" is interpreted as my idea, our ideas, the Absolute's idea, or just the abstract idea, or definition; and to each possible interpretation corresponds a special brand of idealism, namely, solipsism, pluralistic or personal idealism, absolutism, and abstract or logical idealism. In all instances, however, the idealism rests upon the fallacious suggestion that the identity required between reality and idea, between subject

and predicate, for the judgment to be true, is an absolute, existential identity, instead of being, as it is, simply a practical, essential, representative identity. Ideas are primarily the instruments rather than the objects of knowledge, and it is surely not necessary, even if it were possible, for the instrument to be completely identical, either existentially or qualitatively, with that with which it deals.

The incurably fallacious character of the common epistemological argument for idealism is readily seen when it is divested of all superfluous language and of its dialectical form, and is set forth in bare syllogistic outline as follows: If knowledge is possible (and to deny this is to contradict one's self), the real must be the intelligible; but the intelligible is the rational, and the rational is mental, spiritual, or at any rate idea; wherefore the Real is mental, spiritual, Idea. Here we have, of course, the common fallacy of "four terms": the term "rational" is used in two different senses in the course of the argument. In the first instance it means having such a form as might have been given it by mind, that is, objectively rational. In the second instance, it means being valid in its intellectual activity or as a content of thought, that is, subjectively rational.

Now it is true enough that idealism, if it *were* true, would afford a positive solution of the prob-

lem of knowledge. Its epistemological monism (the doctrine of the sameness of the reality to be known and the object experienced or laid bare to thought) would open up a way of escape from agnosticism. But the fact that it would do this, if true, does not prove that it *is* true, especially if, as will appear, there is at least one alternative which would also give a positive solution of the epistemological problem.

Incidentally, it may be pointed out that idealism in the form in which it has enjoyed the greatest prestige, namely, absolute idealism, is not only not proved to be true, but can be shown to be untenable. If Reality is a single all-including conscious Experience, this experience must be either rational or not rational. If it is rational, as Royce maintained, it must have all knowledge. But, as critics have asked, how can an all-knowing mind include an experience of my error and my ignorance precisely as I experience my error and my ignorance, since the way in which I experience them is conditioned upon their *not* being the experiences of an all-knowing mind? Evidently no single experience can be at once all-knowing and all-including. If an Absolute Mind be thought of as all-knowing, but not all-including, this may be a tenable view, but it is not absolute idealism, which stands or falls with the all-including character of a single conscious experience.

Let us examine the other alternative, that the Absolute is all-including, but not in any rational sense all-knowing. This was the view of Bradley. The Absolute was regarded as a single super-rational whole of experience. It was recognized that inclusion in a wider experience would necessarily alter the character of the conscious content thus included, so that nothing could be in and for the Absolute Experience exactly what it is in our experience or for any conscious experience other than that of the Absolute. Every finite experience is included in the Absolute, it was held, but every such finite experience is modified in being included. Here it becomes evident that Bradley's type of absolute idealism is self-refuting. If an experience is necessarily modified in being included, then it is not the original experience that is included; the supposedly all-inclusive Experience is not really all-inclusive. The only way, then, to maintain the doctrine of a single all-inclusive Experience is to deny that any other experience than the Absolute's experience exists. There is no refuge to be found in the notion, favored by Bradley and Bosanquet, of degrees of reality. The experiences other than that of the Absolute may indeed fail to apprehend things as they really are, that is, as they would be for some more adequate experience, and some experiences may fail more or less than others; but

it remains true that this defective experience of the one who fails is itself an existing fact, which experiential fact cannot be included without modification in the Absolute Experience, and so cannot really be included at all. As for the denial of the existence of experiences other than that of the Absolute, each of us is as sure of its falsity, as sure that what we call "my experience" is a fact, as we ever can be of anything. And logically, as we have seen, the non-existence of the Absolute, defined as a single all-inclusive conscious experience, is just as certain as the existence of our own not-all-inclusive consciousness.

There is one other argument for idealism which we must notice; for, while it is oftener in the background of the idealist's thought than made explicit as a reason for the adoption of idealism, it has been perhaps the most potent influence in the direction of idealistic ways of thinking. This is the argument from spiritual values, the practical or ethico-religious argument. Recognizing that positive morality and religion require belief in the reality and agency of spirit, human and divine, it is further assumed that the best way of establishing this reality of spirit is to discredit the belief in the ultimate reality of anything but spirit; and so there exists a strong practical motive for the adoption of a spiritualistic philosophy, with its idealistic interpretation of physical reality. The

idealism of Berkeley, for instance, had its motivation here. Or, assuming that the essential tenet of religion is that of the reality of the Ideal, logical idealism is offered as alone qualified to meet the religious needs of the human spirit. It is affirmed, either (as by the English neo-Hegelians) that Absolute Reality is an absolutely rational Mind or Experience, or (as by some neo-Kantian transcendentalists) that Absolute Reality is the eternal world of ideas or values.

But with reference to this suspiciously esoteric basis for what is so universal in its appeal as the life of morality and religion, it may be remarked that a better basis still for these practical interests than this idealism of the physical would be a realism of the spiritual and the Divine. The adoption of a realism of the physical on the basis of common-sense experience and common-sense thought does not necessarily involve a materialistic or mechanistic and irreligious metaphysic. Conceivably it may be possible to establish on the basis of the moral self-consciousness a spiritual realism, and upon the basis of religious experience at its best a realism of the divine. As a matter of fact, it is only this underlying common sense (if we may call it such) in religion and morals that gives the ethico-religious argument for idealism its attractiveness to the human mind.

(*B*) *Critical Versus Dogmatic Realism*

But while Critical Common Sense is for realism as against idealism, it must be added that it is for a critical as opposed to a dogmatic realism. Under the term "dogmatic realism" we would include both the naïve realism of *uncritical* common sense and what has come to be known as "the new realism." This last has been characterized by one of its votaries as dogmatism in distinction from criticism.

Naïve realism can scarcely be called a philosophy. Rather is it the common pre-philosophical point of view, which does well enough as a practical makeshift, but which a critical examination shows to be full of dogmatism and inconsistency. It seems to hold, on the one hand, that visual objects, for example, have, independently of their being seen, the colors which they have when seen, and yet, on the other hand, that they have one standard color which remains the same in spite of all changes of appearance due to changes of distance from the observer, or to changes in the character of the light in which it is seen. Not only are these two beliefs inconsistent with each other; the latter is dogmatic in its choice of one of the many appearances as the standard and externally real color, and the former is uncritical in taking no account of the appearances which the object would

have, if it were seen under different circumstances, as by the color-blind, or through a colored medium. Criticism would thus throw upon naïve realism a burden of proof which it is altogether impossible for it to bear. No sufficient reason can be given for these arbitrarily chosen and ordinarily unchallenged positions of uncritical common sense.

The new realism undertakes to improve upon naïve realism and to transform it into a self-consistent philosophical system. It makes bold to affirm not only the reality, independently of sense-experience, of all sense-data, but of all possible sense-data, or "sensibilia," as well. By some of the new realists it is maintained that these have their independent being in the physical realm of existence; by others that they simply subsist in a neutral or logical realm of being. Now when one thinks of all the different possible shades of color in all possible variations of light, and of the sound of a moving body as it varies according to the location of the hearer, and of the difference in temperature sense-data, not only according to the distance of the body from the source of heat, but also according to the previous condition of the sensitive body, the neo-realistic view seems to involve a very fantastic multiplication of entities beyond what is necessary. Moreover, hallucinatory objects, which, when recognized as such, can only be explained by common sense as depending

for their existence upon subjective conditions, find no satisfactory explanation from the pan-objectivist point of view of the new realism.

In any case, from the point of view of critical common sense, the burden of proof undoubtedly lies upon those who assert the physical existence, or even the eternal reality in a neutral realm of being, of this practical infinity of qualities, the great bulk of which never become actual in any experience. It is not necessary for common sense to *disprove* the theory. Even if the theory be not self-contradictory, it is at any rate a contradiction of critical common sense, and it must either furnish satisfactory proofs or give up its pretensions to truth.

The doctrine of consciousness developed by the American neo-realists shows how far a thoroughgoing pan-objectivism can depart from critical common sense. According to this school of thought, consciousness is either simply the selective behavior of the organism (and more particularly of the nervous system) in response to environmental stimulus, or simply that part of the physical or "neutral" environment to which the organism selectively responds, or both of these taken together. Now this involves such a contradiction or ignoring of distinctions which are common to everyday life that there can be no doubt but that the burden of proof rests upon the upholders of

this decidedly "new" realism. It ought to be sufficient for the defenders of common sense against this bizarre doctrine to point out that, no matter what the physiological behavior in any instance may be, it is always an *additional* question whether or not this behavior is *accompanied by consciousness*. But the unique relation of awareness, which is the true criterion of the psychical, is either ignored by the neo-realists of this school, or else explained in terms of purely physical adjustment.

The new realism, with its rather wilful insistence upon a rigorous pan-objectivism, or "solipsism of the object," is only rightly understood when it is seen to be the nemesis of pan-subjectivism. The view that consciousness includes as its constituent elements all objects, physical or other, which make up the content of the field of which the subject is aware, is a doctrine common to both psychological idealism and its lineal descendant, the new realism. Only in the one case the existence of these objects is said to be dependent upon the activity of a non-physical subject, while in the other case the objects are said to exist independently of the responsive behavior of the body which "selects" them. The intermediate step between the pan-subjectivism of ordinary psychological idealism and the pan-objectivism of the new realism is the disguised psychological

idealism of the philosophy of pure experience. If, starting with subjective idealism, we treat the subject as an object and interpret it after the manner of subjective idealism's interpretation of objects, as non-existent when not consciously experienced as an object, we get the philosophy of pure experience. Then, if we take seriously the view that the objective contents of experience are all there, whether presented to the conscious subject or not, and if we combine with this the common-sense observation that what things are when they are not presented to the conscious subject they are independently of experience altogether, we arrive at the characteristic position of the new realism. Logical idealism, however, has been mainly contributory to that form of the new realism which finds ultimate reality in a "neutral" realm, which is as yet neither physical nor psychical, but which may become either the one or the other by being brought to stand in certain "external" relations. Logical idealism and logical realism are two mutually consistent ways of expressing the same point of view.

In opposition to the various ultra-dogmatic forms of realism, critical common sense comes to stand for what may be called *Critical Realism*, a doctrine which may be described in preliminary fashion as *undertaking to be as realistic as it can be while remaining as critical as it ought to be.* In the

main it is the position of ordinary empirical science, which might itself be described as the product of critical common sense, only that the scientist's interest in the whole problem is merely incidental as compared with that of the philosopher. The critical realist finds the independent reality of sense-qualities discredited by the variety of mutually contradictory or incompatible appearances which belong to sense-experience, such as the warmness and coldness of the same room or object to different persons at the same time, the differing pitch of the sound of the locomotive whistle to hearers differently related to the moving train, and the different color qualities seen in the same object by the color-blind observer and the person of normal vision. The critical realist adopts the most natural interpretation of such discrepancies, namely, that these "secondary qualities" are subjectively or psychologically conditioned, and do not exist independently of conscious experience. But he does not on this account give up the whole common-sense idea of an independent physical reality. Rather does he hold to this as far as seems consistently possible. Ordinarily, therefore, the critical realist maintains that apart from our consciousness—or, so far as common sense by itself can say, apart from any consciousness—there exists a manifold of physical energy, undergoing mutations in time and (most

would add) in space. From the point of view of philosophy as the wisdom of critical common sense, the burden of proof rests, not upon this practically confirmed scientific revision of common sense, but upon the advocates of such comparatively fantastical doctrines as "idealism" on the one hand, and an extreme and dogmatic realism on the other.

(*C*) *Critical Monism Versus Dualism*

But not only is philosophy led, under the guidance of critical common sense, to realism rather than idealism, and to critical as opposed to dogmatic realism; it remains to be seen that it is led to what may be termed a critical monism as against epistemological dualism.

There is a tendency for the critical revision of common sense to take the direction of a dualistic doctrine, according to which the real object with which knowledge is concerned is totally different, existentially and numerically, from the object directly presented in perceptual experience. From this point of view knowledge (or what goes by the name of knowledge) can never, even in perception, be direct and immediate, but is always through a proxy object, a representative mental content.

But if what is directly experienced is never the independently real object in which cognition is

interested, but always something which is a totally different existence, how can we ever gain knowledge of the independently real object itself? Presumably, indirect knowledge, or what claims to be such, is to be tested, and verified or refuted, by being brought into comparison with direct presentative knowledge; but what becomes of all "knowledge," if there is no such final touchstone for any of it?

Some who hold to this dualistic doctrine, according to which the experienced and the independently real are always two and different, never one and the same, frankly confess that its logical issue is a thoroughgoing agnosticism. But there are others who attempt, in one way or another, to avoid this agnostic implication of the dualism which they imagine is inseparable from the critical realism of revised common sense. Sometimes it is simply assumed, with the plain, unphilosophical man, that we have knowledge of independent reality, without much attention being given to the question whether this position is compatible with the dualistic doctrine, which is by no means the belief of pre-philosophical common sense. (Dualists do know independent reality, we may admit; but they would not and could not, if their dualism were true.) Sometimes, again, knowledge with reference to independent reality is defined in such a way as makes it synonymous with not yet dis-

credited belief, or even more inadequately as the mere "reference" of the idea, or representative content, to external reality. This may be "realism," but it is surely not very "critical." What is overlooked in the one case is that there are not only true beliefs which are not *known* to be true, but also beliefs which may work for a time which are nevertheless not true, so that they cannot be knowledge. And what is overlooked in the other case is that there is reference to reality in erroneous judgments quite as much as in judgments that are true, while it is only the latter that can enter into knowledge.

Different still is the attitude of some of the authors of the recently published *Essays in Critical Realism*, who now freely acknowledge that agnosticism is logically bound up with the unrelieved epistemological dualism common to practically all earlier expositions of critical realism. The view is now advanced that, while from the standpoint of existence, the presented content is wholly different from the independent reality, what is presented in sense-experience is to be regarded as an essence of the independent physical object; it is maintained that we have direct knowledge of the essence of the external object, whose existence we affirm. Thus it is claimed that we know the external and never-experienced thing, since its essence, which is immediately presented

in our experience, and which we may therefore know, is its "what," that is, *what it is*.

It is difficult to see that this ingenious device, however sincerely proposed, accomplishes anything more than to provide a fairly efficacious "camouflage" for the dualism which still totally divides the perceived existence from the existence which is independent of our conscious experience. In the end its solution of the problem of knowledge is merely verbal, like that which admits the dualism but seeks to evade the agnosticism by defining knowledge in terms of practical "belief," or "reference to reality."

In opposition to any absolute dualism, open or disguised, of the experienced and the independently real, we would defend a view which may be distinguished from dualistic forms of critical realism by the designation *Critical Monism*. In the interests of a positive solution of the problem of how there can be verified knowledge of independent reality, it *sets out to be as monistic as it can be, while remaining as critical as it ought to be.*

Critical monism does not dispute the fact that there is in some real sense a numerical duality in the case of the presented and independently real. If, with Professor Lovejoy, among others, we define numerical unity or identity in such a way as to admit of no qualitative difference, then we must acknowledge a duality as between the perceived

and the independently real. They are qualitatively distinguishable, and therefore numerically or existentially different—distinguishably two, rather than indistinguishably one.

But this duality does not necessarily involve that absolute dualism of the experienced or perceived and the real which would logically lead to agnosticism. If that were the case, one might raise the question whether, strictly speaking, even the psychical could be known. Apparently it could only be represented by another psychical content, not qualitatively identical with it, and therefore a wholly different existence. The epistemological dualist always assumes the possibility of immediate knowledge of the psychical object; but a strict application of his dualistic doctrine would lead to a purely representational and non-intuitional interpretation of introspection, and so, logically, to agnosticism, even with reference to the psychological. The immediately presented would forever be simply what we try to know *with*, never what we try to know.

The fundamental error of this extreme dualism lies in the fact that it overlooks the continuity of existence. If every qualitative difference, however slight or unimportant, is to be taken as a mark of total existential difference, then of course the paper on which I am writing is not numerically the same paper as it was when I began this sen-

tence, nor is my pen the same pen, nor am I the same person. But this temporal atomism, this denial of the continuity of existence and of the involved possibility of an essential identity of existence in the midst of certain qualitative changes, would be an extraordinarily flagrant violation of critical common sense.

Similarly, if we appeal to critical common sense in the perceptual situation, we are led to the view that in spite of the qualitative difference between the experienced content and the independent reality, and in spite of the possibility of analytical thought making, for some special purpose, a numerical or existential difference between the two, there may still be such an existential unity or identity between them as to enable one to say with truth that an object which is real independently of our conscious experience has been presented in experience and directly known, even though not all the qualities of the independent reality have been directly presented, and even though not all of the qualities of the object as presented need be thought of as belonging to it in its independent existence. It may well be that there is an *essential* identity between the object experienced and the independent reality.

The language here is reminiscent of that of some of the authors of *Essays in Critical Realism*, but the conception is distinctly different. There

the term "essence" connotes quality only, not existence; it is an abstract, logical essence only. On the contrary, our concept of essence is pragmatic and concrete; it is not to be interpreted as absolutely excluding existence. From this point of view the nominal essence of any reality is that in it which it is necessary (essential) to select or retain for some particular purpose, while its real essence is that in the totality of its existence which it is necessary (essential), as well as possible, to select or retain for the purposes which ought, under the circumstances, to be entertained. Manifestly, essence in this sense of the word will ordinarily include existence. And so it would appear that no *a priori* basis has been shown for excluding the possibility of an existential or numerical oneness, or essential identity, between the object directly presented in perceptual experience and the independent physical reality, even though analytical thought may always, for its own special purposes, abstract from this essential existential identity and regard them as numerically different. This is always possible, since where there is qualitative difference there must be existential difference *to some extent*, even when that existence is not great enough to make the object *essentially* different for *our* purposes.

It remains to be seen whether the critical monism which we have found to be admissible *a priori*

can be reasonably maintained in the face of the facts of perception. If so, this will be by virtue of a species of what may be called, in a broad sense of the term, empirical intuition. By "intuition" we do not mean any infallible cognitive faculty or process, nor would we have its content taken uncritically. The intuition in question might be designated otherwise as *perception in a complex.* Unlike the perception of simple patches of color, simple sounds, and the like, it is the perception of something which cannot be isolated from all other contents of experience and perceived by itself; its presence can be recognized only in and by virtue of a complex of presented contents. Fairly unambiguous instances are to be found in physical movement, animal life, consciousness, the self, other selves, psychical activities, and a great many more or less complex processes and relationships, physical and psychical, individual and social. These are not isolable as elements of "inner" or "outer" sense, nor are they mere aggregates of such isolable elements; rather are they, as we have suggested, realities of the presence of which we can become absolutely or practically certain by virtue of a species of empirical intuition, namely, perception in certain complexes of isolable given elements. There may be instances where the awareness of some of these existences is inferential, but ordinarily this is not the case; it is

practically as immediate and direct as the perception of the elements, and sometimes seems to be even more so.

Now what we are interested in urging here is that another instance of this empirical intuition, or perception in a complex, is the direct, non-inferential awareness of the reality and presence of physical objects (more or less inert or dynamic masses existing in space and time) in and by virtue of certain complexes of the elements of sense, with the aid of apperceptive thought. In perceptual experience we are in direct conscious and cognitive relation with things which, in the main, existed before the perceptual process began, and whose present existence is not dependent upon their being "given" to a perceiving subject, and which, in most cases, will continue to exist after the perceptual process has come to an end.

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There is a special problem, however, in connection with the direct perception of physical reality. On the one hand, a critical revision of naïve common sense leads us to conclude that sense-qualities are subjectively or psychologically conditioned. And yet, on the other hand, in such instances as pain, sensations of temperature and touch, and other bodily feelings, sense-qualities are definitely located in the subject's own physical organism; and in such instances as color, sound, and sensations felt in the place formerly occupied

by an amputated limb, they are more or less definitely and accurately located in the physical environment outside the limits of the subject's own body altogether. So far from the sense-qualities being in the brain, as some critical realists curiously maintain, that is one place in the body where in normal health there are no sense-qualities at all. How, then, can it be maintained that these directly perceived bodies, clothed, as they are, with subjectively conditioned sense-qualities, are not themselves also subjectively conditioned?

This is an important objection to our position, but it is one which can be readily met. In the first place, if, as practically every one would concede, psychosis is a creative process in such instances as free imagination, thinking, and willing, producing such new existences as the particular imaginative constructs, trains of thought and volitions of the individual subject, why, then, may it not be held that the sense-process is similarly creative? It is generally conceded that in such experiences as hallucination the sense-process is creative. The content sensed depends upon the sensing process for its being there. But while the sensing processes in veridical perception and in hallucination are differently caused—by external and internal stimuli respectively—the processes themselves seem to be essentially the same. An especially good illustration of this is found in posi-

tive after-images as compared with the content of ordinary vision. The positive after-images are caused by a continuation of the retinal stimulation for a short time after the external stimulation has ceased. Now these positive after-images, which may be seen in any direction in which the eyes are turned, are manifestly subjectively conditioned; they are the products of a creative sensing process. And so the only reasonable conclusion to draw concerning the original sensing process of which the sensing of the positive after-images is the simple continuation, is that it, too, is a process in which the sense-qualities are creatively produced.

In the second place, if, as we have just seen, and as all but extremely naïve or extremely sophisticated realists maintain, the sense-process *is* creative, producing as new existences, although on certain discoverable conditions, the particular elements of color, sound, taste, and the rest, of which the individual becomes aware from time to time, why, then, may it not be maintained that the particular location in which these sense-qualities are found, either in the subject's own body or beyond it, is similarly due to a creative psychical process? It ought to be obvious that the sense-qualities are where they are experienced. Take pain, for example. Whether or not the pain is in the exact part of the body where the disturb-

ance originated, the pain is where it is found and felt to be, in the finger, for instance, and not in the brain. The sense quality, subjectively produced, is in space as externally real as the space the body is in, and this is as externally real as any space we know. And there seems no ground for saying that the pain exists, as such, when it is not experienced, or felt. It follows, then, that the pain should be thought of as produced when the sensation begins, and as located where it is found to be. From one example learn all. What is true of pain is presumably true of sense-qualities of sound, sight, temperature, taste, touch, and the rest. It is not necessary to argue that the locating process in connection with the psychical production of sense-qualities has been perfect from the beginning. Indeed, it is not perfect yet; and it may well have arrived at its present state of development through a long process of evolution. Obviously, other things being equal, the more accurate the location of the sense-elements in relation to the subject's own body and either useful or dangerous objects of the environment, the better are the chances of survival in the struggle for existence. Inaccurate as is the locating of sense-qualities with reference to distant heavenly bodies, it is accurate enough for such practical purposes as have to do with racial survival.

This theory of the psychical or subjective pro-

duction and location of sense-qualities would make it possible to revise the doctrines of common sense in such a way as would avoid undue dogmatism, on the one hand, and either subjectivism or a logically agnostic dualism, on the other. If the sense-elements, which, of course, are directly intuited or perceived, are at the same time located by and for the perceiving subject in or upon objects in the independently real physical world, then they are (during the time of perception and for the percipient) the qualities of the physical object.* Then, too, it can be said that the intuition of ordinary perceptual consciousness and the essentials of the common-sense doctrine founded upon it are able to meet successfully the demands of criticism. There is no good reason for giving up the belief that independent physical reality is directly presented to the conscious subject in normal perception. Independent reality is revealed as to its actuality, its presence, and many of its qualities

* These qualities of the physical object which depend upon the sensing process we may call—returning to the older usage—secondary qualities, as distinguished from primary qualities, which the physical sciences regard as inhering in the physical object whether it is sensed or not. Primary qualities may transcend human perception, or they may be immanent, revealed. We would suggest that the term "tertiary qualities" be not restricted to values—some of which are primary and some secondary—but that we call those qualities tertiary which the object has only by virtue of our thinking or willing. Illustrations may be found in naming and in erroneous thinking.

and processes, in and through the complex of sense-elements, with the help of the processes of apperception. We perceive the roundness of the table, for instance, from almost any perspective, by locating the color-qualities at differing distances from ourselves. The qualities perceived in the object and the qualities which the object has in its independent existence do not completely coincide; but for ordinary practical purposes there is in normal perception an essential identity of the experienced, or presented, and the real. Broadly speaking, they are not essentially two, but one, even if, for certain transient purposes of analytical thought, they may become essentially two. Hence, in spite of the duality which criticism must recognize, epistemological dualism in the ordinary sense of the term is overcome, and critical realism takes the form of critical monism. Without disregarding any of the just claims of criticism, perception can be interpreted as monistically as is necessary to vindicate the possibility of knowledge of the independently real. At the same time critical common sense is vindicated as being, in this field at least, the true method and content of philosophy.

II. The Problem of Truth and the Problem of Proof

Our discussion of the problem of knowledge in general is not complete when we have taken up the question of the possibility of direct or immediate apprehension of reality in perception. Assuming an affirmative answer to that question, we have still to raise the question of the indirect or mediate knowledge of reality, that is, the knowledge of reality in thought.

Indirect knowledge involves proof of the truth of judgments about reality, and proof means the production of logical certainty. Logical certainty in turn differs from mere psychological certitude in that it is objective and universally valid, as well as subjectively assured; it is an adequately critical and still unimpaired assurance. Certitude, however, being a psychical experience, is not easily defined; perhaps its readiest criterion is a willingness to act, at once and definitively, on the judgment in question. These definitions of terms leave us, then, with two main problems to occupy our attention, namely, the problem of the nature of truth and the problem of the method of proof.

Truth is a quality of judgments. In the typical judgment an idea is brought into relation with a subject matter constituted of some phase of reality, or of what is taken as reality. It has been

objected against this view of the judgment that it overlooks the fact that sometimes the judgment asserts a multiple relation and not a simple dual relation between subject and predicate. It is always possible, however, to throw the judgment into the dual form, in which Reality, or some phase of it, or what is taken as reality, is the subject matter, of which a complex idea representing the multiple relation is predicated.

Already in this partial definition of the judgment, certain definitions of truth are excluded. From the point of view of our previous discussion, however, this is not unjustified; the definitions excluded are those which would be valid only from the point of view of certain epistemological theories which we have considered and rejected. For instance, the definition of truth in terms of the coherence of ideas in a rational harmony is valid only from the point of view of an idealistic theory of knowledge, according to which Reality is simply a coherent system of ideas. Rational coherence is a subordinate test of truth, but not an adequate definition, inasmuch as truth is more than consistency. At the opposite pole from this idealistic definition of truth exclusively in terms of ideas, stands the extreme realistic or panobjectivistic view, which would give a definition exclusively in terms of objective reality, without regarding any reference to ideas as essential; from

this point of view truth is just a synonym for reality. Between these extremes lie those definitions of truth which would make it some sort of relation between the idea (predicate) and the reality (subject matter) under consideration. Here, however, we should have to exclude as untenable from our point of view the dualistic doctrine that independent reality is inaccessible to human experience and thought, and the relation of ideas and reality consequently incommensurable.

We are now ready to face the problem of truth from the point of view of critical realism and monism, the critical common-sense doctrine defended in our discussion of the problem of acquaintance. Holding to the distinction between reality and ideas as ultimately valid, and regarding reality as accessible to experience and thought, what shall we think of the nature and criterion of truth? Even from this restricted point of view, there are three principal theories which demand attention, namely, intellectualism, intuitionism, or anti-conceptualism, and pragmatism.

According to intellectualism, truth is the identity of the idea with the reality, of the predicate with the subject. However nicely this doctrine might fit into extreme idealism or extreme realism, it is doomed to failure as an interpretation of truth from any more defensible point of view. Ideas are by definition, for critical common sense, differ-

ent from things. And, as a matter of fact, in any significant judgment there must be a distinction between the predicate and the thing; what we know with cannot be what we know by means of it, if there is to be any judgment. If all judgments were to be of the form, A is A, why judge at all? But for consistent intellectualism any other type of judgment is necessarily untrue, the predicate not being wholly identical with the subject, the idea with the thing. For strict intellectualism, as Bradley admitted long ago, all judgments are either tautologous, and therefore meaningless, or else false. Human truth, if there be any, must exist in the form of judgments; but for intellectualism no human truth, no judgment—not even this one—can be completely true. Truth is an unrealizable ideal.

A reaction to the opposite extreme from intellectualism is found in the intuitionism or anti-conceptualism of Bergson. Despairing of attaining to the truth about life and reality by means of intellect, with its concepts derived from the mechanical aspects of the environment, this philosopher bids us abandon concepts altogether if we would know the truth; we must rely on immediacy and intuition if we would penetrate into the heart of things. Since no predicate can be exactly identical with its subject in any practically significant judgment, all predicates are to be dis-

carded as falsifications of reality. Such a course, literally followed, would lead to the forsaking of the ideal of truth in judgments altogether, since it would do away with the possibility of all judgment. Anti-conceptualism is a doctrine which cannot be stated, or even thought, without inconsistency; it cannot be recommended without a violation of its own fundamental principle.

Pragmatism stands between the extremes of intellectualism and anti-conceptualism. It would continue to use concepts, to predicate ideas of the realities of experience. But it would not insist on any absolute identity of predicate with subject matter as necessary for truth. The only identity it is interested in is a practical identity of predicate with subject for the purposes underlying the judgment, a functional equivalence of the idea with the thing, or with further experience of the thing. This practical value of the idea or judgment is the criterion of its truth, according to pragmatism, and the typical pragmatist would go further and say that this practical function of the idea is all that is meant by its truth. This, of course, does away with truth as a permanent ideal; it becomes a mere temporary utility. Whereas intellectualism made truth an ideal that proves humanly inaccessible, pragmatism's truth is not only human but all too human. It has no ideal or eternal significance.

But any such extreme pragmatism fits in poorly with critical common sense. Its affiliations are rather with some form of psychological idealism, veiled or undisguised. The monistic and critical realism of our view suggests rather a synthesis of certain elements of intellectualism, pragmatism, and intuitionism. Truth is some sort of representation of reality by idea, of subject by predicate, as intellectualism maintains. But the test of truth about reality, as distinguished from mere consistency, is ultimately a practical test, as pragmatism contends; it is the working of a working hypothesis. Every logical definition, our textbooks tell us, should state the proximate genus and the differentia of the species of the thing to be defined. We get from intellectualism the proximate genus to which truth belongs, and from pragmatism the differentia of the species. Representation of reality by means of idea is the proximate genus of truth; sufficiency for valid and pertinent purposes is its specific differentia. What is taken as truth is representation of the subject by the predicate, of reality by idea, sufficient for the practical purposes for the sake of which the judgment was made. But we have a right to believe that judgment to be really true in which the predicate represents the subject adequately for every practical purpose which ought to be considered in making the judgment; that is, in

deciding between the judgment and its contradictory. From this point of view truth is an ideal as well as an instrument.

The place of intuitionism, or, rather, of intuition in the sense of immediacy, in our critical commonsense doctrine of truth, is connected with the proof of the truth rather than with its definition. The test of truth is the working of the judgment as a working hypothesis; but this is working of a very definite sort. Not every kind of working is working unto verification; not every kind of practical utility of judgments is an evidence of their truth. That working is working unto verification in which acting upon the hypothesis necessarily leads one into an immediate intuition or direct experience of what was supposed in the hypothesis. For instance, the truth of a road map is not verified when it merely works well enough to lead the one who acts upon it to *some* destination, nor even when it leads to a destination equally desirable with the one indicated on the map; its truth is verified only when, through following its guidance, the traveller is led into immediate experience of the reality to which the map was the index.

The problem of proof is not the mere problem of consistent inference. That has to do with logical possibility only, not with truth about reality. Real logic, as distinguished from formal logic, is the logic of truth, not the logic of mere consis-

tency. It must proceed with consistency in all its deductions, but its goal is the production of an adequately critical and universally valid certainty as to the truth of judgments about reality, and this is an affair of induction.

The true model of inductive logic is successful scientific method. In any particular science the presuppositions include the general axioms of thought, the principles and rules of logic, deductive and inductive, and the postulate of the possibility of knowledge through experience and thought. The existence of the object or objects to be investigated, defined in preliminary fashion so as to mark off the field of the science from other sciences, is also presupposed; this may be done on the ground of this existence being already sufficiently proved in previous experience, or, if that be not possible, the existence of the subject matter of the proposed science may be assumed as a general working hypothesis. Each particular science, also, on the principle of the necessary division of labor among the sciences, presupposes, as far as there is occasion to do so, the well-established results of other sciences. In addition to all these more general presuppositions, each science specifically presupposes or includes the particular data of experience that seem to have value for refuting or confirming generalizations concerning the nature of the special object or objects of in-

vestigation, and particularly concerning causes and effects.

The making and testing of such generalizations is the main business of science. All scientific generalization is based upon the fundamental principle, postulate, or hypothesis that in the matter of cause and effect relations the future will be like the past. (In investigating historical data this postulate takes the form of assuming that in causal matters the past was like the present.) This principle is sometimes spoken of as the principle of the uniformity of nature, but perhaps a better designation would be the postulate of the dependableness of nature, or of reality in general. As a generalization it is the first to be acted upon in science, but naturally enough, being the most comprehensive, the goal of its final perfect verification is indefinitely removed. Generalizations of lesser scope are variously styled, as theories, hypotheses, and, as they come to be established, laws and scientific facts.

All generalizations, from the most general to the most empirical and least comprehensive, must be tested by direct observation and experiment. From general theories and previously established results we may deduce the more general (or major) hypotheses, and from these in turn more particular (or minor) hypotheses, until we arrive at a proposition which can be either refuted or veri-

fied in a single crucial experiment. Refutation of a minor hypothesis involves refutation of the unproved major hypothesis from which it was logically deduced; but verification of a minor hypothesis, it should be remembered, does not necessarily carry with it full verification of the major hypothesis from which it was inferred. The process is ordinarily a gradual building up of constructive generalizations and a relatively rapid elimination of mistaken hypotheses—in other words, the trial and error method. Thus, in scientific investigation negative results must be expected to predominate, especially at first. But even these negative results are not without their positive value and significance.*

* The material contained in Part I of this chapter, or more specifically on pages 163 to 206, was originally written a few years ago, under the title *Critical Common Sense*, and in practically its present form, while collaborating in a tentative way with the authors of *Essays in Critical Realism*. From an examination of the subdivision entitled "Critical Monism Versus Dualism," it will be easily seen that the differences of opinion between myself and the other "critical realists" were too sharp to make desirable, from either point of view, the inclusion of my essay in the co-operative volume. Philosophical readers will note that the criticism which has been perhaps most generally levelled against the principal position of these collaborating authors since the appearance of their volume, is substantially the same as that briefly indicated on pages 195 to 199 above.

CHAPTER XII

RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

If the attitude or point of view we have called Critical Common Sense is justified in the philosophy of knowledge in general, there is every reason to believe that it will prove valid in the philosophy of religious knowledge in particular. Not only so, but it is to be expected that it will have much greater practical significance in the religious field than in the field of knowledge in general. Practically speaking, there is not much doubt as to the validity of our knowledge of the physical environment and of the life of man. But there is widespread and serious doubt as to the possibility of any genuinely cognitive religious experience or any adequately verified religious belief. If there is any such thing as conscious knowledge of God, it is apparently a higher achievement and consequently less general than knowledge of physical objects and human beings. The real crux of the epistemological problem lies in the question as to the extent and certainty of religious knowledge.

The previous chapter has been preliminary to our present discussion in two respects. In the first place, it has served to make possible a fair consid-

eration of the problem before us, by clearing the ground of certain obstructions in the shape of inferences with respect to religion, drawn logically enough from erroneous philosophical theories. Whether these inferences are favorable to religion or unfavorable—and both kinds are to be found—they are irrelevant, since the systems of thought from which they are inferred have been found untenable. In the second place, our results in connection with the problem of knowledge in general furnish what may prove to be a helpful parallel as we consider the same problem in its application to the field of religion.

I. The Problem of Acquaintance in Religion

When we take up the problem of immediate or direct religious knowledge, the problem of acquaintance in the realm of religion, we find all the main types of epistemological theory represented, namely, idealism, extreme realism, and agnostic dualism. What we refer to is not the consequences in the way of religious belief resulting from the application of idealism, extreme realism, or agnostic dualism in the interpretation of the physical object. We are spared the consideration of these matters, having found the philosophies in question not reasonably tenable. On the contrary, what we refer to is the application of ideal-

ism, extreme realism, and agnostic dualism in the interpretation of the religious Object, God. To a consideration of the resultant views we must now turn.

Perhaps no application of an idealistic principle in the realm of religion is attracting more attention at the present time than what we may call subjective or psychological idealism in religion. As subjective idealism in the general field is the result of a natural but not necessary suggestion arising out of first studies in the psychology of sense experience, so subjective idealism in the religious realm is likely to be suggested by first studies in the psychology of religion. So much of what is taken by uncritical common sense as part of an independently existing physical reality is shown by psychology to be a subjective product, that the beginner may gain the impression that there is no physical reality, but only the dependent contents of perceptual consciousness. Similarly, there are in the religious beliefs of mankind so many elements which a critical survey shows to be purely subjective constructions without objective validity, that the student may gain the impression that there is no religious reality, that the objects of religion are all of them only the subjective products of religious fantasy. The result is subjective idealism in religion, according to which the only God is the God-idea, a subjective content

of man's mind. Now, as Feuerbach points out in introducing this doctrine, if God is simply the God-idea, agnosticism is overcome; the religious subject can know its own idea. But any one interested in a positive way in religion will regard this proffered remedy as worse than the original disease. Better a real God that is unknowable than a knowable God that is unreal. Followed out consistently in the practical religious life, this psychological idealism can only mean atheism. As the physical life can be lived successfully only when lived in adjustment to a real physical environment, to which our ideas of the world more or less adequately correspond, so the religious life can be lived successfully only when lived in adjustment to a Divine Reality, which our ideas of God more or less adequately represent. From the point of view of a critically optimistic philosophy of values, the positive value of experimental religion at its best furnishes the basis for a strong presumption against the truth of subjective idealism with reference to the religious Object.

Nor is there any proof of psychological idealism in the realm of religion any more than there is in the field of general perception. From the fact that there are ideas, contents of consciousness, that are not valid representations of objective reality, it surely does not necessarily follow that there are no ideas which have objective validity. Whether

in the general field or in religion, psychological idealism rests on an obvious and inexcusable fallacy.

Abstract or logical idealism is also to be found as a theory of religious knowledge. It would regard God not as an independently existing Reality, nor yet as a mere subjective idea in man's mind, but as the eternally valid spiritual Ideal. Now from the point of view of what we have called fundamental religion, namely, aspiration after divine values, this is a very satisfactory definition of the Divine. But from the point of view of experimental religion, with its tendency to enter into such practical relationships as self-surrender and trust toward a Divine Reality regarded as the supreme Power in the universe, a God who is simply a grand Ideal and not an existent Being and Power is no God at all. What does it matter that God is the valid final end of everything, if he is not the actual first cause of anything? Or that we can know what he is, if we have to deny that he is? Or that he is perfect in every respect, if he does not exist?

As a matter of fact, the most satisfactory thing about this abstract logical idealism in religion is that it rests on fallacy and we do not have to accept it. It comes from taking the predicate which experimental religion in its higher developments tends to apply to the supreme Being, and

interpreting it, after the mistaken manner of logical idealism, as if the trueness of the judgment meant that the subject matter judged about could no more be an existent potent being than could the abstraction employed as a predicate. The correction of this fallacy comes from seeing that the relation between subject and predicate is not one of existential identity, but that the predicate is an abstract idea used to guide the one making the judgment in his adjustments to the thing. Hence the only identity expressed by the judgment is a practical identity; it is the functional equivalence, for the purposes underlying the judgment, of the predicate as a substitute for further experience of the thing judged about.

Little need be said of the combination of religious psychological and religious logical idealism in the view that God is the divine Ideal immanent in man's consciousness as the God-idea of religion, becoming, by virtue of this immanence, a potent factor toward its own realization as a divineness in the life of man. Theoretically considered, the view is unnecessary, the component parts still resting as they do on fallacious foundations. Practically considered, as a substitute for a *bona fide* religious realism, it would be much worse than useless. It is appreciative in its interpretation of experimental religion, but if its doctrine were to

be accepted, experimental religion could no longer exist. "The kisses of an enemy are deceitful."

As for ordinary absolute idealism, that is the product of idealistic interpretations of the physical object. As such its fallacious foundations have been sufficiently exposed in our previous chapter. It may be remarked, however, that whether in its Roycean or its Bradleian form it is unsatisfactory from the point of view of experimental religion. Royce's conception of one all-inclusive rational Experience is not only theoretically untenable, as we have seen; as a static super-temporal totality of all reality, it is never *at any time* an existent reality at all. This Professor Royce himself was forced to admit. But when we are asked to accept a God who, from our necessarily temporal point of view, is not now, never has been, and never will be an active existent Factor in human affairs, we must regard such an entity as very far from being the God of experimental religion. Religiously considered, such a God is an idol, an artificial substitute for the God of practical religious experience.

As for Bradley's Absolute, it is still less the God of practical religion. As not moral but supermoral, not personal but super-personal, not rational but super-rational, it is too vague to be an object of intelligent worship or trust. Moreover,

as Bradley has said, the God of religion, even if he be thought of as existing, is not this Absolute. But, for the higher forms of historic religion, God is that beyond which there is no Absolute. He is the Object of absolute dependence.

Extreme monistic realism in religion finds its representatives in the extreme mystics. As the new realists make bold to affirm the independent reality of the whole content of the natural world as presented to sense, so the typical mystic takes the entire content of his mystical consciousness as revelation of the independently existing Divine Reality. He even goes so far as to say not only that what he positively experiences in the mystical state is independently real, but that what disappears from consciousness in the state of ecstasy is thereby shown to be unreal, a mere deceptive appearance. On this basis he not only declares that God exists, but that material reality, time, the finite self, and evil are all absolutely unreal. The psychological explanation of these negations is twofold. In the first place, the mystic's rapt contemplation of God leads to the lapse from consciousness of other ordinary objects of attention, such as the material environment, the passing of time, the self, and the various evils of everyday life. In the second place, the religious evaluation of the whole mystical experience as revelation naturally leads the mystic to accept as authorita-

tive and true all the main suggestions that have come to him in the experience, at least if he is free enough from the traditional external authority to do so. Now there are some of the mystic's subjective certitudes that may well be verifiable in normal, practical religious experience. Such, we may be sure, is belief in the existence, accessibility, and sufficiency of God. But it is obvious that the negative doctrines to which we have referred are constantly being refuted in everyday life. It is utterly dogmatic and ridiculous to maintain, on the basis of a transient experience psychologically intelligible as religious self-hypnosis, that the material world, time, the self, and all evil are unreal. Besides, the reality of God as the ultimate Object of human dependence is not necessarily bound up with the unreality of everything else. What boots it for religion that the religious Object is real, if the religious subject be not real?

Epistemological dualism is much commoner and much more significant in religion than in the general field of knowledge. Where there is one who doubts that we are in a position to apprehend the physical world in sense-experience, there are probably hundreds who doubt that we can apprehend the Divine Reality in religious experience. The dualist in religious epistemology affirms the reality of God, but he denies that there is any recognizable revelation of the Divine in human experi-

ence. He may hold to the idea of a supernatural revelation in the past, but so far as the present is concerned he regards God as an unexperienced and unexperienceable Reality. Just because of this dualism of his theory there is a constant temptation to agnosticism. If the Divine is unexperienceable, how can our religious hypotheses be verified? The unexperienceable tends to be regarded as the unknowable. This temptation to agnosticism has been struggled against: witness the theistic arguments, marking the persistence of religious interest in spite of the decline of religious experience. But the movement in the agnostic direction is the logical course for those who hold the dualistic theory of religious knowledge. Existence is not proved by *a priori* speculation, but by the evidence of experience. The older theism with its denial of present revelation, and deism with its denial of any revelation, were stages toward agnosticism with its denial of the possibility of religious knowledge, even by means of thought. The next step beyond agnosticism is the denial that there exists any such being as God to be known.

In distinction from idealism, extreme or dogmatic realism, and dualism, Critical Common Sense in religion would hold to the permanent possibility of revelation of God in religious experience, on condition of the right religious adjust-

ment. Just what this right religious adjustment is, it is for experience to teach.

From the point of view we are now undertaking to express, revelation of the religious Object is not the only kind of revelation. There is no discovery of any reality without revelation of that same reality; revelation and discovery are inseparable aspects of the same process. Moreover, realities are revealed or discovered through a process that may be characterized as intuition or perception in a complex of psychical elements, no one of which is itself the reality thus apprehended. Thus the physical object is not a color, but it is seen in a complex of colors (including white and shades of gray), without which it could not be seen; the conscious subject is not a feeling or idea, but it is intuitively apprehended in a complex stream of related feelings and ideas; so, too, other selves are intuited in the complex of social experience; and God, we may add, is intuited, apprehended as a Reality, in the complex of psychical elements entering into the religious experience which has found the right religious adjustment and is dependably successful.

In using the term "God" in this connection it is not meant to insist upon any highly developed definition of that term. Defining God simply in preliminary fashion as the dependable Source of an experience of spiritual uplift on condition of a

certain attitude which we may call the right religious adjustment, it may be said that in the experience of that uplift one intuitively apprehends God as a responding Factor and consequently an existent Being. Thus one can make judgments about God on the basis of religious experience, just as one can make judgments about physical things on the basis of sense-experience, and judgments about people on the basis of social experience. As was maintained in an earlier chapter, the empirical argument, demonstration in religious experience, is the one adequate proof of the existence of God.*

In these verifiable facts of revelation we have empirical data for theology and not simply for the psychology of religion. There is a psychological

* This gives us a view of God as an independent Reality, largely transcendent, but proved existent by its effects. But this is by no means the only view or conception of the Divine. Without contradicting this view of God, as a largely transcendent independent Reality, it may be held that the Divine Life is immanent, revealed within the human as a spiritual life, in which the eternal ideal (the good, the true, and the beautiful) is being made real. This is the Logos, the Light that lights every man. Now the transcendent and immanent qualities and relations of the Divine, being real independently of religious experience and appreciation, may be called the "primary qualities" of the religious Object. The "numinous quality," of which Professor Otto makes so much, being there in proportion as religious feeling finds it there, may be called the "secondary quality" of God. Qualities belonging to God only by virtue of man's mythological or speculative theology, may be called "tertiary."

aspect of all religious experiment and discovery, as there is a psychological aspect of the experiments and discoveries of chemists and physicists; but as these do not interfere with the possibility of chemistry and physics as sciences of objective physical reality, so neither does the possibility of a psychology of all religion preclude the possibility of an apprehension of scientific theological facts in instances of dependably successful religious experience. Throughout the history of religion, man has been using the experimental method of trying to discover, or have a revelation of, God. As in all empirical investigation, progress is made by elimination of unsuccessful adjustments; it is the trial and error method. And while through wrong religious adjustment the experience has often been negative, it is nevertheless true that the religious man has been achieving a gradually progressive knowledge of the existence and nature of God. This achievement of critical common sense in religion is comparable to the pre-scientific knowledge gained by critical common sense through experience of the world and reflection on what has been experienced.

II. The Problem of Truth and the Problem of Proof in Religion

In taking up the problem of truth in connection with religious knowledge there is no need of going

again into the controversies between intellectualism and pragmatism and between anti-conceptualism and both. If the synthesis of a certain phase of intellectualism with a certain complementary phase of pragmatism was valid as a definition of truth in general, it is equally valid as a definition of truth in religion. Religious truth is representation of religious reality, adequate for whatever purposes ought to be considered in deciding between the judgment and its contradictory.

But there is a question as to the relation of this realistic or representational pragmatism in religion to intuitionism in religion, the answer to which may have important bearings for the problem of proof in religion. There are three main types of religious pragmatism: a rather futile conservative doctrine, a very radical doctrine, and a more defensible critical doctrine intermediate between the other two. The conservative pragmatism undertakes to prove an entire traditional system of doctrine true by appealing to its practical value. There seems something disingenuous about this, for the traditional system was not originally accepted because of its practical value, but on authority, and generally no attempt is made to use the appeal to practical value as a means of revising to any extent the content to be believed. The radical pragmatism, on the contrary, having sub-

scribed to the doctrine that there is no God but the God-idea, is not interested in the problem of truth in the sense of representing truly the nature of God; it has substituted utility for truth, although it continues to use the time-honored name.

Between these extremes there is room for a moderate critical religious pragmatism of the realistic or representational type, which would undertake to use the practical test as a means of determining the content to be regarded as true, truth being understood in the sense of pragmatically satisfactory representation of reality. This critical, realistic pragmatism is not satisfied merely to defend a content accepted on authority; but, on the other hand, it maintains that God is an independent reality and that permanent truth should be regarded as a real possibility. It is optimistic enough to believe that the theology which is necessary for the religion which is necessary for the morality which is necessary for the greatest human well-being is not only necessary but true, and true in the representational as well as the pragmatic sense.

This particular type of religious pragmatism may well be valid; to the moral optimist it must seem reasonable and presumably true. But it is not easy to convince any one not a moral optimist of its truth. Moreover, as a means of determining

the content to be believed, it is extremely difficult to apply. It would involve a sociological investigation of the concept of human well-being, a social-ethical investigation of the relation of conduct to human well-being, a religio-psychological investigation in the relation of religion to morality, and a theological and psychological investigation of the relation of theology to religion. What seems needed to make any such critical pragmatism practicable in religion is something corresponding to verification in a crucial experiment, the appeal to immediate experience as settling some things in the realm of truth and fact.

This suggests religious intuitionism, or the mystical method. But this, too, by itself is not a practical guide. As we have seen, the pronounced mystic seems to be as certain, subjectively, of the unreality of non-mystical objects as he is of the reality of the mystical One. What is needed is some practical means of distinguishing between those subjective assurances that are, and those that are not, objectively valid.

Very evidently, religious pragmatism and religious mysticism have need of each other. If religious pragmatism can add to its method of testing religious hypotheses by acting upon them an immediate experience of the Divine, such as will have verifying value, it will have taken the longest possible step toward becoming truly scientific. On

the other hand, if religious mysticism will but consent to have its subjective certitudes tested by being acted upon as working hypotheses in practical religion and everyday life, it will have ceased to be unduly dogmatic and will have shown its willingness to become truly scientific. Apparently, religious pragmatism and religious mysticism fit into each other and supplement each other's deficiencies. And not only so, but the resultant synthesis is seen to approximate the method of the empirical sciences. Let us therefore investigate the question as to how far religious knowledge may be thrown into scientific form, and how far its content may be extended and made more certain by an inductive procedure analogous to, or identical with, that of the recognized sciences.

Theology, or religious knowledge, undertaking to use the empirical method in as scientific a form as possible, will include among its presuppositions the axioms fundamental to all true science, the principles and rules of deductive and inductive logic, and the established results of the recognized sciences as far as these may be pertinent to its investigation. Among axioms, one which is significant for theology because significant for anthropology in view of the evolutionary theory is found in the obvious assertion, "A thing is what it is, not what it came from." Among general

postulates the postulate of the possibility of empirical knowledge of reality in general will be expressly or tacitly included.

But theology must also include—whether naïvely or on the basis of religious epistemology or as a fundamental hypothesis—the postulate of the possibility of empirical knowledge in the religious realm. This will involve several things, namely, first, a preliminary definition of the religious Object, that is, God, or the Divine, sufficient to mark off from everything else the special subject matter to be investigated; second, the existence of this religious Object as thus defined, this existence being assumed either as already amply assured on the basis of previous religious experience, or else as a fundamental working hypothesis to be tested in further religious experience; third, the accessibility of this religious Object in and for cognitive religious experience, so that empirical data in the realm of religion will be available for scientific treatment; and, fourth, corresponding to the principle of the dependableness of nature (often called the principle of the uniformity of nature), the principle of the dependableness of the Divine Nature, or the religious Object, God. This principle may be regarded either as a fundamental postulate, already practically assured in the mind of the religious expert, or as a comprehensive generalization or hypothesis, the first to be proposed

and obviously destined to be the last to receive full and final verification.

The special presuppositions, if we may call them such, are the special empirical data of theology, namely, facts of revelation of the Divine within the field of human experience and observation. That there are such facts was the conclusion at which we arrived in our investigation of the problem of immediate religious knowledge. These data may be either particular contemporary and historical instances of revelation of the Divine, or, on the other hand, data in more generalized form, namely, statements of special types of revelation-experience which have been found dependable on specific conditions. A clew to the availability of particular empirical data for religious knowledge may be found in the quality or religious value characteristic of the specific object or instance; but it is important that this criterion be supplemented by further experimental evidence, gained through attempts to promote the value in question by means of definite religious adjustment. This will tend to transform what was at best mere historic or contemporary religious fact into scientific religious fact.

In thus confirming the religious value-judgment that a certain fact of historic or contemporary religion is a true instance of religious revelation, and establishing at the same time a scientific religious

fact as a somewhat generalized datum for theology, we are already engaged in the process known as induction. It will make little difference, probably, whether empirical theology, constructed by approved logical methods, is recognized as an empirical science, or not. What is important is that genuine facts of revelation (experience of the recognizable presence of the Divine within the field of human observation) should be embodied in generalizations in accordance with approved inductive procedure.

In this connection it becomes very important to know the most effective adjustment of the religious subject to the religious Object. To begin with, the religious adjustment is to a Reality necessarily taken as objective in the sense that it is not identifiable with the empirical self of the religious subject, even though the response may be looked for in the life of that subject. But it may be added that the most effective religious adjustment includes aspiration toward a thoroughly ethical and spiritual ideal; concentration of attention upon the religious Object regarded as a Reality and as favorable to this ideal; complete self-surrender to this Reality, God, as a condition of the realization of the ideal; an appropriating faith which mentally affirms that through the dynamic presence of the Divine the ideal is now beginning to be realized; a voluntary respon-

siveness to the Divine, involving readiness to follow instantly what one's best judgment leads one to believe is right and the will of God; and, finally, persistence in this attitude long enough and intensively enough to overcome all resistance, and with the settled intention to make this adjustment habitual in the religious life. When this subjective condition of adjustment to the religious Object is fulfilled, revelation of the reality, presence, and activity of a divine Factor in human experience is dependably experienced. Thus scientific facts of religious revelation are made available for further generalization in an empirical theology.

In the empirical sciences it makes little difference ultimately whether one begins with fact or with theory. One procedure is to begin with general presuppositions, theories, major hypotheses, deducing from these what they logically imply, and finally reaching minor hypotheses which can be refuted or perchance verified in a single crucial experiment. Not only empirical theology but experimental religion makes constant use of this procedure, as, for example, when consequences for the answer to prayer are drawn from the theological theory of the combined perfect love and omnipotence of God. There are many opportunities for fallacy in the following of this procedure, but when sufficient care is taken, the method is par-

ticularly useful in the elimination of faulty hypotheses. Ordinarily it takes much more experimentation to verify a true hypothesis than to refute an erroneous one. (This is for a very good logical reason, which may be learned by considering why there is a fallacy of affirming the consequent, but no fallacy of denying the consequent.) But elimination of erroneous suggestions means constant progress toward the truth, and while the application of the "trial and error" method to theology may have some conspicuous results of a negative sort at first, particularly in correcting certain mistaken notions regarding miracles, special providence, and the answer to prayer, the final outcome will undoubtedly be to prevent a great deal of perplexity and waste of energy in religion, and at the same time to raise very appreciably the general level of religious certainty with reference to what is believed. More spiritual power results from having an unshakable conviction of the truth of a few vital beliefs than from being only half-convinced of a much larger number of doctrines.

The other procedure in empirical science is to begin with particular facts instead of with a general theory, and to build up generalizations from particulars instead of deducing conclusions from generalizations previously made. In this inductive process scientific thought frequently moves along

the lines of the so-called "method of agreement," "method of difference," and "method of concomitant variations." Religious testimony very commonly presents religious data in the form of statements of agreements as to differences in different lives, or in the same life at different times, according as the right religious adjustment was persisted in or not. This is making use of the best of all the experimental methods, the "joint method of agreement and difference." Similarly, when the degree of spiritual attainment is found to vary concomitantly with the degree of fulfilment of certain religious conditions, while other important factors remain unchanged, there is a place for the "method of concomitant variations."

We shall not attempt to give an extensive list of theological laws, but at least one or two may well be cited by way of illustration. The first is the law of elemental religious experiences, stated in generalized form: On condition of the right religious adjustment (defined above) with reference to desired moral achievements of the will, a dependable Factor produces the specific moral results desired. The second illustration of a theological law may be called the law of conversion: On condition of the right religious adjustment, with a view to being turned permanently from sin to God and to the right way of living, a dependable Factor works primarily in the will and ultimately

in the nature more generally the definite and manifest beginning of a new and better type of life. Laws of religious experience may, of course, be stated as laws of the psychology of religion; but when they are stated as above, in terms of the dependable Factor which is the God of experimental religion, they are laws of empirical theology and not of the psychology of religion.

Once religious knowledge has been stated to a considerable extent in the form of dependable laws, important results may be expected to follow. This will be true in the realm of practice, in religious education, missions, and general evangelism. But the results will be equally important for theory. If the theoretical part of our theology—our theory of God, for instance—is to be formulated as critically and scientifically as possible, a distinction must be made between the different ways of effecting the transition from the data and laws of our religious knowledge to our theological theory. The most rigidly scientific procedure is to frame a theory of the nature of the constant objective Factor in religious experience which will be just sufficient to account for the theological laws which have been experimentally established. This rests upon the axiom that we know something of what a thing is from what it does. By this procedure, for instance, we can include as scientifically verified the proposition that the re-

ligious Object is the moral Saviour of those who enter into the right religious adjustment. This proposition, as stated, is a proposition of theology, not of the psychology of religion, and it is a scientifically verified proposition, since what we mean by the religious Object, or God, is just that dependable Factor which responds to the right religious adjustment and delivers from moral evil those who maintain that religious relation. If this were all we knew about God, it would be enough to vindicate the claim that we can have a scientific theology.

But a wider content can be given to our theological theory by following as a general principle the religious postulate that the God that man needs exists. This postulate can be taken as a very general working hypothesis, from which more specific working hypotheses may be deduced. This whole body of theory will be scientific in the sense that it is being scientifically tested, and, we may believe, progressively verified; but it would perhaps be too much to claim that its entire content is fully proved.

It is at this point especially that the objection that theology is not science, but philosophy, gains greatest weight. There are some values which, if critically established as absolutely valid, can be made the basis of inferences concerning the nature of reality. Thus from the evaluation of our moral

consciousness of responsibility as valid, we can infer a really creative, even if limited, human freedom. And from the evaluation of experimental religion at its best as valid, we can infer that the God that man needs exists. Back of these inferences there is a fundamental moral optimism, to be sure, but that attitude itself can be evaluated as valid, from which evaluation can be inferred the proposition that the universe is such that moral optimism is true. Here we find the metaphysics which is logically deduced from a critical philosophy of values making an important contribution to our theological theory. When so derived this particular content of our theory is not science, but philosophy. It thus appears that those who object that theology is philosophy, not science, are correct in what they affirm but wrong in what they deny. We have already seen that empirical theology can be to some extent thoroughly scientific. Theology, then, when constructed aright, is science, at least in part, and it is also philosophy.

Before going further into the mutual relations of theology and philosophy, we must notice a third procedure which may be followed in making the transition from the data and laws of empirical theology to theological theory. The theologian may take into his theological theory in a tentative

way the subjective certitudes of vital and more or less mystical religion, with a view to subjecting them to scientific tests in practical life in general and the practical phases of religion in particular. These subjective certitudes may have been originally the theologian's own, or they may have come from others; they may be of contemporary origin, or they may have come from some historic source, perchance from some outstanding historic religious leader; they may have been selected deliberately from the storehouse of the past, or they may be simply a part of a traditional system of belief accepted originally in implicit faith in some external authority. But however they may have entered into one's theological theory, they are held consistently with the ideal of a scientific theology if they are held subject to progressive verification or refutation by having their logical consequences examined in the light of the facts of experience.

We have seen, then, that in a theology constructed according to the principles of Critical Common Sense, there is room for deduction, for evaluation, and for induction. "Science is a knowledge of what always happens on certain conditions," and judged by this standard our empirical theology includes a demonstrably scientific element. But whether we *call* theology science or

philosophy matters little. What is especially important in this age of science is that we utilize to the full the opportunities which experimental religion offers for scientific theological induction.

CHAPTER XIII

REALITY

If, as appears from what has been said, religious knowledge is possible and to some extent actual, it would seem that an inductive theology supplemented by inferences drawn from critically examined values ought to be in a position to meet the generally recognized sciences on something like equal terms. Both have an intellectually respectable basis. The sciences, it is true, have a larger content of verified knowledge. But theology, while its progress as science may have been slower, is more comprehensive in its outlook and deals with more deeply significant matters. Moreover, philosophy, with the aid of the contribution made by empirical theology, is able to do for the sciences what they seem unable to do for themselves, namely, give a reasonable spiritual interpretation of their results.

The meeting place of science and theology is metaphysics, the philosophy of reality. Aiming to be a comprehensive and self-consistent theory of reality, metaphysics has not infrequently sought to reach its goal by the "high and dry" *a priori* road of pure speculation, without turning aside to make a scientific survey of the facts. As might

have been anticipated, failure has been the result. Rationalistic speculation, whether it uses the method of deduction from self-evident truths or that of the dialectical synthesis of opposing theories, cannot be expected to lead, without fallacy somewhere, to very significant results. (The function of deduction in metaphysics, as in the sciences, is to bring out the meaning of hypotheses; it cannot by itself verify any judgment as true of reality.) It exhibits rational possibility, not actuality. As for the dialectical method in its extreme form, it may be said to reach results that would be very significant, indeed, if they were known to be true; but they can never be shown to be true by the dialectical method, which undertakes to discover what would be true from a supposedly higher point of view, if certain mutually contradictory propositions are both taken as essentially true. Common-sense logic, on the other hand, rests upon the axiomatic truth that propositions which contradict each other cannot both be accepted; one must be false and the other true. Critical common sense in metaphysics first eliminates contradiction and then effects its synthesis. It bids the sciences first be reconciled to their brother sciences, and then to come and offer their gifts. The dialectical method in metaphysics is too uncritical of the materials which go to make up its final structure. For example, almost invariably those who em-

ploy the dialectical method, instead of recognizing the fallacy of subjective idealism and eliminating it as an unjustified dogma, blandly accept it as all true as far as it goes. They regard it as inadequate, of course; it needs to be supplemented, and so they combine it with its contradictory, natural realism, the result being that their philosophical system is vitiated from the beginning. It is no wonder, then, that philosophers who make use of this method have nothing good to say of common sense.

When scientific students of nature venture to philosophize they use a very different metaphysical method. It seems to them that the obvious way to learn the truth about reality is to combine the results of the various sciences, each of which has investigated some aspect or department of reality. In principle they are doubtless right; their method is that of critical common sense, and their results are reasonably certain so long as they confine themselves to the positive results of the sciences. But science itself is as yet very incomplete, and most of the special sciences that have been developed deal with physical aspects of reality. The result is that any metaphysical theory built exclusively on the sciences already developed is likely to give undue prominence to the physical as against the spiritual. Materialistic naturalism is a typical product of this method.

What is needed in metaphysics is the application of critical common sense to the question how a synthesis of the recognized sciences may best be supplemented with the means at our disposal. We would suggest that the general results of the sciences be combined with the metaphysical inferences which can be drawn from an adequately critical philosophy of values. If there is included in the final synthesis a theology that has been made as scientific as possible and has itself been supplemented by a similar critical philosophy of values, that will be better still. It is true that the resultant system of metaphysics will be partly scientific knowledge and partly a critically examined and reasonable faith, but this may very well be the best that any one is in a position to offer. It is also true that the method suggested and the resultant theory of reality are both expressions of an underlying moral optimism; but that fundamental attitude has been examined and found entirely worthy. The saying is probably more than half true, that the kind of philosophy a man has depends upon the kind of man he is. In any case, a philosophy of reality which expresses not only intellectual honesty in accepting established scientific results but also the healthy-minded ethical attitude of moral optimism, is not likely to be a philosophy of which one should be ashamed.

In this synthesis of the empirical sciences (theology included) with the metaphysical implications of absolutely valid values, we may expect to find the solution of the problem of the mutual relations of theology and philosophy. In the Middle Ages there was harmony between these intellectual disciplines, for the reason that philosophy was the bond slave of theology. Finally philosophy revolted and won her war of independence. The result was that for some time now there has been a good deal of mutual suspicion and hostility between the two. This was inevitable so long as the method of theology was a dogmatic traditionalism and the method of philosophy a dogmatic rationalism. But when theology itself becomes scientific, with contributions to its theory from critical evaluation recognized as such, and when philosophy in its metaphysical aspect becomes a synthesis of all the empirical sciences, with such supplementation as can come from a critical philosophy of values, then it will be time for the old controversy to cease and for peace and harmony to prevail. A scientific theology will furnish additional hypotheses for metaphysics to consider. It will also provide progressive verification in religious experience for hypotheses which remain mere speculations for non-religious metaphysics. But the service will be mutual. A metaphysical synthesis of the type we have suggested

would enrich the content of theology with the contribution of the sciences, and by finding a place for the essentials of theology along with the results of science in a harmonious theory of reality, it would have the effect of making religious assurance doubly sure.

There is one phase of this general topic of the mutual relations of metaphysics and theology which is of special interest in connection with our investigation of the reasonableness of Christianity. If it is true that an essentially Christian empirical theology, such as has been under discussion, can be given a place in a system of metaphysics constructed according to the most approved common-sense method, this final exhibition of the fact that Christian faith is theoretically permissible, added to arguments already presented, will be sufficient to vindicate completely the reasonableness of essential Christianity. But if in addition to this it can be shown that the metaphysics of critical common sense needs just such a service as a critically scientific and essentially Christian theology can render; if, in other words, the theology referred to can enrich the doctrinal content of empirical metaphysics where it most needs to be supplemented, and can add to its certainty by furnishing progressive verification of some of its most important theories in practical religious experience, the argument for the reasonableness of

Christianity will be more than sufficient. With these indications of our guiding interest, let us face the principal metaphysical problems.

The older metaphysics divided its problems into a general part, ontology (philosophy of being in general), and three special parts, cosmology (philosophy of the objective world, or nature), psychology (philosophy of the subject, or self), and theology (philosophy of the Absolute as the union of the self and the world; philosophy of God). But nowadays philosophers are engaged upon more specific problems. The result is that there is now no one recognized complete list of metaphysical problems. But in the following list will be found most of the pressing metaphysical questions of the day: (1) Substance and activity; (2) mind and matter; (3) determinism and freedom; (4) body and mind; (5) creation and evolution; (6) mechanism and teleology; (7) nature and the supernatural; (8) law and chance; (9) the one and the many; (10) the absolute and the relative; (11) the finite and the infinite; (12) good and evil. The attempt to view these problems as subdivisions of the three special parts of metaphysics according to the older classification is not particularly fruitful; a good many of the newer problems would have to be placed in more than one of the older subdivisions. Neither is it easy to arrange the problems in the order in which they ought to

be taken up; in many instances full consideration of a question presupposes the discussion of one of the other problems, which in turn in some other respect presupposes consideration of the first. We shall deal with the problems in the order in which they appear in the above list, as probably, on the whole, the most convenient for our present purpose. Our treatment of each topic will necessarily be extremely brief.

The problem of substance and activity need not detain us long. Which is the more ultimate category, substance or activity? Is activity to be explained in terms of substance, or substance in terms of activity? Or are these ultimately and irreducibly two? In view of scientists' interpretation of matter in terms of energy and psychologists' emphasis upon instinct, impulse, wish, behavior, and attention, the tendency at present seems to be to favor activism as opposed to substantism. As a tendency this seems reasonable enough, but Bergson's conception of change without things that change, of activities without anything that acts, seems to do violence to common sense. We need both categories. There is more in ourselves at any moment than our activities at that moment. And yet, on the other hand, we show what we are by what we do. A moderate, not too one-sided activism seems to have strong claims to truth.

We are interested at present in the discussion of substantism and activism chiefly as preliminary to several later questions, including the problem of mind and matter. Is reality all of the material type, whether extended static physical substance or physical energy? Is consciousness a fine and mobile material substance, a secretion of the brain, or a mode of motion of brain-particles, or the behavior of the physical organism? Each of these materialistic views has had its advocates. Or is all reality ultimately immaterial? Is spirit, whether one or many, the only absolutely real being, physical objects being no more then dependent contents of consciousness? Or are both mind and matter ultimately forms of manifestation of the Idea, this alone being the ultimate reality? Or is the ultimate reality all psychical, but not necessarily all personal or all idea? Or, in distinction from all materialism and these types of immaterialism (spiritualism or personalism, metaphysical idealism and panpsychism), are mind and matter ultimately and irreducibly two?

The dualistic doctrine seems much more tenable from the point of view of common sense than either of the rather fantastic extremes of materialism and immaterialism. Materialism is the product of defective analysis and is generally due to confining research to phenomena of the material type. Witness, for instance, the energism of Ost-

wald, the physical chemist, and the behaviorism of Watson, the animal psychologist. But, as Höffding points out, the materialist is not the only one who has committed the mistake of taking one element in experience, or a one-sided aspect of reality, as a fair sample of the whole. Immaterialists have done essentially the same thing, only they represent the opposite one-sidedness. But in idealistic theories the faulty analysis of experienced reality is commonly supported by definite arguments, deductive or dialectical. These arguments, however, as we have seen in our discussion of epistemology, seem fated to be at best inconclusive, and generally fallacious.

But while dualism seems more in accord with critical common sense than either of the fantastic extremes of materialism and immaterialism, the question may be asked whether dualism itself is not also an extreme doctrine. Does it not exaggerate the contrast between mind and matter, especially when it says, as it sometimes does, that the two have no characteristics in common? Although matter may not be reducible to mind nor mind to matter, may not both be reduced to a common denominator? Particularly in view of the considerations which favor a moderate activism, may it not be maintained that the material and the mental are both activities—although differing activities—of some reality or realities? Or

perhaps we should say, activities and their products.

In his discussion of the question of determinism or freedom William James classifies the representatives of the former alternative as "hard" and "soft" determinists. Hard determinists, who are commonly materialists, explicitly deny human free agency, while soft determinists, who are often idealists, affirm responsible freedom on man's part but define the term in such a way as to make man in no real sense the creative cause of his own conduct, even within the narrowest limits. A typical soft determinist is T. H. Green, who calls his doctrine self-determinism. Opposing Spencer's doctrine that the strongest desire, itself predetermined, necessarily determines the action, Green maintains that the thinking subject can intervene in the life of desire and thus reinforce a desire which, without this action of the thinking self, would not be the strongest, in this way making it the motive which determines the action. This looks like a doctrine of real freedom, until one asks about this activity of the thinking self, when it appears that this is itself completely determined by the previously determined character of the self; self-determinism becomes simply a camouflaged determinism. Idealistic forms of determinism are generally accepted as part of an idealistic doctrine, arrived at by means of some

more than dubious argument, such as the dialectical "higher synthesis" of mechanistic realism and subjective idealism—both of them indefensible dogmas. Materialistic and other forms of hard determinism are generally defended in the name of science; the fact that science makes progress by tracing out deterministic relationships, or laws, is made an excuse for the quite unnecessary and forever unprovable dogma that all relationships are completely deterministic.

At the opposite extreme from absolute or total determinism lies—in theory at least—an absolute or total indeterminism, the "causelessness" which defenders of determinism criticise. But it may be doubted whether such a doctrine really exists, except as a man of straw set up to give an easy victory to the predeterminist. The freedom that is defended by the discerning is a freedom within extremely narrow limits. But, as we have seen in our chapter on freedom, the argument of which it is not necessary to repeat, some measure of creative self-determination is logically involved in the validity of the moral consciousness of responsibility. At the same time the conviction of freedom conflicts with no known fact or rational principle. It is theoretically permissible and morally certain.

Closely related to the problems already discussed is the problem of body and mind, or brain

and consciousness. Do body and mind interact? Extreme materialism disposes of the problem by denying that mind as an immaterial reality exists; from this point of view all causal activity is within the physical. A less extreme materialism—epiphenomenalism—recognizes consciousness as an absolutely inert by-product of brain events; here, too, all causation is physical. On the other hand, extreme immaterialism reduces the physical to a mere inert content of consciousness. From this point of view, not only are the seeming effects of consciousness in the body due to mind; brain and body and the whole physical universe are effects and contents of mind; there is no physical causation. The dualistic theory with reference to this problem is to the effect that the two series, the bodily and the mental, run along side by side, but never interact; bodily events are due exclusively to physical causes, and conscious events to mental causes. In distinction from this doctrine of parallelism, as well as from the two one-sided views, materialism and immaterialism, common sense maintains that in sensation the physical affects the mental, and that in volition and similar states the mental affects the physical.

The validity of this common-sense doctrine of interaction is involved in our answers to the problem of mind and matter and the problem of determinism and freedom. Idealism has been ex-

cluded as artificial, unnecessary, and fallacious; neither on grounds of analysis nor by means of argument, deductive or dialectical, can the idealistic dogma be made reasonable. It cannot successfully carry its legitimate burden of proof. Bodies have not been shown to be composed of ideas. The physical is not to be reduced to the mental. This eliminates the one-sided idealistic contribution to the solution of the body-mind problem. But, assuming the reality of the physical as irreducibly different from the mental, we find in the freedom of the human will, already established as theoretically reasonable and morally certain, a convincing argument for interactionism as opposed both to parallelism and to materialism in all its forms. If man is a free agent, responsible to any extent for his conduct, his consciousness is a causal factor in his bodily behavior. Incidentally, this activistic view of mind is distinctly favorable to the belief in immortality.

Assuming, then, the reality of the physical and recognizing the action of mind upon body as morally certain, we find no valid consideration against the complementary conception of the causal relation of bodily processes to mental events, particularly in sensation. Lotze's objection to interaction as inconceivable is obviously urged in order to find a basis for the doctrine of the unity of the World-Ground, and, anyway, it

does not harmonize any too well with his own teaching that it is the business of philosophy to ask what the nature of reality is, not why reality should be what it is. There may be mystery in interaction, but it is perhaps no greater than the mystery of any kind of action. All ultimate facts and relationships are mysterious. Besides, assuming a more or less activistic view of reality, interaction is what we should expect.

We turn next to the problem of origins. Have things in general and the various species of living beings in particular originated by creative activity or by natural evolution? Or are some origins creative but not evolutionary, and others evolutionary but not creative? Or may a process be both creative and evolutionary, and all emergence of the specifically new the product of creative evolution? This notion of creative evolution involves the theory of vitalism, and since this theory has important bearings for several of our problems, it may be well to deal with it in the present connection.

According to vitalism, there is a supermechanical but seemingly unconscious factor determining, within limits set by all mechanical factors, the course of evolution, the development of the individual organism, and the exercise of organic functions. Some vitalists are of the opinion that this vitalistic factor is itself predetermined, though

not mechanically; but this is not the view of Bergson, who thinks of the course of life as being to some extent determined at the time by a factor that is not itself completely predetermined. It is sometimes asserted that vitalism can be proved from an examination of certain biological phenomena, but this is probably too much to claim. But while science may not be able to demonstrate the truth of vitalism, it is equally true that it is not in a position to disprove it. Moreover, strictly scientific method does not need to postulate an absolutely all-embracing mechanism, even when its objective is the discovery of new mechanical factors. It will always be enough to postulate, as sufficient to prompt further research, the view that probably there are still undiscovered mechanical factors.

In metaphysics a good case can be made out for the reasonableness of taking vitalism as very possibly true, or even as probable. In human free action, as we have seen, the conduct is to some extent creatively determined at the time. This corresponds, in the conscious realm, to the vitalistic principle in the biological realm, so that we may extend the application of the term "vitalism" to include this unpredetermined but determining factor in human conduct, belief in which has already been established as morally certain and theoretically reasonable. But on the theory of

evolutionary descent—and this is the guiding idea of all modern biology—it seems not unreasonable to believe that a necessary precondition of the appearance of creatively free personalities in the stream of evolution was the presence of a more rudimentary creative freedom in forms of life from which the human species has descended. There seems good reason, then, to regard the theory of creative evolution as quite probably true; and, in view of the firm basis on which the idea of evolution now rests, it seems clear that the theological idea of creation must, if it is to be reasonable, be stated in terms of creative evolution.

Closely connected with the question just considered is the problem of purpose in the universe, the problem of mechanism and teleology. Extreme mechanism maintains that all processes taking place in the physical world are purely mechanical movements, or mechanical and chemical, since the latter cannot be reduced to the mechanical model. The mechanistic theory is generally materialistic, and materialism we have found to be the result of an incomplete analysis of what is given in experience. Moreover, as we have repeatedly pointed out, the mechanistic theory is a scientifically unnecessary and unprovable metaphysical dogma of some scientists. In so far as remainderless mechanism in the phenomenal

realm is inferred from a deterministic idealism, it is to be met by referring to the already exposed, insecure, and fallacious basis underlying all such idealism.

Extreme finalism in its theistic form agrees with extreme mechanism in holding that all that happens is completely predetermined, but with this difference, that it regards purpose as the all-determining factor. Any such view would make responsible human freedom impossible; but of such freedom we are morally certain, so that, in this form at least, extreme finalism is a discredited dogma. In its humanistic form extreme finalism seems to regard all that enters into any experience as made to be what it is by the purposes of the individual or group having the experience. This is manifestly an extreme exaggeration of the truth that to some extent reality is plastic to human purposes. Furthermore, extreme humanistic finalism presupposes subjective idealism and is thereby discredited.

As a matter of fact the world, as we have found it, seems to include some processes (in the inorganic world, for example) which are purely mechanical and chemical, others which are undoubtedly creatively determined by the human will, and still others, intermediate between these two, which are quite possibly or even probably to some extent being creatively determined at the time by

a super-mechanical but apparently unconscious vitalistic factor. In such a world how can a purpose or purposes, such as religion commonly attributes to God, be in process of being worked out? The answer to this question has been sufficiently indicated for our present purposes in our discussion of providence and the problem of evil. There it was shown that the world as we know it can be reasonably interpreted as the sphere of a divine purpose and adequate providential control.

We are now ready to take up the problem of nature and the supernatural, the most important aspect of which is perhaps the problem of miracle. With reference to this question there are two principal mutually antagonistic views, naturalism and dualistic supernaturalism. In its more extreme form naturalism is deterministic and mechanistic, and generally also materialistic. But whether it be materialistic or idealistic, it has virtually been excluded from reasonable belief by considerations advanced in earlier parts of our discussion against all four of the doctrines involved: determinism, mechanism, materialism, and idealism.

There is, however, a more moderate naturalism which confines itself to a denial of miracles and all supernatural revelation, in the sense of divine intervention in the world of nature and human experience. In taking up this question we shall

first inquire as to the value of the rationalistic approach, and then try out a non-rationalistic approach along three different but not necessarily conflicting lines.

According to rationalistic philosophy, the real is knowable in terms of the rational forms of thought, and so must be in its own constitution completely rational. The laws of nature, a knowledge of which enables us to go beyond actual experience in the description of reality, are interpreted as evidence of the rationality of the real. The conclusion is then drawn that, since the real must be perfectly rational, the reign of law must be universal; there can be no element in nature or in spirit that is not an expression of law. It has even been maintained that, as the rational is essentially deducible by pure thought, there is nothing in reality that is not necessarily involved in pure reason, so that if only we were rational enough, everything would be knowable apart altogether from experience. Of course, from this point of view it is settled *a priori* that there can be no miracles. At the very least, miracles are to be defined as events not deducible by pure reason, but the ordinary idea of miracle goes even further than this, and includes the notion of a law-transcending process. This would involve, if not the violation or suspension of the laws of nature, at any rate the counteracting of the effects of

natural law by the introduction of a superior contrary force.

Now it may eventually be necessary to admit that miracles in this latter sense do not happen; but, if so, it will never be because rationalism has proved their impossibility. Rationalism in the form in which it would deny miracles *a priori* is itself an unproved and unprovable dogma. Some knowledge may be possible, but that does not mean that all reality is knowable *a priori* or that rational form exhausts the nature of reality. There is always some difference between what we know and what we know with. There may be more in the subject matter than is contained in the rational idea which constitutes the predicate. Rationalistic as Professor Royce was, and certainly not a defender of miracle-faith, he nevertheless found it necessary to admit the existence of what he called a "capricious element of irrationality." Anyway, it is the business of philosophy, as it is of science, to find out through investigation what the nature of the world is, not to assert without examining the facts what it must be. The rationalistic solution of the problem of miracle is altogether too easy; if we want to discover and not simply to assume the answer to our question, we must try some other approach.

Let us now try the scientific approach, as this is interpreted in the critical philosophy. From

this point of view, even if a *bona fide* miracle were to happen, it could never be known scientifically to be a miracle. We know events in so far as we are able to fit them into the rational order characteristic of the constructive activity of the human understanding, with its categories of unity, cause and effect, and the rest. Until the law is discovered, the event is not scientifically known.

Just here there is need of a further distinction. In dealing with alleged facts which seem inexplicable in terms of known laws, there is much need of what may be termed an open-minded scepticism, an attitude which keeps on investigating but recognizes the constant danger of errors of observation. But it may come to be disingenuous to refuse to admit the fact for no other reason than that it has not been possible to formulate the law. And yet when finally the law is discovered, the fact may be so much better known that the former admission of fact will be seen to be only partially true. The wise investigator may be sceptical, but he will not be dogmatic. If we would steer a reasonable middle course between opposite dangers in experimental investigation—the danger of losing the truth through over-credulity and the danger of losing it through over-scepticism—let us first try to explain the alleged fact in terms of known laws of nature and mind, or explain the story of the event in terms of known laws of mind.

If this is not reasonably possible, let us look for new laws, stating definite conditions under which the phenomenon will always happen. But if this is not possible and yet the alleged fact is strongly supported by unimpeachable testimony or by the evidence of the senses, let the scientist recognize that there may be some questions which he cannot answer, but which science will eventually answer; and, furthermore, that there are some other questions which, if answered at all, must be answered not by science but by philosophy. To philosophy, not to science, belongs the question whether every real event is such that if it were fully understood it would be seen to be completely explicable in terms of general laws. In other words, empirical science as such cannot settle such questions as whether miracles can happen, or whether there can be even such an event as a creatively free human act, in the sense in which we have affirmed it as morally certain. These are questions of philosophy.

This leads us to turn from the scientific to the practical approach to this question of miracle. As we have seen, an event of the kind that rationalism would rule out as impossible may nevertheless be a fact. Any creatively free human act is such an event. We can be quite certain that such an event is a fact, although science must leave forever unanswered the question as to whether

such an event is even possible—must leave it unanswered, because by scientific methods unanswerable. Without scientific verification of the belief and despite the opposition of rationalism, we can know our creative moral freedom to be a fact as certainly as we know that our consciousness of moral responsibility is valid. Here, then, in man's limited but certainly real creative freedom we have a fact which is not completely explicable in terms of general law. If we mean by the natural that which, if fully understood, would be found completely explained in terms of general law, then man's creative activity is, as Bushnell maintained, supernatural. It is the human supernatural.

We seem to have admitted the nose of the supernaturalistic camel into the naturalistic tent. How much farther will it go? Is human freedom the only freedom in the universe? If vitalism is true, as has seemed possible, the vitalistic factor could only be excluded from the category of the supernatural by a different definition of the natural from that suggested in the preceding paragraph. Probably the most serviceable use of language would require us to modify the definition so as to include the vitalistic principle, at least below the human, in the category of the natural. Still, if that were done, the justice of calling man's free activity supernatural would become more questionable.

But the question of chief interest in the present connection is whether our moral certainty of the human supernatural does not logically require us to adopt a hospitable attitude toward the idea of the divine supernatural and toward the idea of miracle in the sense of divine activity which is not completely explicable, even theoretically, in terms of general law. It must be admitted that there is much in the metaphysical views already indicated to suggest a hospitable attitude toward this suggestion. Not only the limited indeterminism we have affirmed, but the activism, interactionism, vitalism, and creative evolutionism we have favored more or less decisively would seem to call for a receptive attitude toward the idea of a divine supernatural activity, if not, indeed, also toward the idea of miracle as ordinarily understood.

If we are to go any further with the attempt to solve this problem of miracle and the supernatural, we must adopt the definitely religious approach. Rationalistic philosophy presumes to settle the question by arbitrarily begging the question for the negative; science, aware of its limits, has to give the problem up as insoluble; the practical approach can give us certainty only of the human supernatural, the creative freedom of man, whatever it may suggest further as to a superhuman supernatural. What more can religion do? There is this at least to be said, that the question

is a religious question, and it may well be true that the answer must come from religion.

We have seen that the reasonable religion involved in moral optimism has the right to expect revelation of the Divine, at least when man approaches God in the right spirit and maintains the right adjustment. This means that reasonable religion has the same right to expect supernatural action on God's part, *if there can be no adequate revelation without it.* There must be miracle enough for adequate revelation. But if there can be a dependable response to the right religious adjustment experienced in the life of the human spirit adequately preparing man to face with spiritual triumph whatever he may be called upon to face, may not this be adequate revelation, without any intervention to suspend or counteract the laws of external nature? It does not appear that there is any imperative religious need of miraculous intervention in external nature. There must be adequate revelation, and there must be enough divine supernatural activity for that revelation, but there need be no more than just enough for that.

Indeed, it is a fair question whether this revelation in the form of the dependable response of a Saving Factor to man's religious faith and adjustment really involves a *supernatural* divine activity at all. If the divine response to the right religious adjustment is to be absolutely dependable, as it

must be for the meeting of human need, does this involve any divine action that would not be completely statable in terms of general law? Perhaps not, so far as we know; and yet perhaps there is such creatively free activity on God's part, for all we know. We may think of God as creatively choosing between genuinely possible alternatives neither of which would be morally wrong. There is nothing in this concept of a supernaturally and creatively free God that is repugnant to reasonable religion, provided always that God be thought of as good enough, as well as great enough, to respond in an absolutely dependable and adequate way to the right religious adjustment. Even man may have a dependably good character without any loss of genuinely creative freedom.

The one limitation we have the right to postulate imperatively on the basis of moral optimism is that there shall be nothing arbitrary or capricious in the free supernatural activity of God. But there is good reason to maintain that direct intervention to suspend or counteract the laws of external nature would be an arbitrary and capricious act. As was urged in our discussion of the problem of evil, if God is to intervene in this way to destroy human evil, he must, in fairness to all, intervene in every instance of similar need; and if he were to intervene as often as this would call for, what would become of the dependable natural

order which is so essential for man's intellectual and moral development? In short, there is no solution of the problem of evil if we admit direct miraculous intervention in external nature.

Thus religion, not science, and much less rationalistic speculation, has the last word to say about miracles. There must be and there is miracle enough for adequate revelation, but not miracle enough to defeat the attempt of faith to solve the problem of evil. Just what events this will call for, the race must learn through experience. Just how miraculous or supernatural these events will have to be, we may not be in a position to know with absolute certainty.

After this prolonged discussion of nature and the supernatural, we may dismiss, as already virtually answered about as far as we can answer it, the problem of law and chance. Both extremes with reference to this problem have been excluded. Reality, it has been maintained, includes events not completely explicable in terms of general law, events not wholly predetermined but to some extent being creatively determined at the time. And yet, the reign of law is adequate for man's imperative need of a dependable world from which to learn and a dependable God on whom to rely.

When we take up the problem of the One and

the many, of singularism and pluralism, we are dealing with one of the most religious of metaphysical problems. Here, consequently, philosophy may reasonably look to religion for appreciable contributions, and while the contribution made depends upon the kind of religion appealed to, there are achievements of practical experimental religion at its best that have the very greatest significance for the solution of this age-old problem.

Reality is presumably one, in some sense of the word. It is a totality at least. But it is also very evidently many. Is the unity of reality more fundamental than the plurality, or the plurality than the unity? Or are both aspects equally fundamental? It would seem as though, here at least, truth must lie between the two extremes. But some very extreme views have had defenders.

Among the most extreme of the singularists have been some of the mystics. This is easily understood. The mystic state, as we have seen, is one of rapt contemplation of the one and only God, and since in this extreme concentration of attention everything but the divine object lapses from consciousness, the suggestion comes, with an irresistible feeling of its being infallible revelation, that this Object is not only the one and only God but the one and only Reality. But this mystical

singularism, or "theopantism,"* cannot be submitted to the test of practical life in the workaday world without being discredited—at least in its more negative aspects. We do not say that practice refutes the reality of the God whom the mystic contemplates, but we do say that practice refutes the correctness of the extreme mystic's interpretation of his God when he thinks of him as the one and only Reality. Mystical singularism is sometimes supported by absolute idealism, and absolute idealism by mystical singularism, as is seen at its best in the philosophy of W. E. Hocking; but the mere fact that there is a large measure of agreement between the mystical doctrine and the philosophy seems no sufficient reason for accepting either, especially when we remember that the philosophy is a combination of fallacious conclusions, and the mystical doctrine, especially in its negative aspects, including its subjectivist interpretation of the physical world, is the result of religious self-hypnosis. Moreover, as absolute idealism in its two typical forms, the Roycean and the Bradleian, we have already found singularistic idealism, apart from the mystic's "theopantism," to be self-refuting.

But not only are the arguments for extreme sin-

* Professor Otto suggests that this term be used for the doctrine that God is all, as distinguished from pantheism, the doctrine that all is God.

gularism unconvincing. There are some weighty considerations of a positive sort to be urged against that system of thought. Chief among these are the fact of the individual man's creative free agency and the fact of evil, especially moral evil, which the conscience that has not been tampered with and spoiled—"through philosophy and vain deceit!"—refuses to explain away. Reality may well be one totality in which human free wills and moral evil exist as absolutely real elements; but reality cannot be a unified Being in which the individual free agent and moral evil are obliterated. If extreme singularism is true, either I am unreal or I am the Absolute, both of which alternatives are absurd.

But the most extreme forms of pluralism are likewise unacceptable. The notion of a pluralism so absolute that the many are not related to each other in any way, even negatively, is easily seen to be self-refuting; but it is doubtful if this doctrine has been seriously held by any one. Even the doctrine of absolutely non-interacting monads is fantastically artificial and antagonistic to common sense. Moreover, all the weight of our moral consciousness of responsibility for the welfare of others is against this extreme view, as is also our experimental religion with its adjustment to God and seeking of revelation from him.

The fact is that the essential Christianity which

has been outlined and defended as reasonable contains a number of valuable corrections of extreme pluralism and suggestions toward a solution of this important problem. If God is accessible to man whenever man turns to God in the right spiritual attitude; if God reveals himself to man as an uplifting spiritual power in man's life on religious conditions; if God will deliver man's personality and values from destruction at bodily death; if God was in Christ and is in the Christ-like, realizing his purposes in and through human agency; if God exercises a providential control over the world and man that is adequate for all human religious needs, then extreme pluralism is no more tenable than the opposite extreme. Moreover we have here the outlines of a theory of the one and the many that has all the prestige of the support of morality and religion at their best, and that in the spirit of critical common sense keeps close to the concrete realities of experience.

The general view suggested is that of a quasi-organic unity. The physical universe may be thought of as the physical body of God, made up of God's active and potential energy undergoing transformations under the unifying control and guidance of the Divine Will, and giving rise by creative evolution and development to a plurality of partially independent but largely dependent

beings, analogous in some respects to organs within an organism. The immanence of the divine Life and Spirit within the subordinate units is of varying degrees, and may be increased by prayer, that is, by spiritual aspiration and by the right religious adjustment; it is this increased immanence of the Spirit of God that is the true answer to prayer. The process is comparable to the way in which in our own lives the conscious will may participate in the more habitual and relatively automatic activities of the body—in the act of breathing, for instance—as there may be the need and demand for such participation. In such ways as these essential Christianity can answer the questions raised and not satisfactorily answered by metaphysics. In this way not only does theology render a much-needed service to philosophy; incidentally there is added further confirmation to the already adequate argument for the reasonableness of the Christian faith.

The next two problems on our list, the absolute and the relative, and the finite and the infinite, are of far-reaching significance and great interest at the present time. Their discussion is beset with great difficulty, and when any one but the expert specialist touches upon them, doubtless discretion is the better part of valor. With reference to each of them, however, one or two very general suggestions along religious lines may be ventured.

It seems a one-sided extreme to say that there is no Absolute, but that all is relative, and the same thing may be said of the view that an unconditioned Absolute alone is real. All relativity can be thought of as relative only through implied contrast with an absolute standard. Religion has its Absolute—not the idol which absolute idealists have set up in the place of God, but the real God of experimental religion, the absolutely sufficient and satisfactory Object of religious worship and dependence. Now this true Absolute of religious experience is not unrelated. An unrelated entity could not be the Absolute of religion.

Coming to the problem of the finite and the infinite, one is conscious of the ancient controversy between those who held that the universe was infinite in space and time and those who claimed that it was finite; of the Kantian cutting of the Gordian knot by reducing space and time to mere forms of subjective apprehension; of the much-advertised new definition of the infinite, for which the claim is made, whether justifiably or not, that it eliminates all self-contradiction from this notion; of the contribution offered by the savants of the day in the shape of curved space and a finite universe. One listens and is interested, but—one fears the Greeks offering gifts. If bad comes to worst, and one must choose between the alternatives of an unimaginable limit and a self-

contradictory actual infinite sum, the former seems the lesser of the two evils. Renouvier had the courage to maintain, years after Kant's *Kritik* had become common property, that the idea of a creative First Cause was true because its contradictory was the self-contradictory notion of an infinite number of past events, that is, a number so great that when increased it becomes no greater, having been as great as possible already. If in the spirit of Spencer the question be raised as to whether the First Cause is to be thought of as uncaused and eternal, or self-caused, or caused by another, it can always be pointed out that even man, with his real though limited freedom, is to some extent a creative first cause and at the same time and to the same extent uncaused by any other; within limits, he is self-caused. What man is in slight degree the immanent Spirit and Will of the universe may well be in sufficient degree to involve the ultimate dependence of both the world and man upon that same Being, as the cosmic creative First Cause.

One more suggestion may be mentioned. There may be self-contradiction in the notion of an actual quantitative infinite, but there is no contradiction in the notion of infinite potentiality, for at any time the total product of infinite potentiality is a finite actual sum. And it is this concept of infinite potentiality rather than any actual

quantitative infinity that practical common-sense religion is interested in ascribing to God.

Thus, so far from the difficulties of these two problems, that of the absolute and the relative and that of the finite and the infinite, being peculiar to their relation to religious concepts, the truth is that the difficulties exist quite independently of the religious views here defended. Indeed, it would seem that the difficulties are rendered less acute, if anything, by being brought into connection with certain fundamental concepts of religion.

We come at last to the final problem of the philosophy of reality, the problem of the value of reality, the problem of good and evil, or of optimism and pessimism. But on this topic there is no need to repeat what was said in our discussion of the problem of evil and especially in the beginning of our apologetic for the reasonableness of Christianity, when we defined moral optimism and defended it against non-moral optimism, pessimism, and mere meliorism. With this final return to our starting point we seem to have traversed the field of thought which we undertook to survey, and to have given some attention to practically all the principal points of interest. Unfortunately, but almost unavoidably in view of the multiplicity of things to be considered, the attention we have been able to give to many in-

teresting matters has been much less than by their importance they have merited.

In this concluding word we would call attention once again to the fact that in the earlier chapters of our discussion a complete argument was offered for the reasonableness of essential Christianity, identified with the religion of moral optimism, without any appeal to particular facts of history and without consideration of technical philosophical problems. Thereafter it was pointed out, as a second argument, that when appeal is made to particular facts of history in connection with the founding of the Christian religion, essential Christianity in its now richer because more concrete and historical form is again found to be reasonable and therefore, it may be concluded, true. And now that technical philosophical problems have been considered, viewing the outcome of this third approach to our problem, we may venture the opinion that, in spite of the incompleteness of present answers to some metaphysical questions, the result is such as should make assurance of the reasonableness and truth of essential Christianity trebly sure.

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